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1Abstract
Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a “regulatory” or
“enabling” model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will
generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the
Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement
action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders,
directors or creditors.
When New Zealand’s company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private
enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors’
duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon
North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public
enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the
enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand’s securities law.
While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action,
the law on directors’ duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was
hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle.
This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United
Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement
role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors’ duties and shareholder
remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties
to enforce corporate rights and duties.
A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that
the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been
achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform
package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than
public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation.
Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by
shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held
companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as
securities law, where the wider public interest was affected.
Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal
a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate
2rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI
enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held
companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly
enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors’
duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as
well as securities law requirements.
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4I Introduction
A Objectives of the Research
This thesis seeks to determine the practical efficacy of, and need for, public and
private action to enforce company law in selected jurisdictions.
Specifically, it investigates enforcement action taken against company directors and
managers in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom and, in particular, the
extent to which public and private enforcers actually make use of the wide range of
enforcement mechanisms which are available to them.
A central theme of the thesis is the debate between those favouring high levels of
involvement by state agencies (the “regulatory” approach), and those who believe the
market should be left to function with a minimum of state control (the “enabling”
approach). It is often claimed that we live in an over-regulated society. Bottomley
and Parker state that most western democracies are increasingly administrative states,
“shaped by explicitly adopted policies which are incorporated in legislation and
implemented by an array of large regulatory agencies”.1
Historically, this has been particularly true of New Zealand, which until the mid
1980s was among the most highly regulated economies in the western world.2
However, with the election in 1984 of a Labour government determined to reduce its
involvement in the economy, and increasing reliance on Chicago school-type
                                                
1 Law in Context (2nd ed.), The Federation Press (1997), p358
2 “Until the mid 1980s New Zealand was … insulated by high levels of protectionism and with a
degree of state intervention and regulation unparalleled in any other developed western economy … A
further key feature of the economy was the complex regulatory structure built up over a prolonged
period. The preference for state intervention in economic activity was quite deep-rooted … The web of
controls was far-reaching and most sectors of economic activity were subject to regulatory control”:
Massey, New Zealand: Market Liberalisation in a Developed Economy, St. Martin’s Press (1995),
Preface and p26-27.
5economic philosophies,3 New Zealand soon became one of the least regulated. 4 This
extended to the regulation of companies, which has in recent times been left largely in
the hands of shareholders and other interested parties, with state enforcement playing
the role of a “backstop” in cases where the wider public interest is considered to be at
stake.5
In Australia and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, state regulatory agencies like
the ASIC and the DTI have been much more prominent in the enforcement of
corporate rights and duties, apparently as a response to high levels of corporate and
regulatory failure over the last few decades.
While it could be said that New Zealand’s company law enforcement system aims to
be “enabling” or “performance-oriented”; and that those of Australia and the United
Kingdom are towards the “regulatory” or “conformance-oriented” end of the scale,6
changes in philosophy and practice in all three countries are occurring. Both Australia
and the United Kingdom have recently begun to show signs of moving toward a more
enabling model, including a greater emphasis on private powers of enforcement.7 In
New Zealand the change of government following the 1999 general election,8 and the
                                                
3 See Bottomley and Parker, Law in Context (2nd ed.), The Federation Press (1997), p364-365 for a
description of the approach of the Chicago school.
4 See Fitzsimons, “Australia and New Zealand on Different Corporate paths” (1994) 8 Otago Law
Review 267; and Patterson, “Light-handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years On” (1998) 6
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 134, 134. Patterson notes that “over the last decade, a
policy of deregulation, corporatisation and privatisation of state trading entities has transformed New
Zealand from one of the most heavily regulated to one of the lightest regulated western economies”.
5 See The Law Commission, Report No. 9: Company Law Reform and Restatement, NZLC R9
(1989), para. 318.
6 See Francis, “The Responsibilities of Corporate Governors: Conformance or Performance?” [1995]
12 Butterworths Corporation Law Bulletin 8.
7 See, for example, the recently enacted Australian provisions on directors’ duties and shareholder
remedies, now found in Parts 2D.1 (Duties and Powers of Directors) and 2F.1A (Derivative Actions)
of the Corporations Act 2001; and the reforms proposed for the United Kingdom in the Report of the
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (2000).
8 From November 1999, New Zealand has been governed by an avowedly centre-left coalition
government, made up initially of the Labour and Alliance parties, but requiring support on confidence
and supply issues from the more economically left-wing Green and New Zealand First parties. The
6possibility of more state involvement in business matters,9 has quickly provoked
comment from business leaders and even from the courts. It has been suggested in
some quarters that New Zealand’s company law is, or is soon to be, made up of a
“choking smog of … mandatory rules … enforced by government power irrespective
of the prior consent of adult parties”.10
The thesis tests the hypothesis that patterns of corporate litigation in New Zealand,
Australia and the United Kingdom are consistent with the apparent aims of their
respective enforcement systems; namely that in New Zealand enforcement is carried
                                                                                                                                         
previous administration (the centre-right National Party) was seen as more “business-friendly”. “The
result [of the 1999 general election] is seen as an end to 15 years of hands-off economic policy …
[The new government] will govern only by maintaining Green (and occasionally New Zealand First)
support and that may be bought at a price of more left-wing policies than [Prime Minister Helen]
Clark will want”: McLay, “1999 New Zealand General Election: An Update”, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies PacNet Newsletter No. 48, 10 December 1999,
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac4899.html  . A similar situation prevails following the July 2002
election, with Labour now leading a minority coalition with the Progressive Coalition party (led by
former Alliance leader Jim Anderton), with support on confidence and supply from the United Future
party. The government has also stated its intention to maintain a “collaborative working relationship”
with the Greens: see “Statement on the Formation of the Government”, press release from the Office
of the Right Hon. Helen Clark, Prime Minister, 8 August 2002; and Morris and Geddis, “Election
2002 — Legal Issues” [2002] New Zealand Law Journal 332.
9 Signalled, perhaps, by such policies as the approval of a Takeovers Code after its sidelining for
several years and a review of New Zealand’s insider trading laws. On the issue of the Takeovers Code,
compare Russell’s comments in 1995, when the Code was first drafted (“The Takeovers Debate: The
State of Play” [1995] Company and Securities Bulletin 90) with those of the present New Zealand
Minister of Commerce, Paul Swain, reported in Howie, “Takeovers Code Unveiled”, The Dominion
(Wellington), 18 October 2000, p21. On the review of insider trading law, see Ministry of Economic
Development, Insider Trading: Discussion Document (September 2000), where the option of making
insider trading a criminal offence is raised. The Minister of Commerce seems to favour such a change,
noting that no one has been found liable under the current privately enforced law since it was adopted
in 1988: see Fallow, “Commerce Minister Tackles Insider Trading”, The New Zealand Herald
(Auckland), 28 September 2000.
10 Shirtcliffe, “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998]
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 66, 66. Shirtcliffe’s views appear to be shared by at least some
potential directors: see, for example, the recent New Zealand case of Hattie v Registrar of Companies
(2000) 8 NZCLC 262,152, 262,153, where Williams J noted the general disinclination of chartered
accountants to accept directorships of closely held companies “because of the risk of personal liability
that can arise under the current legislation”.
7out primarily by private parties, with public enforcement being limited to matters
where the public interest is affected, such as securities law; and that in Australia and
the United Kingdom public regulatory agencies play a much more prominent
enforcement role, dealing with a much wider range of issues. Suggestions are made as
to the reasons for the patterns observed. The question of whether the apparent
changes in direction referred to above have had (or are likely to have) any effect on
these patterns is also investigated.
The thesis begins with a detailed consideration of the debate on the relative merits of
public and private enforcement of company law and, in this context, an overview of
recent reform activity in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. These
reforms are analysed in terms of their stated objectives such as (in the case of private
enforcement) greater accessibility and clarity in the law, the encouragement of
efficiency and accountability on the part of company managers, and the lowering of
compliance costs; and (in the case of public enforcement, where relevant) the
maintaining or improvement of confidence in the economy and the enforcing of laws
which private parties are not in a position to enforce. The objectives of the various
potential enforcers of corporate rights and duties (shareholders, directors, creditors
and state agencies) and where they coincide and diverge are considered.
The practical effect of the reform activity is then assessed by surveys of recent
company law judgments in each jurisdiction. Despite much having been written on
the theoretical underpinnings of the private and public enforcement models,11 there
appears to have been little empirical research on this issue, and therefore little
indication of the practical effects of each model.12 Obviously, if a particular mode of
enforcement is not used in practice, there is little point in making it available,
whatever its theoretical advantages may be.13 This research will therefore be useful in
directing future policy makers towards those methods which are likely to be most
                                                
11 See Chapter III below.
12 See “Prior Empirical Studies” below.
13 A point made by Fitzsimons in relation to insider trading in New Zealand (“Enforcement of Insider
Trading Laws by Shareholders in New Zealand: An Analysis and Proposals for Reform” (1995) 3
Waikato Law Review 101); and by Ramsay on the statutory derivative action in Australia: “Corporate
Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory Derivative Action” (1992) 15
University of New South Wales Law Journal 149.
8effective in enforcing particular corporate rights and duties. It will also provide some
concrete answers to the questions of whether there are grounds for people becoming
less inclined to be involved in company management because of the perceived risks of
personal liability, and whether the expressed fears of over-regulation, with its
consequent negative effects on business confidence and growth, are justified.
B Prior Empirical Studies
Professor Ian Ramsay’s 1995 investigation into who — shareholders or state agencies
like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)14 — most often
initiates action to enforce corporate rights and duties in Australia15 provided the
initial model for an earlier work16 which, in turn, provides the basis for this thesis.
This thesis seeks to update and build upon these earlier empirical studies.
Ramsay’s study surveyed reported Australian cases for the period between
September 1989 and March 1994, and considered the relative merits of enforcement
action by shareholders and by the Australian Securities Commission (now the ASIC).
Ramsay concluded that, although a balance is required in relation to who enforces
corporate rights and duties, public bodies such as the ASIC are often in a superior
position to take enforcement action. This was reinforced by his finding that
shareholders rarely take enforcement action, in most cases leaving that role to the
ASIC. It could therefore be argued that recent and proposed reform of enforcement
                                                
14 Formerly the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), but renamed with effect from 1 July 1998:
see sec 7(2) of the now repealed Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989, as
amended by the Financial Sector (Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 1998. The ASIC
continues in existence despite the repeal of the 1989 Act by virtue of sec 261 of the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001.
15 “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian Securities
Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174.
16 Berkahn, Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand 1986-1998,
Unpublished Research Paper, School of Law, Deakin University (1999), a revised version of which
appears in Berkahn and Trotman, “Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand
1986-1998” (2000) 7 Canterbury Law Review 516.
9mechanisms in Australia (the statutory derivative action for example) will not be as
useful as they may appear.17
In contrast to both the United Kingdom and Australia, where enforcement is perhaps
the most important of the ASIC’s obligations,18 the current New Zealand company
law model relies heavily on private enforcement, almost to the exclusion of public
agencies. Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may be undertaken in some
cases by regulatory agencies including the Registrar of Companies and the New
Zealand Securities Commission, but is largely left to shareholders and other private
enforcers such as creditors and other directors. My earlier study surveyed reported
and unreported New Zealand company law cases covering the period between 1986
and 1998 and, like Ramsay, noted what types of actions were being brought, and by
whom. I found that a much higher proportion of company litigation in New Zealand
was instigated by private parties, and that therefore amendments to, for example, the
oppression remedy and derivative action would be more effective in New Zealand
than in Australia, simply because if shareholders do not take action to enforce
corporate rights and duties, it is unlikely that a state agency will, except in very
limited circumstances where there is a clear public interest in doing so. I found that
almost all public enforcement action in New Zealand between 1986 and 1998
involved the enforcement of securities legislation against widely held companies.
C Some Terminology Defined
The term “manager” is used throughout this thesis in a broad sense, including de jure
and de facto directors, “shadow” directors (that is, those in accordance with whose
directions or instructions a company’s directors are required or accustomed to act)
and others who participate in the “management” of a company, as described by
                                                
17 See Ramsay, “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian
Securities Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174,
175; and, on the disincentives faced by shareholders commencing litigation, Ramsay, “Corporate
Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory Derivative Action” (1992) 15
University of New South Wales Law Journal 149, 162-164.
18 Ramsay, “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian
Securities Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174,
176-177.
10
Ormiston J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Vic) v Bracht19 and Chisholm J
in Thompson v District Court Christchurch:20
“The concept of ‘management’ … comprehends activities which involve policy
and decision making, related to the business affairs of a corporation, affecting the
corporation as a whole or a substantial part of that corporation, to the extent that
the consequences of the formation of those policies or the making of those
decisions may have some significant bearing on the financial standing of the
corporation or the conduct of its affairs”.
The term used to describe such a person in the current Australian and United
Kingdom legislation is “officer”, defined in sec 9 of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth)21 and sec 744 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) respectively. The expanded
definition of “director” in sec 126 of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) covers the same
ground.
                                                
19 (1988) 14 ACLR 728, 733-734.
20 (2002) 9 NZCLC 262,824, 262,829.
21 In his report on the 2001 collapse of HIH Insurance Ltd, Owen J noted the significant role played
by so-called “middle management” in undesirable management practices. He also noted uncertainty as
to whether such persons could be brought to account for such practices, due to anomalies in the
current Australian legislative structure pertaining to directors’ and other officers’ duties. These
anomalies include differences in the classes of person who are subject to particular duties and
uncertainty in the relationship between similar (but distinct) definitions like “officer”, “executive
officer” and “officer of a corporation”. Owen J recommended that these definitions should be replaced
by a single definition, based on the function performed by the relevant person rather than their legal
relationship to the corporation. He also recommended that all the general duties imposed by Chapter
2D of the Corporations Act 2001 be imposed on all personnel encompassed within that new
functional definition: The Failure of HIH Royal Commission, Report of the HIH Royal Commission
(2003), Volume 1, para. 6.4-6.4.5.
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II Research Methodology
As noted above,22 the thesis includes a consideration of the “public v private” debate,
and of the recent and proposed reforms in the three jurisdictions under consideration.
With this theoretical background, the practical effect of the different approaches to
enforcement is then considered by means of surveys of recent company law
judgments in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. These surveys
compare the patterns of enforcement litigation in each jurisdiction for the period 1986
to 2002, with a view to identifying the effects of reform activity and changes in
government policy on the activity observed. Differences between enforcement
activity involving closely and widely held companies are also noted and considered.
A Data Collection
Relevant cases were identified by searching the following sources:
• For the New Zealand survey, New Zealand Company Law Cases, published by
CCH New Zealand Ltd at roughly monthly intervals and included in New
Zealand Company Law and Practice (loose-leaf and electronic).23 All relevant
cases for the years 1999 to 2002 were surveyed, and the results added to those
found for the years 1986 to 1998 in my earlier study.24
                                                
22 See “Objectives of the Research” above.
23 These reports are described by the publisher as “the authoritative company law cases report series”
in New Zealand, with “extensive” coverage of cases relating to company and securities law: CCH New
Zealand online catalogue,    http://www.cch.co.nz/catalogue/coprods/ncp.asp   .
24 Berkahn, Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand 1986-1998,
Unpublished Research Paper, School of Law, Deakin University (1999), p35-44; Berkahn and
Trotman, “Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand 1986-1998” (2000) 7
Canterbury Law Review 516, 534-538. This earlier study included both reported and unreported
judgments. For the sake of consistency across the surveys of each jurisdiction, those few unreported
cases included in the earlier study (10 cases of over 140 surveyed) were disregarded for the purposes of
this thesis.
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• For the Australian survey, the Australian Company Law Reports and
Australian Corporations and Securities Reports, published by LexisNexis
Australia at roughly monthly intervals and included in Australian Corporation
Law (loose-leaf and electronic).25 Relevant cases for the period between 1986
and 2002 were surveyed.26
• For the United Kingdom survey, Butterworths Company Law Cases, published
ten times per year by LexisNexis.27 Relevant cases were identified for the
period 1986 to 2002.
For the purposes of these surveys, cases involving “corporate rights and duties” were
defined as any cases where the actions of company directors or managers are subject
to the courts’ scrutiny. This includes actions brought against directors and managers
personally, such as breaches of directors’ duties or cases where it is sought to hold a
director personally liable in tort or otherwise; as well as cases brought against the
company, but where it is the actions of the directors, as the company’s controllers,
which are at issue, including breaches of securities legislation, and cases where a
shareholder claims that the affairs of a company have been conducted in an unfairly
prejudicial manner. In such cases it is usually the actions of the directors, as the
                                                
25 The Australian Company Law Reports were published between 1975 and 1989, and the Australian
Corporations and Securities Reports from 1989. These reports provide comprehensive coverage of
Supreme, Federal and High Court cases on company and securities law, as well as significant cases
from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and judgments of the Corporations and Securities Panel:
LexisNexis Australia online catalogue,    http://www.lexisnexis.com.au/aus/products/  .
26 Initially it was intended to only survey Australian cases for the period between April 1994 and
2002, and to add the results to those found by Ramsay for the period September 1989 to March 1994:
“Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian Securities
Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174, 180-183.
However, the lack of any information in Ramsay’s study on the size of the companies involved, and
his use of the ASC Digest (a publication detailing all proceedings initiated by the ASC for the period
under consideration) rather than reported judgments for his survey of public enforcement action, made
it preferable, for the sake of consistency across the surveys of each jurisdiction, to undertake a new
survey of Australian cases.
27 These reports include all “significant company law judgments”: LexisNexis United Kingdom
online catalogue,    http://rimer.butterworths.co.uk/webcat/enquiry   /.
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“directing mind and will of the corporation”,28 which are subject to the courts’
scrutiny. As has been noted by Gray, in the context of directors’ liability for non-
compliance with regulatory provisions, “the buck has to stop somewhere with a real
person, not just a corporate person, for sanctions ... to have any sting in their tail.”29
Those cases identified as relevant were then divided according to whether the
company involved (that is, the defendant company or company of which the
defendant was a director) was closely or widely held. The definition of “closely held”
generally used for the purposes of this survey is based on that used in the South
African Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984,30 and in the Australian Close
Corporations Act 1989 (now repealed),31 namely a company with ten or fewer
members or shareholders. An exception has been made in the few cases where a
company’s shares were wholly or substantially held by another, widely held,
company or other corporate entity. Such companies have been classified as widely
held despite having fewer than ten shareholders, on the grounds that their asset values
and turnovers are more akin to those of a widely held company. Not all cases
surveyed gave a clear indication as to which category the company involved fell into.
In those cases where a definite categorisation was not possible, a judgment was made
based on the facts given in the case report or transcript and information gleaned from
other sources such as the New Zealand Companies Office database.32
B Analysis
After relevant cases were identified, tables were constructed showing the results of
the surveys. The time period under consideration was divided into three shorter
periods as follows:
                                                
28 Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713; Meridian Global
Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7, 11.
29 “Company Law and Regulatory Complexity”, in Grantham and Rickett (Ed.), Corporate
Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p156.
30 Section 28. See Cilliers, Benade, Henning, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker and Pretorius,
Corporate Law (3rd ed.), Butterworths (2000), p596-598.
31 Former sec 60(1).
32 Available for searching at    http://www.companies.govt.nz   .
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• 1986 to 1993, which coincides with the period immediately preceding both the
coming into force of the 1993 company law reform package in New Zealand,
and the beginning of the reform process brought about by the enactment of the
Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 in Australia;33
• 1994 to 1998, the immediate post-reform period in New Zealand and Australia.
In Australia and the United Kingdom, this period also saw the formulation of
policy which has resulted in further reform in Australia (in the form of the
Corporate Law Economic Reform (or “CLERP”) Act 1999) and appears set to
do the same in the United Kingdom;34
• 1999 to 2002, the post-CLERP period in Australia and one of continuing
review and reform of company law in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
The tables divide the relevant cases from each jurisdiction, and from each time period,
according to:
• The particular causes of action which are dealt with, eg. breaches of statutory
and/or common law directors’ duties, enforcement of other statutory
provisions, actions in tort, and breaches of securities legislation;35
• The party bringing the action, whether a private party such as a shareholder,
director, creditor or the company itself; or public enforcer such as the Securities
Commission, ASIC or DTI; and
• Whether the case involves a closely or widely held company.
Conclusions were drawn based on the resulting data. It was expected that private
enforcement action (particularly by shareholders and directors) would continue to be
much more common than public enforcement action in New Zealand for the entire
period under consideration. This expectation was based on the limited evidence found
in previous studies, and the direction in which reform activity is currently headed. A
rise in public enforcement was, however, considered a possibility towards the end of
                                                
33 See p65-134 below.
34 See p134-159 below.
35 Cases where more than one cause of action was pleaded, for example applications for relief from
unfairly prejudicial conduct which also sought, as an alternative, a winding up of the company on just
and equitable grounds, have been counted under each cause of action pleaded. One case may therefore
appear on a table more than once.
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the survey period, due to policy changes in the areas of takeovers and insider trading.
It was expected that private enforcement in New Zealand would continue to apply
mainly to closely held companies, where the interests of shareholders are more
closely linked to those of the company, with public action largely remaining confined
to widely held companies whose actions are more likely to affect the public interest.
Changes in patterns of enforcement over the survey period were considered more
likely in Australia and the United Kingdom, if the role of state agencies is indeed
being scaled down and private enforcement is being encouraged and made more
readily available, as some commentators and law reform bodies appear to claim. A
trend towards greater levels of private enforcement was a possibility in both
jurisdictions, although it seemed likely that public agencies would still have a greater
share of enforcement activity than in New Zealand.
C Limitations
These surveys only reveal actions which have resulted in at least one judgment, rather
than all enforcement action commenced by the various enforcers during the period
under review.36 Thus, no account was taken of actions that were discontinued or
settled, or of administrative decisions which were not challenged. A further limitation
to this research arises from the fact that only reported judgments were included, as no
suitably comprehensive source of unreported company law judgments delivered
during the survey period appears to be available from either Australia or the United
Kingdom.
This should not affect the validity of the study. There do not appear to be any
significant differences in the proportions of company law judgments that are reported
in the three jurisdictions, despite an initial impression that there may be.37 According
                                                
36 This limitation was also noted by Ramsay, “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by
Shareholders and the Australian Securities Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23
Australian Business Law Review 174, 175.
37 Between 1986 and 2002, there were seven volumes of the New Zealand Company Law Cases and
48 volumes of the Australian Company Law Reports and Australian Corporations and Securities
Reports, but only 26 volumes of the Butterworths Company Law Cases. The average number of
companies on the register during the same period was around 181,500 in New Zealand, 898,000 in
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to the publishers of the New Zealand and Australian reports used in these surveys,
around 30% of the company law judgments received from the courts in each country
are considered worthy of reporting, due to the legal significance or public profile of
the case, or its potential usefulness to lawyers or to those involved in company
management.38 LexisNexis UK, the publisher of the reports used for the United
Kingdom surveys, was unable to provide any information on the proportion of
judgments reported in those reports, so an estimate was calculated as follows. A
search of a United Kingdom-based case law database, Casetrack,39 reveals that during
the period 1999 to 2002, a total of 1,218 company law-related judgments were
delivered by the courts of the United Kingdom. During the same period, 337 cases
were reported in the Butterworths Company Law Cases, suggesting that around 28%
of the United Kingdom’s company law judgments are reported. As the reports used
for each survey appear to represent about the same proportion of the total company
law judgments delivered by the courts in each country, no weighting has been applied
to any of the figures generated for comparative purposes.
                                                                                                                                         
Australia and 1.2 million in the United Kingdom. Australia thus has around five times as many
registered companies as New Zealand, but almost seven times as many reported company law cases;
while the United Kingdom has almost seven times as many registered companies as New Zealand, but
not even four times as much reported case law.
38 This information was received in response to enquiries made to CCH New Zealand Ltd and
LexisNexis Australia.
39 Available for searching at    http://www.casetrack.com    . All judgments delivered by the High Court
or higher which were listed under the Casetrack subject heading “Company/Commercial” were
counted. 1999 was chosen as a starting point because that was the first year for which all judgments
from all relevant courts were included in the Casetrack database.
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III Models of Corporate Law Enforcement — The “Public
v Private” or “Regulatory v Enabling” Debate
A Introduction
It is generally acknowledged, whether one favours a light or heavy handed approach
to corporate regulation, that some control of company managers is necessary. Adam
Smith noted in 1776 that,
“The directors of ... companies, being the managers rather of other people’s
money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it
with the same anxious vigilance [as they would] their own ... Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of such
a company.”40
More recently, it has been observed that, whether losses to shareholders are caused
by “corporate controllers abus[ing] their position of trust by arranging for the
shifting of assets ... into their own hands”,41 or simply by “the euphoria and panic of
public markets susceptible to rumour, ... rash decisions of investors large and small
[and] by real changes in economic conditions and confidence”,42 the enforcement of
legal standards is necessary.43 The debate centres on how much state regulation is
warranted and what is achieved by it.
                                                
40 The Wealth of Nations, Books IV-V (1776); reprinted Penguin Books (1999), p330-331; noted by
Jensen and Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 305.
41 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on Reform of the Law Governing
Corporate Financial Transactions (1991), p1.
42 Walls, “Where Are We, and How Did We Get Here?”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law
Society and New Zealand Society of Accountants Company Law Conference (1994), p2.
43 Shirtcliffe, “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998]
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 66, 66. Shirtcliffe, although strongly in favour of self
regulation, concedes that “it may be that humans need a certain quantum of rules ... If people are not
constrained by social rules, ... then binding legal rules will be sought to fill the gap”. See also
Ramsay, “Models of Corporate Regulation: The Mandatory/Enabling Debate”, in Grantham and
Rickett (Ed.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p221.
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The literature on the debate may be divided into sources dealing with the issue of the
desirability of regulation in general, and those discussing its relevance to the
enforcement of company law in particular. On regulation generally, Ogus44 identifies
two general systems of economic organisation. The first he describes as the
“collectivist” system, under which the state seeks to correct perceived deficiencies in
the market through action by government regulatory agencies. Such agencies are the
most prominent enforcers of legal obligations in such a system, and their involvement
cannot generally be displaced by private agreement between parties.
Ogus compares this to the “market” system, which generally leaves parties free to set
their own rules, subject only to certain basic restraints. Under this model, private
enforcement of rights and duties is the norm.45
This chapter examines the arguments in favour of both the public and private
enforcement models, including such issues as the costs and goals of each model and
the factors that motivate public and private enforcers. The significance of the size and
ownership structure of a company to these arguments is then noted.
“Performance-based”, self regulatory, methods are not the focus of this thesis.
Although such methods may be an important component of the enabling approach to
company law, and although they are, strictly speaking, a form of private
                                                
44 Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Clarendon Press (1994), p1-3; and Ramsay,
“Models of Corporate Regulation: The Mandatory/Enabling Debate”, in Grantham and Rickett (Ed.),
Corporate Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p218-221. The following
discussion assumes that high levels of State regulation and public enforcement are necessarily linked,
and that a market-based system will be characterised by private enforcement although this is not
always the case. Ogus notes that regulation, “by which the State seeks to direct or encourage
behaviour which (it is assumed) would not occur without such intervention … is public law in the
sense that in general it is for the State (or its agents) to enforce the obligations which cannot be
overreached by private agreement between the parties concerned”: “Evaluating Alternative Regulatory
Regimes: The Contribution of Law and Economics” (1999) 30 Geoforum 223, 223.
45 Black and Kraakman, “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law” (1996) 109 Harvard Law
Review 1911, 1916, list “enforcement, as much as possible, through actions by direct participants in
the corporate enterprise (shareholders, directors and managers)” among the central features of the
“market” model.
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“enforcement”, in the sense that they seek to remove the need for rigid state
regulation by providing effective self regulation, they are not discussed beyond the
brief references to them below. The thesis is concerned instead with the legal controls
available to shareholders and other private enforcers, and how they compare with the
legal regulation imposed by public agencies.
B Arguments for Public Enforcement
Public agencies involved in company law enforcement may act as market regulators.
Market regulation is designed to preserve stability and confidence in a market as a
whole, without necessarily being concerned with individual failures within the
market. An example of this approach is New Zealand’s banking supervision regime,
undertaken by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand under the Reserve Bank Act 1989:
“Banking supervision is aimed at countering this inherent weakness in the system
[that is, banks’ vulnerability to ‘runs’, should doubts emerge about their ability to
meet their obligations], primarily by establishing a framework within which banks
are required, and are known to be required, to operate ... But banking supervision is
not intended to provide an absolute guarantee against any bank failing, nor against
depositors of a failed bank suffering some loss ... Rather, the objective is to
provide a framework of constraints, disciplines and incentives designed to make
bank failures rare and isolated events.”46
Francis47 notes that there are several reasons why a regulatory system may be
chosen. These include:
• Reducing risk. This justifies, for example, the regulation of tobacco advertising
and sales, and the disclosure requirements in securities legislation;
• Fairness. This is generally based on inequalities of information or bargaining
power. It may justify competition and “fair trading” laws, for example;
• Defining boundaries, ie. allowing potentially risky practices, subject to
reasonable limits. This can serve to reduce risk, without the need for more
                                                
46 White, “Why are Banks Supervised?”, in Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Monetary Policy and the
New Zealand Financial System (3rd ed.), GP Publications (1992), p182.
47 The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, Clarendon Press (1993), p20.
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drastic action such as prohibiting the activity in question altogether; and
• Maintaining stability and confidence in an economy. If this is the goal of
regulation, equilibrium in a market as a whole is what is aimed for, rather than
preventing individual failures within that market. Mandatory disclosure of
financial information to potential investors in public companies also reflects
this objective.48
A study by Polinsky and Shavell49 has investigated the economic theory behind
different enforcement policies. They note that private enforcement is generally
appropriate when the victims of harm are aware of who the perpetrators are, when
they possess the necessary information to detect and prove infringements, and when
there is an inducement of some kind for parties to becomes involved, eg. a monetary
return. In other cases, public enforcement may be required. This explains why, for
example, the enforcement of contract and tort law is primarily private, while
prosecutions for theft, which may require expensive but necessary information
systems such as computerised fingerprint databases, are made by public agencies.
Much of the economic analysis of the enforcement of law focuses on the efficiency of
the alternative systems, ie. the single sum of the costs and benefits accruing from each
option, without regard to what could be termed social considerations such as the
distribution of these costs and benefits. This argument is championed by Kaplow and
Shavell.50 Such a view would favour private enforcement in most cases, on the
grounds that if the victim of certain conduct considers that the benefits of
enforcement action outweigh the costs, they will be motivated to take action. If they
                                                
48 See Australian Company and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on an Enhanced Statutory
Disclosure System (1991), p6-7.
49 “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law”, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper 159 (May 1998), p2-3. See also Shavell,
“Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law”, John M. Olin Centre for Law, Economics
and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 408 (February 2003), p6-8.
50 “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income” (1994) 23
Journal of Legal Studies 667, 677. Sanchirico, “Inequity and Distortion: The Continuing Debate on
Equity and Efficiency in the Law”, University of Virginia School of Law, Law and Economics
Working Papers, No. 00-19 (2000), p3, notes that since its publication in 1994, Kaplow and
Shavell’s article has been cited 36 times in law and economics literature, either as authority or noting
its widespread acceptance.
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do not, then it would be inappropriate for the state to do so. However, other
economic scholars have questioned this, and concluded that an exclusive focus on
efficiency is not justified. Sanchirico,51 for example, argues against the views of
Kaplow and Shavell, and states that “to the extent that equity is of any social
concern, legal rules should be adjusted away from efficient standards in a manner that
helps those who are less well-off”. Under this approach, public enforcement is more
acceptable, even if a cost/benefit analysis shows it to be “inefficient”. Action will be
taken to remedy infringements even where the return, in economic terms, is less than
the cost of taking the action, because it is considered socially desirable to deter or at
least be seen not to tolerate certain conduct.
Applying these general observations to the enforcement of company law in
particular, Ramsay notes that public enforcers may act as surrogates for company
stakeholders. Action may be taken by the state on behalf (or for the benefit) of
specific individuals or groups in cases where it is not considered feasible for the
action to be taken personally, either because of lack of funds of lack of information.
Action taken by the ASIC for breaches of the directors’ duties set out in Part 2D.1 of
the Corporations Act 2001 falls into this category.52 Ramsay refers to the significant
costs associated with shareholder litigation and the lack of incentive that often exists
for a particular shareholder to take action which maximises the value of the company
as a whole and the wealth of other shareholders. He concludes for these reasons that
state agencies like the ASIC are often in the best position to enforce company law.
In a similar vein, Fitzsimons53 also refers to the costs of bringing a private action, the
lack of information available to shareholders and their inability to evaluate that
information, as reasons why public enforcement of company law is necessary in
many cases. He claims that the private enforcement of New Zealand’s insider trading
                                                
51 “Inequity and Distortion: The Continuing Debate on Equity and Efficiency in the Law”, University
of Virginia School of Law, Law and Economics Working Papers, No. 00-19 (2000), p8.
52 “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian Securities
Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174, 177-179 and
181.
53 “Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws by Shareholders in New Zealand: An Analysis and
Proposals for Reform” (1995) 3 Waikato Law Review 101, 120-121.
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laws54 has proven ineffective for these reasons. He recommends greater powers of
enforcement for the Securities Commission and notes that, although the Commission
has until recently not had a formal enforcement role in this area, it has “found itself
playing an increasing role in the regulation and detection of insider trading, in the total
absence of shareholder and public issuer action”. This has included informal
investigations, publication of reports either suggesting or providing evidence of
insider trading, and the summoning and admonition of alleged offenders. 55 Other
commentators also contend that shareholders in larger companies are, for the most
part, inactive when it comes to corporate governance issues in general,56 and
enforcement in particular.57
Those in favour of high levels of company regulation may also point to the potential
for market failure as a justification for its imposition. For example, in 1991 the
Australian Company and Securities Advisory Committee stated that “general market
forces” did not guarantee adequate and timely disclosure of financial information to
investors in public companies, and that a mandatory, publicly enforced, system of
                                                
54 Part I of the Securities Markets Act 1988. See p95-98 below.
55 “Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws by Shareholders in New Zealand: An Analysis and
Proposals for Reform” (1995) 3 Waikato Law Review 101, 120-121.
56 Black, “Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States”, in Newman (Ed.),
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference Ltd (1998), vol. 3,
p459-464. See also Yavasi, “A Socio-legal and Economic Introduction to Corporate Governance
Problems in the EU” (2001) 22 The Company Lawyer 162, 164: “For practical reasons, contributors
of capital hand over the direction and management of the company’s affairs to a smaller group capable
of relatively quick and continuous decision-making … In fact, passive investors have neither the
willingness nor the ability to manage”. Interestingly, this observation is not confined to small
shareholders. Yavasi also notes that “even with proxies, the total votes cast in the UK is often no
more than 12-13%, which makes it clear that even institutional shareholders seldom vote”: Ibid,
citing J. Charkham (then advisor to the Governors of the Bank of England), Corporate Governance
and the Market for Control of Companies, Bank of England Panel Paper (1987), p7.
57 Galbraith, “The 1993 Act — Balancing the Rights of Shareholders, Directors, Executive Officers
and Creditors”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society and New Zealand Society of
Accountants Company Law Conference (1994), p136. Galbraith notes that “in the past shareholders
have either been reluctant to act, as in the case of institutional shareholders who generally have not
rocked the New Zealand corporate boat, or have been unable to act, as in the case of smaller
shareholders or minority shareholders, because of cost”. See also Ramsay, “Enforcement of Corporate
Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian Securities Commission: Evidence and
Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174, 175, and the references cited therein.
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disclosure was therefore required to “promote investor confidence in the integrity of
Australian capital markets”.58 It has also been noted that mandatory disclosure
regimes and other forms of financial market regulation can serve to reduce risk to
investors and maintain stability and confidence, without the need for more drastic
action such as prohibiting a potentially risky activity.59
C Arguments for Private Enforcement
One argument in favour of private enforcement is that it reduces overall costs, and
imposes them on the parties who stand to benefit most from enforcement
proceedings — the company and/or its shareholders — rather than on the public
purse. Schwartz makes the point that “private enforcers with proper incentives
reduce the need for government supervision which, but for the activities of private
enforcers, would be necessary.”60 He favours shareholder enforcement on the grounds
that it reduces average “agency costs”, principally monitoring costs61 but also those
other costs that are incurred in holding managers accountable, including those costs
involved in interpreting the law so as to avoid potential liability.62 The classic
                                                
58 Report on an Enhanced Statutory Disclosure System, Sydney (1991), p6-7.
59 Francis, The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, Clarendon Press (1993), p20.
60 “In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradley”
(1986) 71 Cornell Law Review 322, 328.
61 Goddard, discussing the effect of limited liability on monitoring costs, notes that “if an
investment in an enterprise brings with it unlimited liability for the debts of the enterprise, but I am
not involved in its management on a day-to-day basis, I have a significant incentive to monitor the
enterprise’s activities and in particular the likelihood of my being called on to meet its debts”. By
reducing the investors’ risk, limited liability reduces, but does not eliminate, the need for such
monitoring and its associated costs: “Corporate Personality — Limited Recourse and its Limits”, in
Grantham and Rickett (Ed.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998),
p23. See also American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, ALI Publishers (1994), vol. 2, p14; and McEwin, “Public versus Shareholder
Control of Directors” (1992) 10 Company and Securities Law Journal 182, 183.
62 “In a lawyer-led economy, there will be thousands of expensive lawyer hours spent on interpreting
the law ... As transaction costs may consume nearly 50% of all resources in a modern economy, it is
not surprising that heavily regulated countries have puny growth rates”: Shirtcliffe, “Good
Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998] Company and Securities
Law Bulletin 66, 71, citing North, “Economic Performance Through Time” (1994) 84 American
Economic Review 359.
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definition of agency costs, as they apply to the relationship between shareholders
and managers of corporations, is that offered by Jensen and Meckling. They note
that, although directors are not agents of shareholders in the strict legal sense,63 in
economic terms their position can be described as one of agency. A feature of the
relationship is that the interests of the shareholders (as “principals”) and directors
may diverge,64 which imposes costs (so-called agency or monitoring costs) on the
parties:
“The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the
aberrant activities of the agent. In addition, in some situations it will pay the agent
to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain
actions which will harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be
compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for
the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal
decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships, the
principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs
(nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary) and in addition there will be some divergence
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximise the
welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare
experienced by the principal due to this divergence is also a cost of the agency
                                                
63 See De Mott, “Shareholders as Principals”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Key Developments in Corporate Law
and Trust Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Harold Ford, LexisNexis (2002), p105-129, for a
discussion of why, though useful in certain contexts (such as the present one), the analogy between
agency and the relationship of directors to shareholders should not be carried too far. Key differences
exist between the two types of relationship, including the general inability of shareholders to give
directors binding instructions.
64 The problem is illustrated by the following example, noted by Sitkoff, “An Agency Costs Theory
of Trust Law”, University of Michigan, John M. Olin Centre for Law and Economics, Working Paper
No. 03-004 (2003), p13: “Consider, for example, a real estate agent on a 5 per cent commission.
Assuming the principal cannot feasibly monitor the agent’s day-to-day activities, the agent has no
incentive to undertake even $10 worth of effort to improve the realised price by $100, because the
agent reaps only $5 of this sum. But this $10 of additional effort would have been in the principal’s
best interests, so if the parties’ interests were perfectly aligned (as would be the case if the agent were
selling his or her own property), then the agent would have undertaken the effort. The agent’s failure
to do so therefore leads to a welfare loss. True, the divergence in this example is an artifact of the 5
per cent commission, and a higher commission of, say, 15 per cent, would have solved the problem
here. But no compensation scheme short of transferring complete ownership of the project to the agent
will solve the incentive and risk-sharing problems when the agent’s efforts are unobservable”.
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relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the ‘residual loss’. We define
agency costs as the sum of:
1. the monitoring expenditures by the principal,
2. the bonding expenditures by the agent,
3. the residual loss”.65
Legally imposed directors’ duties and other enforcement mechanisms are said to limit
agency costs by acting as incentives for directors to behave in the interests of the
company (the shareholders as a group) without the need for direct monitoring.
It is also argued that public enforcers lack the motivation and understanding of
business conditions which is required to adequately administer the enforcement of
corporate rights and duties. Mason, for example, states that public enforcement
action, such as investigations by the ASIC where it has reason to suspect a
contravention of any law relating to the affairs of corporations,66 tends to be
undertaken with little regard to the interests of the company involved or its
shareholders:
“Australian experience has shown that such investigations may be normally
commenced only when the company or group of companies concerned may be in
an extremely parlous situation, and it is possible that the very act of appointing an
inspector may severely damage the company’s prospects and thereby injure its
members ... Shortly, it can be said that these provisions are aimed at inquiry and
penalisation, rather than the redemption of the company’s fortunes.”67
Perhaps the most common argument against high levels of public regulation of
companies is that, by limiting individual freedom of choice and stifling initiative, it
may inflict serious harm on a nation’s competitiveness and efficiency. Too much
“black letter” regulation of corporate managers is said to discourage them from their
primary role, that of “creating value to enhance their company’s and their country’s
                                                
65 Jensen and Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 309-310.
66 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 Part 3.
67 “Possible Alternatives to an Australian Securities and Exchange Commission: Contingent Fees
and Derivative Actions by Shareholders” (1976) 50 Australian Law Journal 26, 27-28.
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competitive position”, resulting in boards becoming motivated by penalties for failure
to conform to the rules rather than by the rewards of good performance.68
In support of this argument, Black and Kraakman state that the aim of corporate
regulation is the provision of
“a set of rules ... that encourage profit-maximising business decisions, provide
professional managers with adequate discretion and authority, and protect
shareholders (and to some extent creditors) against opportunism by managers and
other corporate insiders.”69
In a similar vein, Shirtcliffe notes that
“Investors ... want their money to be dealt with honestly. They expect not to be
defrauded ... They are looking not simply for the minimum performance required
at law, but the best possible performance that will bring them tangible rewards.”70
These two elements of corporate governance — accountability of managers for the
money entrusted to them by shareholders and other stakeholders, and the
enhancement of corporate performance — are also noted by Keasey and Wright.
They emphasise the fact that the performance element is just as important as the
prevention of actual fraud or carelessness, if not more so. Good governance, they
conclude, should be “as much concerned with correctly motivating managerial
behaviour towards improving the business, as directly controlling the behaviour of
managers”. 71 Significantly, Keasey and Wright pay little attention to law
enforcement procedures as tools to achieve good corporate governance, focusing
instead on self regulatory mechanisms such as the relationship between executive
remuneration and company performance, and internal control mechanisms designed to
                                                
68 Francis, “The Responsibilities of Corporate Governors: Conformance or Performance?” [1995] 12
Butterworths Corporation Law Bulletin 8.
69 “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law” (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911, 1920
(emphasis added).
70 “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998] Company and
Securities Law Bulletin 66, 69; See also Sealy, “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties” (1995)
1 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 92.
71 Corporate Governance: Responsibility, Risks and Remuneration, John Wiley and Sons (1997), p2.
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improve the quality of the financial and business information which is available to
directors.72
The enabling approach is thus based on the belief that
“The best focus for a [Companies Act] is to see it as oiling the wheels of
commerce, to make the wheels of business even better. Experience shows that
tough company laws do not pay off. Many jurisdictions which have experimented
with increased formalities, with centralised controls, with increasingly heavy
penalties for breaches of company law, have found them counterproductive.”73
D The Significance of Corporate Structure
In my previous study on this issue,74 I noted that the proponents of public and
private-based enforcement models each appear to assume a distinct model of a
typical company, and of what the role of a shareholder should consist.
The arguments in favour of a significant role for public enforcement agencies are
based primarily on the assumption that private parties have insufficient information
and influence on (and therefore little interest in) the internal workings of companies.
These factors affect their ability and motivation to successfully enforce corporate
rights and duties. Such arguments are only really relevant to large, widely held
companies, but not to smaller, closely held ones. It will have been noted that all the
examples used above refer to the enforcement of securities law which, by definition,
deals with the offering of investment opportunities to the general public. In such
                                                
72 Ibid, p5-16. See also Cadbury (Chairman), Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance, Gee and Co. (1992), which concluded that self regulation, by means of a
voluntary “code of best practice” and other extra-legal controls, is preferable to legislation as a means
of improving the way companies are run.
73 Sealy, “Company Law: Directors and the Company They Keep” [1990] New Zealand Law Journal
434, 434.
74 Berkahn, Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand 1986-1998,
Unpublished Research Paper, School of Law, Deakin University (1999), p11-13; Berkahn and
Trotman, “Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New Zealand 1986-1998” (2000) 7
Canterbury Law Review 516, 520-522. See also the references cited therein and Bamford, “Directors’
Duties: The Public Dimension” (2000) 21 The Company Lawyer 38.
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cases, shareholders are relegated to the status of “bystanders” or passive investors,
with little power over their investment or influence on the activities of the
company.75 The companies they invest in could, however, be described as “public”
entities, in that their actions affect a widely dispersed group of participants. In such
cases, public enforcement does seem justified.
Bottomley, after exploring the conceptual linkages between company and
administrative law, concludes that they are both based on the control of “bureaucratic
power”:
“Considered as bureaucratic organisations, modern public bureaucracies and large-
scale business corporations have much in common ... Both public and private
bureaucracies operate on the basis of a separation between those who manage the
enterprise and those who are the intended beneficiaries. This separation results,
amongst other things, from the fact that each constituency — the general public,
and shareholders — is widely dispersed and therefore unable itself to perform the
tasks of management effectively. Moreover, these dispersed constituencies face
similar difficulties in monitoring the actions of those to whom the power of
management is delegated.”76
Bottomley also notes that, for this reason, the principle of non-interference by
outside parties in the governance of companies, as enshrined in Foss v Harbottle77 for
example, is more applicable to small “private” companies like the one which was
involved in that case,78 than to larger enterprises or corporate groups.79
                                                
75 Hill, “Changes in the Role of the Shareholder”, in Grantham and Rickett (Ed.), Corporate
Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p190-192. See also Grantham and Rickett,
Company and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, Brookers (2002), p898: “At the risk of
over-generalisation, shareholders may be said to be of two types. First, there are those who own
shares as a consequence of their active participation in the business undertaken by the company.
Secondly, there are those who own shares purely as a financial investment. Shareholders in large
listed companies are almost by definition of the latter type”.
76 “Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: Two Versions of the Same Story?”
(1995) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 127, 130.
77 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
78 “Corporations like this, of a private nature, are in truth little more than private partnerships”:
Wigram VC at (1843) 2 Hare 461, 491.
79 “Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: Two Versions of the Same Story?”
(1995) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 127, 141-142.
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If this view is taken, it is quite legitimate for public agencies to enforce shareholder’s
rights, at least to the extent required to ensure “a free and open market, offering
shareholders ease of entry and, critically, exit”.80
However, if one considers the arguments in favour of an enabling approach to
corporate regulation, the opposite assumption appears. Shareholders and other
potential private enforcers are assumed to be integrally linked to the company,
possessing a level of motivation and understanding which an outside agency would
not have. Corporate actions are seen as resulting from informed and consensual
decisions. Such a state of affairs would only exist in a closely held company, where
there is no significant separation of ownership and control, and where it could
legitimately be expected that company participants will take responsibility for
enforcing corporate rights and duties.
In such cases, shareholders could be described as “owners” or at least “beneficiaries”
of the company (for whom managerial powers are held “in trust”),81 and so could be
expected to take responsibility for the actions of management. It is easy to
understand the characterisation of state regulation as “rules enforced by government
power irrespective of the prior consent of adult parties ... crowd[ing] out self-reliance
and voluntary co-operation” in cases where the participants are genuinely free to
“sort out their preferred arrangements”.82 But this is not necessarily a realistic
assumption in an age where the widely dispersed corporate group is the
“quintessential model of corporate business activity”.83
                                                
80 Hill, “Changes in the Role of the Shareholder”, in Grantham and Rickett (Ed.), Corporate
Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p191.
81 Ibid, p179.
82 Shirtcliffe, “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998]
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 66, 66 and 68.
83 Bottomley, “Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: Two Versions of the Same
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E Conclusion
Public enforcement is advocated principally on the grounds that it serves the public
interest or that it is required to overcome inequalities in access to information or in
bargaining power. In the context of corporate law enforcement, these issues arise
chiefly in the area of securities law. Individual shareholders in widely held, “public”,
companies are, in most cases, not in a position to adequately enforce the companies’
disclosure and other obligations. Action by a public agency therefore appears most
justifiable — and most necessary — to enforce such obligations.
Proponents of private enforcement, on the other hand, generally assume companies
to be essentially private entities, owned and managed by the same people. In such
cases, those people will possess both the motivation and information required to
enforce corporate rights and duties, and enforcement action by public agencies will
usually be unnecessary. Indeed, it may be counterproductive, threatening the
performance of smaller companies by placing undue emphasis on their accountability
to “the public”, when the public in fact has little or no interest in their operations.
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IV Enforcement Regimes — Past, Present and Proposed
A Introduction
All three of the jurisdictions under consideration have recently undergone, or are in
the midst of, major reforms to their corporate law regimes. These reforms are, in
terms of their general aims at least, consistent with recent reform activity in other
comparable jurisdictions. It appears to be generally accepted that the common law
directors’ duties and enforcement mechanisms are unsatisfactory, and a trend towards
greater director accountability and a liberalising of access to remedies has prevailed
recently in several common law jurisdictions.84 This has been accompanied by a
general move towards more reliance on private enforcement of corporate rights and
duties.
North American, and particularly Canadian, enforcement provisions have provided a
model for recent reforms elsewhere. The North American approach is generally
described as “inherently anti-regulatory, placing its faith in the efficiency of private
contractual arrangements and the sanctions resulting from efficient markets and the
private interests of market players.”85 Some commentators, however, have recently
detected elements of a more “communitarian”86 view of corporate law, recognising
the need for a higher degree of regulation in the general societal interest. Although it
has been noted that the anti-regulatory, or “contractarian”, view is so pervasive in
United States and Canadian corporate law literature that people have difficulty “in
                                                
84 See note 263 below.
85 Hodder, “Harmonisation with Australia in Directorships — Current Difficulties and Future
Problems”, paper presented to the Institute for International Research Conference (1992), noted by
Fitzsimons, “Australia and New Zealand on Different Corporate Paths” (1994) 8 Otago Law Review
267, 284.
86 A term used by Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh, “The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Cross-roads” (1999) 62 Law and
Contemporary Problems 9, 41. See also Welling, “From Our Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of
a Corporate Constitution” [1996] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 123, 124; and Millon, “New
Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law”
(1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373.
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even imagining an alternative view”,87 it appears that elements at least of the
communitarian perception of companies are present in North American company
law, and that they are largely responsible for the liberal approach to private corporate
law enforcement in that part of the world.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the North American view of the nature of
business corporations which, it is argued, represents a combination of both
contractarian and communitarian ideas. It then considers the growing influence of the
North American corporate law model and, in particular, that model’s emphasis on
private enforcement. Finally, recent and proposed reform activity in New Zealand,
Australia and the United Kingdom is considered, including the policies underlying
these reforms.
B Corporate Law in North America
1 “Contractarianism” v “Statutory Division of Powers”
Despite often being described as a “nexus of contracts”,88 the North American view
of the business corporation is not, as is traditionally the case in many countries
whose corporate laws derive from the United Kingdom, solely as an association of
                                                
87 Allan, “Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law” (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law
Review 1395, 1401.
88 See Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386, 392; and Jensen and Meckling,
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3
Journal of Financial Economics 305, 305-311. Frankel notes that such a description carries with it
some unforeseen, and perhaps problematic, implications, and believes that “mischief is currently done
by the indiscriminate use of the concept ‘contract’ to describe various relationships … ‘Contractarians’
define corporations as criss-crossing contracts among the different actors, including shareholders and
management …, switching to the language and jurisprudence of contract … [Yet] these scholars
follow the characterisation of corporations by economists, although the definition of ‘contract’ in
economics differs from the legal definition. For economists, ‘contract’ means any agreement or
obligation by economic actors. For lawyers, ‘contract’ refers to particular types of legally enforceable
obligations … When we blur the distinction between [for example] fiduciary and contract
relationships, calling them by the same name, we tend to disregard the reasons for the different rules
that govern them”: “Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules” (1995) 74 Oregon Law Review 1209, 1209-
1211.
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the shareholders based on the law of contract.89 While the traditional contractarian
model does form the basis of companies statutes in most common law countries
(including, historically, the United States and Canada), most North American
jurisdictions now follow a “statutory division of powers” model, which includes
some communitarian characteristics.90
The term “contractarian” is used by commentators such as Palmer and Welling,91 to
describe a company law system which is fundamentally based on principles of
contract, with the terms of the company constitution being contractual in nature and
enforceable as such. Such a system is exemplified by sec 14 of the current United
Kingdom companies legislation, the Companies Act 1985, which provides:
“Subject to this Act, the memorandum and articles, when registered, bind the
company and its members to the same extent as if each had been signed and sealed
by each member and contained covenants on the part of each member to observe
the memorandum and articles”.92
Palmer and Welling note, citing the United Kingdom cases of Hickman v Kent or
Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders’ Association93 and Beattie v E and F Beattie Ltd,94 that
the statutory contract is limited in its application and therefore not always enforced
                                                
89 Welling, “From Our Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of a Corporate Constitution” [1996]
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 123, 124.
90 The exception is British Columbia in Canada, which follows the United Kingdom model and
deems companies’ constitutions to be contracts: see the Company Act 1999 (BC) sec 13, which is
practically identical to sec 14 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) (see below); and McGuinness, The
Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada (1999), p67-68 and
190.
91 Canadian Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.), Butterworths Canada (1986), p2-
4. Note that the pages of this text are numbered separately in each chapter so that, for example, p2-4
is the fourth page of chapter two.
92 See also New Zealand’s previous companies legislation, the Companies Act 1955, which provided
in sec 34(1) that the memorandum and articles “bind the company and the members thereof to the
same extent as if they respectively had been executed as a deed by each member”. This was known as
the “sec 34 contract”: see Trotman, “Articles of Association and Contracts”, in Farrar (Ed.),
Contemporary Issues in Company Law, CCH New Zealand Ltd (1987), p35.
93 [1915] 1 Ch 881.
94 [1938] Ch 708.
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by the courts, making it “generally not a particularly reliable procedural vehicle for
the enforcement of intra-corporate obligations”.95 The courts in both Hickman and
Beattie found that the company constitution had contractual force under the United
Kingdom Companies Act only as between the company and its shareholders in that
capacity. A shareholder who was also given some contractual right under the
constitution in another capacity, for example as a director or as the company’s
solicitor, could not, therefore, enforce that right.96 As noted by Astbury J in
Hickman:
“An outsider to whom rights purport to be given by the articles in his capacity as
such outsider, whether he is or subsequently becomes a member, cannot sue on
those articles treating them as contracts between himself and the company to
enforce those rights”.97
Buckley LJ put the same point more succinctly in Bisgood v Henderson’s Transvaal
Estates Ltd:
“The purpose of the memorandum and articles is to define the position of the
shareholder as shareholder, not to bind him in his capacity as an individual”.98
The contractarian model, in its traditional form, thus generally requires a breach of
some right which has been specified in the constitutional contract between company
and shareholder before a remedy is available. As Palmer and Welling put it, most
                                                
95 Canadian Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.), Butterworths Canada (1986), p2-
28.
96 See also Re Pritchard (1873) 8 Ch App 956; Melhado v Porto Alegre Railway Co. (1874) LR 9
CP 503; and Eley v Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd (1876) 1 Ex D 88. Under
the current Australian legislation, this is overcome (at least in relation to directors and company
secretaries) by the provision that a company’s constitution has effect as a contract “(a) between the
company and each member; and (b) between the company and each director and company secretary;
and (c) between a member and each other member”: Corporations Act 2001 sec 140(1) (emphasis
added). See discussion at p99-101 below.
97 [1915] 1 Ch 881, 896. See also the early United States case of Flint v Pierce 99 Mass 68 (1868)
where a creditor was held to be unable to enforce a provision in a company’s articles which purported
to give him the right to sue shareholders personally for loans upon which the company defaulted.
98 [1908] 1 Ch 743, 759.
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shareholder actions “must be channelled through the statutory contract action”.99
Obviously, public enforcement of corporate rights and duties has little place in the
traditional contractarian model. Sealy notes that
“much of the law [on the control of corporate managers] handed down to us
reflects this Victorian perception of the company, in particular … the idea of the
director as trustee or agent for his (or her) constituents, the company in the sense
of the collective corporate membership. It is they who have chosen him, warts
and all; they who can remove him; they who can ratify his acts in excess of
authority and forgive his sins; even, for many decades, they who could dictate to
him and his co-directors how to run the business”.100
As the shareholders of a company are considered its controllers under the
contractarian model, they are assumed to be in a position to enforce their rights, as
specified in the constitutional contract, through an action for a breach of that
contract. In theory at least, there is no need for public enforcement to enforce
shareholders’ rights. Other parties, despite the fact that they may be affected by
corporate actions, are ignored altogether.
The traditional contractarian model may be compared to the North American-derived
“statutory division of powers” model, under which an “immutable division of
powers” is created among the various participants in the governance of the company,
imposing statutory obligations and granting statutory rights and remedies to certain
parties by virtue of their status as shareholders, directors, etc, regardless of the
particular capacity in which they present themselves.101
                                                
99 Canadian Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.), Butterworths Canada (1986), p2-
46.
100 “Directors’ ‘Wider’ Responsibilities — Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural” (1987) 13
Monash Law Review 164, 165. Kay and Silberston note that, under British law, “the corporation is
regarded as a creation of private contract … Corporate Governance is a matter for the company itself to
determine and to describe in its articles of association. The legal system therefore provides, and is
intended to provide, no more than a mechanism for the negotiation and enforcement of these
contracts”: “Corporate Governance”, in Macmillan Patfield (Ed.), Perspectives on Company Law: 2,
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (1997), p50.
101 Palmer and Welling, Canadian Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.),
Butterworths Canada (1986), p2-4.
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The statutory division of powers approach originated in the Canadian province of
Ontario in the early 1970s, as a result of the Lawrence Committee Report.102 The
Lawrence Committee recommended that the province discard its “ancient and
outmoded” Letters Patent system, under which companies were formed by the
Crown granting the privilege of corporate status on an individual basis.103 It also
rejected the memorandum and articles-type constitution as being outdated and
instead opted for an entirely new form, based on the concept of
“a workable statutory framework within which corporate planners could develop
corporate constitutions suitable to their wants, but which superimposed adequate
protection for minority shareholders and creditors”.104
The Committee recommended that company law should be primarily enabling rather
than regulatory, although some mandatory provisions were necessary to prevent
abuses of power by management and majority shareholders. The statutory division
of powers model was further refined by the Dickerson Committee Report of 1971,105
from which developed the influential Canada Business Corporations Act. The
Dickerson Committee was heavily influenced by the United States Model Business
Corporation Act, which was prepared by the American Bar Association’s
Committee on Corporate Laws. This model Act has been adopted, to varying
degrees, by most United States jurisdictions, and consequently similar corporate law
principles now prevail throughout most of North America.106
                                                
102 Lawrence (chairman), Interim Report of the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature on
Company Law, Ontario Legislative Assembly (1967), cited in Palmer and Welling, Canadian
Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.), Butterworths Canada (1986), p2-46 to 2-47;
and Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2nd ed.), Butterworths Canada
(1991), p50
103 See Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2nd ed.), Butterworths
Canada (1991), p47-50 and 97-98.
104 Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2nd ed.), Butterworths Canada
(1991), p50.
105 Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, Information Canada (1971).
106 McGuinness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada
(1999), p4; Welling, “From Our Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of a Corporate Constitution”
[1996] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 123, 124. The Company Law Review Steering Group
in the United Kingdom note that the enactment of the Canada Business Corporations Act in 1975
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The statutory division of powers model departs from the contractarian system in
that enforcement of the company’s constitution is achieved through processes
derived directly from the statute itself, rather than through creating a statutory
contract. Consequently, in order to be eligible for one of the statutory remedies, a
person must have the appropriate status, rather than a personal contractual right
which he or she wishes to enforce. The capacity in which that person has an interest
in the matter is irrelevant, removing the principal obstacle to enforcement by
company shareholders and other interested parties which applies in traditional
contractarian systems.107
It has been noted that, by means of the reforms following the recommendations of the
Dickerson Committee, Canadian corporate legislation now gives shareholder remedies
a higher profile than any statutes based on the United Kingdom model ever have.
These remedies108 include the statutory derivative action, the oppression remedy and
the appraisal remedy, otherwise known as the minority buy-out right, for
shareholders who dissent from fundamental changes in corporate policy. The
communitarian view of the corporate entity, upon which such features are arguably
                                                                                                                                         
represented a move away from the previous tendency to follow the United Kingdom’s company law,
and the beginning of “a trend towards radical reappraisal and simplification along largely American
lines”: Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of
Trade and Industry (1999), p24. The Steering Group further notes (at p28-29) that, although the
competition between American States for incorporations has perhaps led to an overall set of company
laws “which appear to favour management at the expense of shareholders as compared to the balance
of [British] law”, this is balanced by the greater flexibility provided by, for example, laws allowing
shareholder agreements which limit the powers of management and a “strong pro-shareholder trend” in
federal securities legislation. Company shareholders in the United States, in common with those in
Canada, also have access to such remedies as the statutory derivative action, appraisal remedy and
remedy for unfair prejudice: see The Law Commission (UK), Shareholder Remedies, Law Com 246
(1997), p259-260.
107 Shapira notes that “the move from a contract to statute as a juridical basis of the corporate
constitution has an important bearing on enforcement … It affects enforceability of all rights and
obligations between the company and its shareholders”: “Shareholders’ Actions and Remedies”, in
Morison’s Company and Securities Law, LexisNexis (loose-leaf), vol. 2, para. 36.1.
108 Cheffins and Dine, “Shareholder Remedies: Lessons from Canada” (1992) 13 The Company
Lawyer 89; Griggs and Lowry, “Minority Shareholder Remedies: A Comparative View” [1994]
Journal of Business Law 463, 468-477. See p43-54 below for discussion of these remedies.
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based, has been described by Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh as follows:
“Rather than advocate the imposition of legal restraints on the behaviour of
corporate managers, [contractarians] prefer to rely on voluntary contracts and
market forces to align the interests of managers and stakeholders. In contrast,
communitarians … argue that liability rules and judicial review are necessary to
constrain the behaviour of corporate managers”.109
However, although the Canada Business Corporations Act gives some enforcement
powers to the Director General of the Corporate Directorate, an official of the
Canadian Ministry of Industry,110 it is a major premise of the Act that it be “largely
self-enforcing” through private civil action initiated by the aggrieved party.111
This raises what at first might appear to be an anomaly in the statutory division of
powers model; it is characterised by private, rather than public, enforcement, despite
Welling’s contention that:
“the typical Canadian corporation was always viewed as a social institution rather
than as an association of shareholders. The business corporation was rather like
                                                
109 “The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate
Governance at a Cross-roads” (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 9, 34. See also Millon,
“New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law”
(1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373, 1377-1379. Millon refers to the contractarian
stance as “anti-regulatory” and “individualistic”, and notes that “proponents argue against corporate
law rules that mandate or inhibit particular governance relationships. They would instead leave it up
to the various participants in corporate activity to specify their respective rights and obligations
through contract … In contrast to contractarians, ‘communitarians’ more readily look to legal rules to
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law must combat the harmful effects on non-shareholder constituencies of managerial pursuit of
shareholder wealth”.
110 These include the power to apply to the court for an order directing an investigation of a company
if it appears that its business is being carried on fraudulently or in an oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial manner; and the power to inquire into the ownership of any security of a company to
establish compliance with certain of the Act’s securities law provisions: Canada Business
Corporations Act ss 229 and 235. In addition, the Director may participate in an action taken under
the oppression remedy where the person complaining of oppressive conduct has a good reason for not
bringing the action personally: sec 241. This occurs very infrequently: “Investigations and Remedies”,
in Canada Corporations Reporter, CCH Canadian Ltd (loose-leaf), vol. 1, para. 9950.
111 Ibid, para. 9000.
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the municipal corporation, and people who chose to invest in the one or live in
the other accepted that they were opting into a sub-species of governmental
organisation”.112
Such a view is supported by the proliferation in recent times of statutory provisions
which permit — or require — business corporations to consider the interests of what
Bradley et al and Millon describe as “non-shareholder constituencies” such as
employees, customers, suppliers, the natural environment and the community in
general.113
According to this view, company shareholders are viewed more as members of a
community than merely as contracting parties. The preferred enforcement strategy,
however, is still to require those shareholders,114 rather than a public body, to enforce
their rights. This may appear to conflict with Bottomley’s view, discussed above, 115
that if companies are in reality “public” entities, then public enforcement is
appropriate. However, Bottomley’s analysis also assumes a model of a large-scale
business corporation, based on the control of “bureaucratic power”, where the
constituency (the shareholders) are not involved in management and have difficulty
monitoring those who are. The North American corporate law model, on the other
hand, retains the contractarian assumption that shareholders will exercise, if not direct
management control, at least some “residual managerial authority”.116 This authority
is said to be achieved via the shareholders’ enhanced access to remedies, and also by
means of the ability of shareholders to make by-laws restricting the business a
                                                
112 “From Our Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of a Corporate Constitution” [1996] Company
and Securities Law Bulletin 123, 124.
113 See Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh, “The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Cross-roads” (1999) 62 Law and
Contemporary Problems 9, 24-29, where a long list of such statutes are noted; and Millon, “New
Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law”
(1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373, 1379.
114 Selected other parties are also granted status as “complainants”: see sec 245 of the Canada
Business Corporations Act.
115 “Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: Two Versions of the Same Story?”
(1995) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 127, 130. See p28-29 above.
116 Palmer and Welling, Canadian Company Law: Cases, Notes and Materials (3rd ed.),
Butterworths Canada (1986), p7-24 to 7-25; McGuinness, The Law and Practice of Canadian
Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada (1999), p911-920.
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company may carry on, and by provision being made for unanimous shareholder
agreements under which the powers of directors to manage or supervise the business
or affairs of the company may be limited.117 McGuinness notes these different routes
by which shareholders can exercise control over the company’s affairs and concludes
that they essentially allow the shareholders, should they be so minded, to reserve to
themselves total control over the corporation’s business and affairs.118
Thus, the statutory division of powers model gives much more private enforcement
power to shareholders and other “insiders” than does the traditional contractarian
approach, under which access to remedies is severely restricted. However, this
appears to be the limit of the statutory division of powers model’s concession to
communitarianism. It retains the contractarian “shareholder primacy norm”119 and the
related aversion to allowing state “interference”, seeing companies as basically
private, if not solely contractual, bodies. The statements above by Hodder and
Welling,120 suggesting that the North American view of the business corporation is,
on the one hand, strongly contractarian and, on the other, strongly communitarian,
both appear to be somewhat overstated. The approach taken under the Canada
Business Corporations Act and similar statutes actually contains elements of both
views, resulting in a generally anti-regulatory system which nonetheless shows a
strong commitment to upholding shareholder control over company directors,
through both the provision of a limited amount of residual management authority and
the opening up of access to extensive private enforcement powers.
                                                
117 See, for example, ss 6(1)(f) and 16(2) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, which permit
statements in a company’s articles restricting the business the company may undertake; and sec 146(2)
of the same Act, which provides for unanimous shareholder agreements.
118 The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada (1999), p912.
119 Millon, “New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in
Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373, 1376.
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2 Enacted Directors’ Duties and Enforcement Mechanisms
Directors’ Duties
North American corporate law has traditionally imposed higher standards of care and
prudence on company directors than those required under United Kingdom-style
contractarian regimes. This greater concern for director accountability has prompted
jurisdictions in the United States and Canada to state directors’ duties in statutory
form, rather than leaving their formulation to the less certain method of judicial
development. Nel notes the contrast as follows:
“The lack of codification [in the United Kingdom] has resulted in directors often
not being aware of or not appreciating the extent of their duties towards the
company, its shareholders and other stakeholders, and ultimately it is left to the
courts to decide whether the actions or inactions of the directors have been in
accordance with their ‘fiduciary’ duties … [The] ‘undemanding terms’ referred to
[in the older United Kingdom case law] are in contrast to the duty of care imposed
in other jurisdictions”.121
He notes further that “whilst the United Kingdom has been procrastinating for more
than 100 years”,122 numerous other countries, following the lead of the United States
and Canada, have codified or partially codified the duties of directors in the interests
                                                
121 The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Masterbond Group and
Investor Protection in South Africa: Corporate Law and Securities Regulation in South Africa,
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (SA) (2001), vol. 2, para. 14.2 and 14.7,
citing Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 Ch 100; Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
[1911] 1 Ch 425; and Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. [1925] Ch 407.
122 The Davey Committee of 1896, the Jenkins Committee of 1962, the Law Commission’s 1998
Consultation Paper (Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a
Statement of Duties, Law Com Consultation Paper No. 153) and the Company Law Review Steering
Group’s Final Report (Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, Department
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without result.
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of making the law more certain, accessible to lay people and more comprehensible.123
Section 122(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act is typical:124
“Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his powers and
discharging his duties shall —
(a) act honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the
corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances”.
Provisions like this apply an objective standard (though incorporating what is known
as the “business judgment rule”) to all directors, whether active in the company’s
management or not.125 The business judgment rule states that it is not the success or
failure of a decision upon which a director is judged, but rather the process by which
that decision is reached. The court in Briano v Rubio, for example, commenting on the
Californian provision based on the Model Business Corporation Act, said that the
statute “combines the [subjective] notion of a director’s immunity from liability for
an honest mistake of business judgment with the [objective] concept of a director’s
obligation to use reasonable diligence in performing his or her duties”.126 The rule’s
                                                
123 The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Masterbond Group and
Investor Protection in South Africa: Corporate Law and Securities Regulation in South Africa,
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (SA) (2001), vol. 2, para. 14.15 and 14.18.
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125 McGuinness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada
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126 54 Cal Rep 2d 408, 414 (1996). See also Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A 2d 858 (1985).
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application in Canada is confirmed by the comments of Koenigsberg J in Act
Enterprises Ltd v Cliger Construction Ltd. His Honour stated, quoting from a
respondents’ submission with which he agreed, that
“The ‘business judgment rule’ in Canada operates to shield directors from court
intervention in business decisions which have been made honestly, prudently, in
good faith and on reasonable grounds. The court ought not to usurp the function
of the board of directors in managing the company, nor should it eliminate or
supplant the legitimate exercise of control by the majority. Business decisions
honestly made should not be subjected to microscopic examination. The
jurisdiction of the court is one which must be exercised with care. On the one hand
the minority shareholder must be protected from unfair treatment. On the other
hand the court ought not to usurp the function of the board of directors in
managing the company, neither should it eliminate nor supplant the legitimate
exercise of control by the majority. The legislation is not intended to give to the
court to interfere with the internal management of a company by directors who in
the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the memorandum and articles of
association are acting honestly and without any purpose of advancing the interests
of themselves or others of their choice at the expense of the company or
contrary to the interests of other shareholders. There should be no interference
simply because a decision is unpopular with the minority”.127
The standard is thus, in the words of Eisenberg, “fairly demanding” in relation to the
requirement for prudence and reasonableness, although less stringent when the actual
substance or quality of a decision is called into question.128
Enforcement Mechanisms
Two remedies in particular — the remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct and the
statutory derivative action — are characteristic of the North American corporate law
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model.129 A third, the minority buy-out right or “appraisal remedy” available to
minority shareholders who dissent from certain company decisions, is not discussed
in detail in this thesis as, although a shareholder remedy in the broad sense, it is not
designed to enforce compliance with directors’ or managers’ obligations and litigation
is seldom required to exercise it.130
Remedy for Unfair Prejudice
Canada’s remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct131 is found in sec 241 of the Canada
Business Corporations Act. Broadly similar provisions appear in Canadian provincial
companies legislation132 and in the United States.133
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1, 30-35. See also Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2nd ed.),
Butterworths Canada (1991), p553-564; Lowry, “The Oppression Remedy — A Canadian Approach”
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The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada (1999), p947-998.
132 See, for example, sec 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.
133 In the United States, such provisions are often limited in their application to close corporations
only. See Thompson, “The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression” (1993) 48 The Business
Lawyer 699, note 70, for a list of those thirty seven States whose corporate statutes include a remedy
for “oppression” or “unfair prejudice”. As in Canada, unfair prejudice in the United States has been
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Section 241(2) provides that relief may be granted for conduct of the corporation
itself, its “affiliates”134 or its directors which is “oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to,
or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or
officer” of the company. If such conduct is found to have occurred, the court is given
the discretion to make any order it thinks fit, to rectify the matters complained of”.
The three expressions used in the provision — oppression, unfair prejudice and
unfair disregard of a petitioner’s interests — have been generally treated by the
Canadian courts as indicative of a single, broad standard of conduct which, if
breached, will attract relief. In Miller v F. Mendel Holdings Ltd,135 although the court
held that the three grounds of relief were mutually exclusive, it concluded that since
the category of conduct which unfairly disregards a petitioner’s interests is wider
than that which is unfairly prejudicial, which in turn is wider that oppressive
conduct, the broad standard of “fairness” is the appropriate test for relief under sec
241.136 In Westfair Foods Ltd v Watt, Kerans J held that the words of sec 241 require
the courts to exercise their discretion “broadly and liberally”:
                                                                                                                                         
tied to the frustration of the reasonable expectations of the petitioning shareholder: see Haynsworth,
“The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension” (1986)
35 Cleveland State Law Review 25, 37-38; Thompson, “Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’
Reasonable Expectations” (1988) 66 Washington University Law Quarterly 193; Re Kemp and
Beatley Inc., 473 NE 2d 1173, 1179 (1984); Stefano v Coppock, 705 P 2d 443, 446 (1985); and
Balvik v Sylvester, 411 NW 2d 383, 386 (1987).
134 Section 2(2) provides that a body corporate is affiliated with another body corporate if one is the
subsidiary of the other, if both are subsidiaries of the same body corporate or if each is controlled by
the same person. If two bodies corporate are each affiliated with a third body corporate at the same
time, they are deemed to be affiliated with each other.
135 (1984) 30 Sask R 298.
136 See also Re Abraham and Interwide Investments Ltd (1985) 20 DLR (4th) 267, 275-276. In this
case, Griffiths J found that the actions of the company and its directors, in paying unauthorised
directors’ fees and consulting fees, was not “oppressive”, in the sense of being “burdensome, harsh
and wrongful”, but was unfairly prejudicial, “or at the very least unfairly disregarded the applicant’s
interest as a shareholder”, and was therefore subject to relief under the Ontario provision. His Honour
said: “The section is drawn in very broad terms, and as remedial legislation should in my view be
given a liberal interpretation in favour of the complainant.” A similar conclusion was reached by the
Dickerson Committee in 1971; see Dickerson, Howard and Getz, Proposals for a New Business
Corporations Law for Canada, Report to the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
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“I cannot put elastic adjectives like ‘unfair’, ‘oppressive’ or ‘prejudicial’ into
watertight compartments. In my view, this repetition of overlapping ideas is
only an expression of anxiety by Parliament that one or the other might be
given a restrictive meaning”.137
Lowry138 also emphasises the flexibility and open-endedness of the Canadian
approach to the oppression remedy. In this regard, he points to the “often-cited
recommendation” in Ferguson v Imax Systems Corporation, that “the section should
be interpreted broadly to carry out its purpose ... What is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial in one case may not necessarily be so in the slightly different setting of
another”.139
The Canadian oppression provision does not specifically incorporate a “just and
equitable” standard for relief. However, the principles set out in Ebrahimi v
Westbourne Galleries,140 and the associated “legitimate expectations” test, have been
applied by the Canadian courts to sec 241. It was made clear in Lord Wilberforce’s
judgment in Ebrahimi that the courts need not look exclusively at a company’s
constitution when deciding the nature of the obligations undertaken by its
participants. What is important is the giving of effect to the full set of terms and
understandings on which it has been agreed the company will operate, be they
expressed or implied. Thus, for example, where there is a reasonable expectation that
                                                                                                                                         
Information Canada (1971), para. 484: “In sum, we think that the courts should have very broad
discretion, applying general standards of fairness, to decide these cases on their merits.”
137 (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 48, 52.
138 “The Oppression Remedy — A Canadian Approach” [1991] Journal of Business Law 196, 198.
139 (1983) 43 OR 128, 137.
140 [1973] AC 360, 379: “The foundation of it all lies in the words ‘just and equitable’ and, if there
is any respect in which some of the cases may be open to criticism, it is that the courts may
sometimes have been too timorous in giving them full force. The words are a recognition of the fact
that a limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own: that
there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are
individuals with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in
the company structure ... The ‘just and equitable’ provision, ... as equity always does, enables the
court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a
personal character arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust, or
inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular way”.
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all shareholders will participate in the company’s management, exclusion from
management will prima facie be conduct which is unfairly prejudicial, and a remedy
will be available under sec 241. Anisman thus describes the basis of the remedy as
“fairness, premised on the expectations of the parties, at least for closely held
corporations”,141 an intent which was at the heart of the decision in Diligenti v
RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd. In that case the approach used in Ebrahimi was
followed in applying British Columbia’s unfair prejudice remedy. Fulton J concluded
that
“in circumstances such as exist here, there are ‘rights, expectations and
obligations inter se’, which are not submerged into the company structure, and
these rights are enjoyed by a member as part of his status as a shareholder in the
company ... Although his fellow members may be entitled, as a matter of strict
law, to remove him as a director, for them to do so in fact is unjust and
inequitable, and is a breach of the equitable rights which he in fact possesses as a
member”.142
The enforcement of such shareholder expectations is not restricted to small, closely
held “partnership analogy” corporations, although “it is more likely to arise, and to
generate judicial sympathy, in these situations.”143 The circumstances under which
the courts have not been willing to give effect to shareholder expectations are
illustrated by cases like Jackman v Jackets Enterprises Ltd,144 where a shareholder
was denied relief for her exclusion from the company’s management, on the grounds
that she had been given her shares only as a gift, and therefore had no real expectation
                                                
141 “Majority — Minority Relations in Canadian Corporate Law: An Overview” (1987) 12 Canadian
Business Law Journal 473, 483.
142 (1976) 1 BCLR 36, 51. See also Canbev Sales and Marketing Inc. v Natco Trading Corp. (1998)
42 OR (3d) 574, where it was held that the remedy may be invoked where the reasonable expectations
of the applicant, as construed by reference to the circumstances in which his or her rights in the
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144 (1977) 4 BCLR 358.
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of having any management role; and 820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd,145
where Farley J said that those expectations which the courts will consider are not
“those that a shareholder has as his individual ‘wish list’. They must be expectations
which could be said to have been (or ought to have been considered as) part of the
compact of the shareholders”. Similarly, in Westfair Foods Ltd v Watt,146 Kerans J
noted the contrast between “reasonable expectations” and “wishful thinking”.
A lack of good faith on the part of the defendant is not required for relief to be
granted under sec 241 and its equivalents, a point noted, for example, in Sparling v
Javelin International Ltd, where Gomery J held that:
“It is not necessary that oppression and unfair treatment be caused by the
deliberate act of the corporation or its directors, nor is it necessary for the
unfairness to have its source in the management of the corporation at all. What
is important is the result, not the intent. Thus, the applicant does not have to
establish bad faith on the part of the corporation’s directors or management in
order to convince the court to make an order”.147
Statutory Derivative Action
Statutory procedures for derivative actions are provided for in both the United States
and Canada. The United States provision is found in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and equivalent state legislation, including the corporations statutes
of Delaware — where more than 50% of publicly traded companies in the United
States are incorporated — and New York.148 It differs in many respects from the
more flexible Canadian provisions which have served as the model for recent and
                                                
145 (1991) 3 BLR (2d) 113.
146 (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 48, 58.
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proposed reforms elsewhere, and therefore will not be discussed in detail in this
thesis.149
Section 239(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides that a court must
grant leave before a complainant may commence, or intervene in, an action “in the
name and on behalf of a corporation”. This formulation identifies the nature of the
derivative action, and distinguishes it from actions brought to enforce personal rights.
The aim of the provision is to overcome the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle,150
that a company itself must take action to remedy wrongs done to it, and that if the
alleged wrong is ratifiable by a majority of the company’s shareholders, the minority
may not sue.151
A derivative action was available under the common law, if one of the “exceptions to
Foss v Harbottle” applied. However, these exceptions were narrow and the statutory
provision is potentially much wider — there is no requirement that the wrongdoers
be in control of the company,152 it is not limited to certain types of action,153 and the
complainant may be a director or “any other person who, in the discretion of the
court, is a proper person to make an application”, as well as a current or former
shareholder.154
The justification for making an applicant apply for leave is to prevent trivial or
malicious actions from proceeding, and also appears to be a recognition of the fact
that to burden the company with the costs of bringing action, at the behest of
                                                
149 For detailed discussion on the United States provisions, see Kluver, “Derivative Actions and the
Rule in Foss v Harbottle: Do We Need a Statutory Remedy?” (1993) 11 Company and Securities
Law Journal 7, 12-15; and Thai, “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia?
Comparisons with United States, Canada and New Zealand” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law
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152 See Atwool v Merryweather (1867) LR 5 Eq 464; Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93; and
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154 Section 238: Definition of “complainant”.
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someone with a relatively minor economic stake in the company, may outweigh the
benefits, even if the claim has merit. Uncontrolled access to the remedy could also
result in potential directors feeling so vulnerable to suit that they decline such
positions, and in companies and their directors facing undeserved reputational and
financial damage due to a proliferation of spurious actions.155 The leave requirement
is thus a “process of balancing conflicting interests”.156
Some uncertainty exists in Canada on the question of whether a derivative action may
be brought under the oppression remedy as well as via the statutory leave
procedure,157 and whether the statutory leave requirement acts to the exclusion of
actions under the common law. For example, it was held in Rogers v Bank of
Montreal158 that, despite the existence of a statutory leave procedure, a plaintiff may
still rely on an exception to Foss v Harbottle as an alternative means of proceeding
with a derivative action. The better view, however, appears to be that expressed in
Farnham v Fingold, where Jessup J held that the very broad language of sec 239(1)
embraces “all causes of action ... that a shareholder may sue for on behalf of a
corporation”, and that therefore the requirement to seek leave of the court applies to
all derivative actions.159
This was the intention of the Dickerson Committee, whose recommendations
culminated in the introduction of the statutory derivative action in Canada in 1975.
The Committee’s report refers to the “abrogation” of the rule in Foss v Harbottle,
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and its “substitution” with the new regime.160 Macintosh is of the opinion that
“Rogers appears to be bad law, and ought not to be followed”,161 and Sutherland
states that:
“The codification of the [derivative] action embraces all causes of action that a shareholder
may sue for on behalf of a corporation, and thus there no longer exists a common law
[derivative] action. The statute must be complied with, and leave must be obtained from the
court”.162
Under sec 239(2), in determining whether to grant leave, the court must be satisfied
that:
(a) The complainant has given reasonable notice163 to the corporation’s
directors of his or her intention to apply for leave if the directors fail to
take action themselves;
(b) The complainant is acting in good faith; and
(c) It appears to be in the corporation’s interests that leave be given.
The requirement for good faith has at times been interpreted as something which the
complainant must positively show, rather than something to be rebutted by the
defendant.164 However, the more prevalent view is that good faith will be presumed
unless there is some reason to believe that the complainant is using the threat of
derivative proceedings for an improper purpose, such as a personal vendetta or to
extract some personal advantage from the corporation or its directors.165
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In assessing whether the granting of leave appears to be in the corporation’s best
interests under sec 239(2)(c), matters such as the likelihood or otherwise of the action
succeeding, the potential costs to the corporation of the action proceeding166 and any
action already taken by or on behalf of the corporation have been held to be relevant
factors.
On the issue of the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding, while it is not necessary
to make out a prima facie case,167 the complainant is required to show that the claim
has at least some merit. It was held in Re Marc-Jay Investments Inc. and Levy that:
“It is obvious that a judge hearing an application for leave to commence an
action cannot try the action. I believe that it is my function to deny the
application if it appears that the intended action is frivolous or vexatious or is
bound to be unsuccessful”.168
As noted by Nemetz CJ in the British Columbian case of Re Bellman and Western
Approaches Ltd:
“The section does not say that the court must be satisfied that it is in the best
interests of the corporation. It says that no action may be brought unless the
court is satisfied that it appears to be in the interests of the corporation to bring
the suit. I take that to mean that what is sufficient at this stage is that an
arguable case can be shown to subsist”.169
Section 240 gives the court power to make any orders it thinks fit in connection with
the conduct of the derivative proceedings, including orders authorising the
complainant or any other person to control the conduct of the action and for the
direct payment of any amount awarded in the proceedings to security holders of the
corporation rather than to the corporation itself.
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Of particular significance is the power to order that the costs of an action for which
leave is given will be met by the corporation. Section 240(d) provides that, when an
action is brought or intervened in under sec 239, the court has the discretion to order
the corporation to pay “reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant in
connection with the action”. Although there is no statutory presumption that costs
will be met by the corporation, the Canadian courts have generally taken the view
that, provided the action is genuinely brought in the interests of the corporation, it is
the corporation that should be liable.170 In this regard, the courts have followed the
common law approach to this issue. In Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2), for example,
Lord Denning said that a prima facie right of indemnification by the company arose
“on the plainest principles of equity”, whether the action was successful or not.171
Buckley LJ agreed:
“Where a shareholder has in good faith and on reasonable grounds sued as plaintiff
in a minority shareholders’ action, the benefit of which, if successful, will accrue
to the company ... it would, I think, clearly be a proper exercise of judicial
discretion to order the company to pay the plaintiff’s costs”.172
However, as the court has complete discretion in deciding whether or not to grant
costs under sec 240(d), a complainant may only be awarded part of the costs of
bringing the action. This occurred in Turner v Mailhot,173 where Reid J held that the
presumption of entitlement to costs could be rebutted where the plaintiff could
afford to pursue the action independently, or where he or she was likely to make a
substantial personal gain if the action was successful. As a result he restricted the
plaintiff’s indemnity to only 50% of his total costs.
Once leave has been granted under sec 239, the proceedings may not be stayed,
discontinued, settled or dismissed without court approval.174 This is designed to
                                                
170 McGuinness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada
(1999), p939.
171 [1975] QB 373, 391.
172 Ibid at 403-404.
173 (1985) 50 OR (2d) 561, 567.
174 Section 242(2). This provision applies to all actions brought under Part XX of the Canada
Business Corporations Act, including unfair prejudice proceedings.
54
prevent the defendants paying off the applicants in return for discontinuing the
action, and to discourage “strike suits” by applicants who begin actions with such
payoffs as their objective. The requirement for court approval may also have the
effect of encouraging equitable settlement (as settlements which are not fair and
reasonable to all parties will not be approved).175 In fact, most derivative actions in
Canada to date have not actually proceeded to trial. Fair settlement has apparently
been reached.176
3 The Influence of the North American Model in Other Jurisdictions
The North American approach to corporate law, and to enforcement issues in
particular, has proven to be influential in several other jurisdictions where reforms
have been undertaken (or are currently being considered) in this area.177 Included
among these jurisdictions are the three under consideration in this thesis. These are
considered in detail later in this chapter.178 Others whose company law has been
influenced by the North American model include South Africa, Singapore and Hong
Kong.
South Africa
The general companies statute of South Africa, the Companies Act 61 of 1973,
“remains very much UK-style memorandum of association legislation, with all of the
related trappings”.179 Cilliers et al note that the United Kingdom-derived
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contractarian view of the company constitution applies in South Africa, citing
Gohlke v Westies Minerale (Edms) Bpk180 and sec 65(2) of the 1973 Act, which
provides that a company’s memorandum and articles of association bind the
company and its members “to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed
by each member”.181 The constitution is therefore enforceable by a member as a
contract between him or herself and the company182 and enforcement mechanisms are
generally limited to those available under the traditional contractarian model.183 The
1973 Act does include a remedy for unfair prejudice in sec 252 and a statutory
derivative action in sec 266. However, the derivative action suffers from a number of
procedural complexities; for example it is only available for certain types of wrongs,
namely those causing damage or loss to the company “as a result of a wrong, breach
of trust or breach of faith committed by a director or officer … while he was a
director or officer”;184 and it does not actually allow a shareholder to bring
proceedings on the company’s behalf. Rather, if a prima facie case is made out by the
applicant, the court may appoint a provisional “curator ad litem”185 who investigates
the merits of the proposed action and reports back to the court.186 If the court deems
it necessary, it may then confirm the curator’s appointment and authorise him or her
to initiate proceedings against the wrongdoer.187 Furthermore, the statutory action
does not abolish the complex common law derivative action based on the exceptions
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to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.188 Nel summarises the flaws in the South African
provision as follows:
“Unfortunately, the timorous makers and shapers of South African company law,
once having left the safe harbour of United Kingdom company law, made the
derivative action so unattractive and costly as to place it beyond the reach of the
ordinary shareholder … It is to be noted that if the action proceeds, the curator ad
litem becomes the plaintiff and the member who has suffered the wrong has no
further say in whether the proceedings should be continued, withdrawn or settled.
His role is relegated to little more than a ‘whistle-blower’, but a ‘whistle-blower’
who faces enormous financial risks. Not only could he be ordered to pay the costs
of unsuccessful proceedings, but would probably be ordered to furnish security for
costs even before the action commences189 … This is stark contrast to modern
views which are expressed in the American, Canadian and New Zealand company
laws”.190
He recommends that the South African derivative action provision be substantially
amended to bring it into line with the North American model and that a North
American-style appraisal remedy also be introduced. 191 Codification of directors’
duties, complemented by privately enforced civil liability for breaches, is also
recommended.192 Public enforcement would be limited to the “protection of investors
and the promotion of stability and integrity of financial markets”,193 ie. the
enforcement of securities law, rather than company law in general.
One area where strong North American influences are already discernable in South
Africa is close corporations law. 194 The Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 provides
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for a simpler and less expensive regime for the incorporation of small businesses and,
unlike similar attempts elsewhere,195 appears to have been very successful.196
Professor Johan Henning, for example, a leading authority on close corporations in
Southern Africa,197 notes that the acceptance of the concept is borne out by the ever-
increasing numbers of close corporations which have been formed since the Act came
into force: almost 300,000 during the period 1985-1994, compared to about 60,000
registrations under the general companies statute.198 He notes further that the South
African close corporations law has provided the model for similar statutes in
neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia,199 and that “in the main,
international reaction has also been favourable”.200
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p113-148; “Controlling Close Corporations and Controlled Companies: Definition and Analysis”
(1996) 2 Corporate Law Development Series 82; “The Five-Act Approach to Entrepreneurial Law
Reform in South Africa” (1999) 1 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 63; and
“Close Corporation Law Reform in Southern Africa” (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 917.
198 Henning, “Closely Held Corporations: Perspectives on Developments in Four Jurisdictions”
[1995] Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 100, 101; and “Close Corporations and Private
Companies in South and Southern Africa”, in Macmillan Patfield (Ed.), Perspectives on Company
Law: 1, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (1995), p167. These statistics are also noted by Spisto
and Samujh, “Close Corporations in South Africa: A Viable option for New Zealand Small Business
Corporate Law?” (2001) 9 Waikato Law Review 153, 154.
199 See the Private Business Corporations Act 1993 (Zimbabwe) and the Close Corporations Act
1988 (Namibia). The latter in particular is a virtual copy of the South African Act and both
incorporate all of the significant features of the South African close corporations regime.
200 Henning, “Closely Held Corporations: Perspectives on Developments in Four Jurisdictions”
[1995] Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 100, 101 and 104-106; and “Close Corporations
and Private Companies in South and Southern Africa”, in Macmillan Patfield (Ed.), Perspectives on
Company Law: 1, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (1995), p193-196. See, for example,
Procaccia, “Designing a New Corporate Code for Israel” (1987) 35 American Journal of Comparative
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In formulating the Act, “guidance was sought in modern Corporations Acts (for
instance the Canada Business Corporations Act of 1975), various partnership codes
and Professor Gower’s ‘The Incorporated Private Partnership Bill’ in the Final
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of the
Present Company Law of Ghana (1961)”.201
South African close corporations do not have “directors” as such; instead every
member (up to a maximum of ten)202 has the presumptive right to actively participate
in the corporation’s management and to represent the corporation in the carrying on
of its business.203 Sections 42 and 43 of the Act set out the fiduciary duties and
duties of care and skill which members owe to the corporation.204 All members must:
• Act honestly and in good faith. Management powers and the right to represent
the corporation in its business must be exercised in the corporation’s interests
                                                                                                                                         
Law 581, 589; and Sealy, “Legislating for the Small Business”, in Reforming Company Law,
Institute of Directors (1994), p11. Sealy describes the South African Act as “a model worth very
serious consideration” and one with more merit than the simplifications introduced for private
companies in the United Kingdom by the Companies Act 1989.
201 Naudé, “The Need for a New Legal Form for Small Businesses” (1982) 4 Modern Business Law
5, 12. Gower’s recommendations in areas like directors’ duties and the statutory derivative action
foreshadowed later reviews such as the Canadian Dickerson Report and NZLC R9. See also The Law
Commission (UK), Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), p249-251 and 268-271 for a
summary of relevant provisions of the Ghanaian Companies Code 1963, which was based on Gower’s
report.
202 Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (SA), sec 28.
203 Section 46(a) and (b). This right may be waived by means of an “association agreement”, ie. a
written agreement between the members regulating their relationship inter se and the relationship
between them and the corporation. Such an agreement may regulate any matter, provided it is not
inconsistent with the Act: sec 44(1). See Cilliers, Benade, Henning, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker
and Pretorius, Corporate Law (3rd ed.), Butterworths (2000), p610-611.
204 Section 42(1) states that members stand in a fiduciary position to the corporation. Hence,
members owe their duties to the corporation as a separate legal person and not to other members.
Fiduciary duties between members may, however, be stated in an association agreement: see Cilliers,
Benade, Henning, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker and Pretorius, Corporate Law (3rd ed.),
Butterworths (2000), p616-620; and Spisto and Samujh, “Close Corporations in South Africa: A
Viable option for New Zealand Small Business Corporate Law?” (2001) 9 Waikato Law Review 153,
160.
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and for its benefit. In particular, a member must avoid any conflict between his
or her interests and those of the corporation, including deriving any personal
economic benefit at the corporation’s expense and competing with the
corporation’s business;205
• Act with “the degree of care and skill that may reasonably be expected from a
person of his knowledge and experience”.206
Section 64 of the Act also provides that a member must not knowingly be a party to
reckless, grossly negligent or fraudulent trading by the corporation.
Public enforcement of these duties, described in this context by Naudé as “a blunt
and largely ineffective instrument for ensuring that technical and administrative duties
imposed in an Act like the Companies or Close Corporations Act are complied
with”,207 was largely rejected in the 1984 Act in favour of self-enforcement.208
Sections 42(3)(a), 43(1) and 64(1) provide that, if a duty is breached by a member,
that member is personally liable to the corporation for any loss suffered as a result or
(in the case of a breach of fiduciary duties under sec 42) for any economic benefit
derived by the member from the breach.209 Enforcement action may be brought either
by the corporation itself or by a member by way of a statutory derivative action
under sec 50. A derivative action is available, inter alia, where a member has breached
a duty to the corporation under sec 42 or sec 43. All a member need do before
initiating proceedings is notify all other members of his or her intention to do so.
Section 50 therefore represents a much simpler, and thus more effective, remedy than
                                                
205 Section 42(2).
206 Section 43(1).
207 Naudé, “The Need for a New Legal Form for Small Businesses” (1982) 4 Modern Business Law
5, 16.
208 Note, however, that there are a total of twelve provisions that create publicly enforceable offences:
see Cilliers, Benade, Henning, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker and Pretorius, Corporate Law (3rd ed.),
Butterworths (2000), p644-646; and Henning, “Close Corporations and Private Companies in South
and Southern Africa”, in Macmillan Patfield (Ed.), Perspectives on Company Law: 1, Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies (1995), p175.
209 In the words of Jordan, “the rules are few, but if they are not followed, members incur personal
liability”: Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: An International Survey of Companies
Law in the Commonwealth, North America, Asia and Europe, Department of Trade and Industry
(1998), p52.
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the equivalent provision in the Companies Act 61 of 1973.210 In the case of reckless
or fraudulent trading under sec 64, direct action may be taken by a member or creditor
of the corporation, a liquidator or the Master having jurisdiction in the court to which
the application is made.
Members of South African close corporations also have access to a remedy for
unfairly prejudicial conduct under sec 49. This is available only in situations where
the member’s own personal rights are affected (whereas sec 50 applies to breaches of
duty to the corporation)211 and allows a court to make such orders as it thinks fit,
“with a view to settling the dispute”, provided it is just and equitable to do so.212
Singapore and Hong Kong
North American-style enforcement policies are also evident in these two
jurisdictions. Singapore’s Companies Act 1967 exhibits the general structure of
United Kingdom-inspired contractarian legislation,213 but includes a statutory
statement of directors’ duties, a broadly worded unfair prejudice remedy and a
statutory derivative action.214 However, with the exception of a relatively high
number of actions for unfairly prejudicial conduct brought by minority shareholders
in private companies, the remedies provided to private parties are seldom used:
                                                
210 Spisto and Samujh, “Close Corporations in South Africa: A Viable option for New Zealand
Small Business Corporate Law?” (2001) 9 Waikato Law Review 153, 161.
211 See Cilliers, Benade, Henning, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker and Pretorius, Corporate Law (3rd
ed.), Butterworths (2000), p619-622.
212 Section 49(2). See Gatenby v Gatenby [1996] 3 SA 118 (E); De Franca v Exhaust Pro CC [1996]
4 All SA 503 (SE); and Geaney v Portion 117 Kalkheuwel Properties CC [1998] 1 SA 622 (T).
213 The Act is directly derived from the Malaysian Act of 1965, which in turn was strongly
influenced by the Australian uniform companies legislation of 1961. Jordan notes that, “to the extent
that legislative change in Australia itself has been heavily dependent on developments in the United
Kingdom, the ultimate source of much of Singapore’s companies law remained the United Kingdom”:
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: An International Survey of Companies Law in
the Commonwealth, North America, Asia and Europe, Department of Trade and Industry (1998),
p92.
214 Ibid at p94; Yeo and Koh, “The Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance”,
Country Paper for Singapore, presented to the Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance
(2001), p10-14. Although it is based on the Canadian provision, the statutory derivative action in
Singapore is limited in its scope to unlisted companies.
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“In Singapore, the task falls, more often that not, on the regulatory authorities to
take action against errant directors. Such actions are by way of criminal
prosecutions. Occasionally, companies do initiate civil suits. These are usually
against former directors and are in relation to the directors’ negligence or
situations where fraud or dishonesty is alleged. Many of such suits are initiated by
liquidators upon the company’s insolvency where the company’s collapse is
attributed to the incompetence or fraudulent conduct of a director. Civil action by
a company’s shareholders against directors for misconduct are uncommon”.215
This is attributed by Yeo and Koh to the lack of a suitable provision for derivative
proceedings involving listed companies, the prohibitive costs of bringing private
enforcement action and the relatively low and dispersed shareholdings of institutional
investors in Singapore, which results in no significant active monitoring of company
management by such investors.216 These concerns were highlighted recently in a
report to the Singapore government on this issue, after which the government
“affirmed the need to equip investors with the legal tools for them to take civil action
against errant directors instead of merely relying on regulators”, and proceeded to
introduce reforms to insider trading legislation to facilitate enforcement action by
affected shareholders.217
In Hong Kong, the North American influence is even more evident in a recent review
of that jurisdiction’s company law,218 although it is unclear how much of that
                                                
215 Yeo and Koh, “The Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance”, Country Paper
for Singapore, presented to the Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance (2001), p15.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid, citing Corporate Finance Committee (Singapore), The Securities Market Final
Recommendations, Financial Review Group (1998), paras 3.4 and 5.6. The reforms referred to were
contained in the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act 2000 (Singapore).
218 Jordan, Consultancy Report on the Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Financial
Services Branch of the Hong Kong Government (1997), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/cmpny.htm    . Although the People’s Republic of China resumed
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the region’s constitution (The Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China) maintains the existing common
law-based legal system for at least the next fifty years and, according to the author of the Consultancy
Report, “the actual administration in Hong Kong … demonstrates a great deal of continuity with that
of pre-handover days”: Jordan, “The Politics of Law Reform: The Making of New Companies Law in
Hong Kong” (1998) 7 Canterbury Law Review 22, 28 and 37. See also Ho, “Rethinking the System
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influence will translate into actual reform.219 The review is described as being “a
direct descendent of major companies law reform efforts which have preceded it:
Professor Gower’s 1962 Ghana Code, Canada’s 1971 Dickerson Report, the United
States Model Business Corporations Act (1984) and New Zealand’s 1989 Company
Law Report No. 9, Company Law Reform and Restatement”.220 The author of the
Consultancy Report which resulted from that review (Cally Jordan, a Canadian
academic and practitioner) considered that company law in Hong Kong should be
freed of a heavy regulatory burden and become “permissive, facilitative and enabling”:
“Rather than relying upon externally imposed administrative and criminal
sanctions, company law can be structured so as to be primarily self-enforcing ... In
the proposed regime, greater reliance would be placed on civil and contractual
remedies. The burden of enforcement would be shifted to those most directly
aggrieved.”221
The Consultancy Report recommended a statutory statement of directors’ duties to
act in good faith and in the company’s best interests, and with reasonable care,
diligence and skill; and several new statutory shareholder remedies including an
enhanced unfair prejudice remedy, a statutory derivative action and an appraisal or
“buy-out” right. In the Report’s commentary on these recommendations, the
influence of North American (and New Zealand’s North American-influenced)
provisions on the defining and enforcing of corporate rights and duties is repeatedly
                                                                                                                                         
of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong” (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 603,
605-606.
219 See discussion of the Report of the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform below.
220 Jordan, Consultancy Report on the Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Financial
Services Branch of the Hong Kong Government (1997), Introduction, para. 41. See also The Law
Commission (UK), Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a
Statement of Duties, Law Com Consultation Paper No. 153 (1998), p25, which describes the Hong
Kong review as being “based on modern companies legislation in the United States, Canada and New
Zealand”; and the comments of the United Kingdom Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of Trade and
Industry (1999), p28: “Hong Kong has … completed a review of company law and proposals to adopt
legislation very close in style and content to the Canadian and New Zealand approach have been
made”. See para. 2.06 of the Consultancy Report.
221 Jordan, “The Politics of Law Reform: The Making of New Companies Law in Hong Kong”
(1998) 7 Canterbury Law Review 22, 31.
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acknowledged. 222 Public enforcers such as the Registrar of Companies and the
Financial Secretary would retain a primarily administrative role, with residual
enforcement powers in cases involving the public interest.223
However, the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform,224 in a response to the
1997 review issued in February 2000,225 effectively “jettisoned the entire Review in
firm, if not scathing, terms”, rejecting the bulk of its recommendations.226 On the
subject of what it called “American codification”,227 the Committee concluded that
the factors upon which the North American model’s success have been built did not
apply in Hong Kong, and that the North American model was therefore not an
appropriate one to follow.228 These factors include a general separation of corporate
ownership and control, and often widely dispersed shareholdings.
The Committee stated that it “is a little curious that the Consultants should have
made so much of the ‘enabling’ issue”,229 asserting that Hong Kong’s existing
company law already rates fairly high on an “enabling index”. Referring to the
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on the Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Financial Services Branch of the Hong Kong
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Committee’s Recommendations” (2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 281, 284-285.
229 Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (Hong Kong), Report of the Standing Committee
on Company Law Reform on the Recommendations of a Consultancy Report of the Review of the
Companies Ordinance, Hong Kong Companies Registry (2000), para. 4.27.
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Consultancy Report’s recommendation to provide statutory default rules for
directors’ and shareholders’ meetings, the Committee said: “Under existing law,
directors and shareholders can regulate their own proceedings. Yet the Consultants
would take these provisions out of the private domain and put them into the
statute”;230 and referring to the recommendation of a direct statutory grant of
management power to directors, which may be overridden by a unanimous
shareholder agreement, it noted: “As for directors’ powers, under the existing law,
shareholders are free to determine the scope of such powers. Yet the Consultants
propose to take away that freedom”.231
On the issue of directors’ duties, the Committee rejected the Consultancy Report’s
recommendation that duties of care and honesty be included in the statute, on the
grounds that “directors are expected to take risks and it is easy to be wise after the
fact … Too onerous a burden would simply scare off good managers”.232 The
Committee did not, however, completely reject the concept of a statutory statement
of directors’ duties, recommending that this question be kept under review in the light
of international developments.233 On shareholder remedies, the Committee rejected
the Consultancy Report’s recommendation that the unfair prejudice remedy be
extended in line with the Canadian and New Zealand provisions, and that provision
be made for a “Canadian-style statutory derivative action”.234 It did, however, accept
the desirability of a statutory right of action in some form.235 The inclusion of an
appraisal remedy was also rejected.236
Further study was recommended on the issue of public enforcement. The Committee
saw self-enforcement as generally desirable in theory, but noted that “the Report
failed to discuss the problems and difficulties of self-enforcement and failed to put
forward any real solutions”237 or, at least, solutions with which the Committee
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233 Ibid, Recommendation 59.
234 Ibid, Recommendations 94 and 95.
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236 Ibid, Recommendations 98 and 99.
237 Ibid at para. 12.15. See paras 12.10-12.19 generally.
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agreed. Essentially, it was recommended that the status quo should remain for the
foreseeable future. Consideration was not given to abandoning the approach whereby
a public body is specifically charged with regulating the corporate conduct of
companies,238 as recommended by the Consultancy Report.
C New Zealand Reforms
1 The 1993 Company Law Reform Package
New Zealand’s company law underwent a major transformation with effect from 1
July 1994, moving from a United Kingdom-derived contractarian system to
something more akin to the North American statutory division of powers model. The
reform programme had its beginnings in September 1986 when the New Zealand
government announced its intention to undertake a comprehensive review of
company law, with the New Zealand Law Commission being given responsibility for
the formulation of a new Companies Act.239
                                                
238 Under the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, the Securities and Futures Commission
is currently charged, inter alia, with the enforcement of corporate and securities law (including the
Companies Ordinance), the supervision and monitoring of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and
Futures Exchange, the licensing and regulation of securities and future dealers and advisors, the
protection of investors and “the suppression of illegal, dishonourable and improper practices”: see Ho,
“Rethinking the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong” (1997) 42
McGill Law Journal 603, 608. Ho, a member of the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform
which was responsible for the 2000 report on the 1997 Consultancy report, states that the Securities
and Futures Commission “stands at the apex of the regulatory framework” and recommends that the
Commission’s enforcement powers be increased, not decreased as recommended by the Consultancy
Report: Ibid at 642 and 648.
239 See McKenzie, “Corporate Law Reform: The New Zealand Experience” (1994) 4 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 129, 129; Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors
under the Companies Act 1993” (1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 15-16; and Du Plessis, “Some
International Developments in Company Law: A South African Perspective” (1993) 14 The Company
Lawyer 224, 226. The New Zealand Law Commission was established by the Law Commission Act
1985 to “promote the systematic review, reform and development of the law of New Zealand”: sec 3.
The Commission’s specific functions are set out in sec 5 of the Act, including the making of
recommendations for law reform where required; advising on the review of any aspect of the law of
New Zealand conducted by any Government department or organisation, and on proposals resulting
from such a review; and advising the Minister of Justice on ways to make the law more
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The Commission’s brief, forwarded to it by the Minister of Justice pursuant to sec
7(2) of the Law Commission Act, was to
“examine and review the law relating to bodies incorporated under the Companies
Act 1955, and to report on the form and content of a new Companies Act.
The continuing work of the Securities Commission in the fields of takeovers,
insider trading, and company accounts will form part of this overall inquiry. Also
related to this reference is the review being conducted by the Department of
Justice of the law and practice of company liquidations and individual
insolvency”.240
A discussion paper was prepared to identify the areas and issues which the
Commission felt would be prominent in shaping the form and content of a new
Companies Act, and to seek comment from interested parties as to how these issues
should be treated.241
Specific questions were raised regarding each area of the law, with tentative
suggestions being made wherever possible by the Commission as to the direction it
favoured, based upon consultation with an informal committee set up to advise on
the way in which the inquiry should be handled and to identify the major policy
issues to be considered. This committee included accountants, legal practitioners,
academics, business people and government officials.
Previous attempts at company law reform in New Zealand had largely been confined
to ad hoc amendments to combat weaknesses in particular areas of the law. The
                                                                                                                                         
understandable and accessible, having regard to the desirability of simplifying the expression and
content of the law as far as is practicable. For comment on the Commission’s role in law reform in
New Zealand, see McGuire, “Comments on the Powers of the New Zealand Law Commission” [1995]
New Zealand Law Journal 270.
240 Cited in the Preface to The Law Commission, Report No. 9: Company Law: Reform and
Restatement, NZLC R9 (1989) (hereinafter “NZLC R9”), p ix.
241 The Law Commission, Preliminary Paper No. 5: Company Law: A Discussion Paper, NZLC
PP5 (1987). See Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand Experience”
(1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 239 for a summary of the issues identified by
the Commission.
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result of this was that the Companies Act 1955, which was closely modelled on the
United Kingdom Act of 1948, was not very dissimilar to the Joint Stock Companies
Act 1860, New Zealand’s original companies statute and a virtual copy of the Joint
Stock Companies Act 1856 (UK).242 The Commission’s approach, set forth in its
Report No. 9 and the appended draft Companies Act,243 was not to follow closely
any existing company law model, but rather to start afresh; to assess what the
appropriate issues to be considered were, and then to discuss all feasible options,
rather than proceed with any preconception that a particular model should be
preferred over all others. The Commission did, however, acknowledge that the
Canadian Dickerson Report of 1971244 and the United States Model Business
Corporation Act had provided working models for many of the reform proposals:
“The draft [Act] has its own coherence and internal consistency. It is not based on
the 1955 Act and employs distinctly different concepts and terminology in a
number of critical areas. Nor is the Commission’s draft based on any one overseas
model, although the (US) Model Business Corporation Act has been of great
assistance, as was the work of the Dickerson report which preceded the Canada
Business Corporations Act”.245
This was particularly true in the areas of directors’ duties and enforcement, and was
also evident in the abandoning of the traditional contractual view of the company
constitution and its replacement with a statute-based approach similar to that
                                                
242 The approach employed in New Zealand between 1860 and 1955 of following the corresponding
United Kingdom Acts almost verbatim is exemplified by the following extract from the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Companies Bill 1933: “[New Zealand Companies Acts] should as far as possible
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243 NZLC R9, p179-378.
244 Dickerson, Howard and Getz, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada,
Report to the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Information Canada (1971).
245 Preface to The Law Commission, Report No. 16: Company Law Reform: Transition and
Revision, NZLC R16 (1990), p xvii. See also NZLC R9 para. 32-33.
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prevailing in North America.246 The Commission identified “the redefinition of the
distribution of power within the company by direct operation of statute rather than
by a deemed contract”247 as one of the most significant of its reforms. It noted the
uncertainty as to the limits of the statutory contract’s application248 and the need for
mandatory minimum levels of director responsibility and shareholder protection to be
provided by statute.249
Harmonisation with Australian law,250 in the sense of using the existing Australian
legislation as a model, was rejected by the Law Commission. The Commission noted
that the law in Australia was “in a state of flux”, with the eventual outcome of reform
proposals in that country still uncertain, and that the Australian legislation was (and
still is) comparatively complex251 and difficult for the uninitiated to understand. This
ran contrary to a major aim of the New Zealand reform exercise — to make the law
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250 See NZLC R9 para. 145-153. See also Du Plessis, “Some International Developments in
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only 407 sections. By the same token, however, the Canada Business Corporations Act has only 276
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Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand Experience” (1998) 16 Company
and Securities Law Journal 236, 247 and 249.
69
more accessible and intelligible. It was considered that there was no significant benefit
in complete harmonisation. The Commission noted that “the essential elements of the
company law of both jurisdictions ... remain comparable”,252 and this was sufficient
to create an environment conducive to trans-Tasman trade, the overall goal of the
harmonisation of business laws.
The approach selected by the Commission and embodied in its draft Act was to
formulate a “basic law applicable by reason of shared principle to all companies”,
governing their creation, operation and termination; that is, a “core” company law
statute. Other requirements not derived from these shared principles or applicable
only to some companies (such as listed companies) were to be “imposed through
specific legislation and rules superimposed upon the general company law base”.253
Also of major importance was the need for a more accessible and intelligible law, as
required under sec 5 of the Law Commission’s enabling statute.
In September 1993 a new regime was enacted to replace the 1955 Act,254 comprising
a package of 23 separate pieces of legislation relating to, amongst other things,
financial reporting, takeovers and securities, as well as the new core company law
statute, the Companies Act 1993. With a few exceptions, some of which are noted
below, the 1993 Act essentially gives effect to the Law Commission’s
recommendations.255
Comment on the basic features of the 1993 reform package has generally been
positive;256 however, some are critical of certain aspects of the reforms. Both
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253 NZLC R9 para. 67.
254 The Companies Act 1955 was not repealed immediately. Existing companies were given a three
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out in the Companies Reregistration Act 1993) were deemed to be reregistered, with the result that all
companies are now governed by a single company law regime.
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Goddard and Elias question the wisdom of “striking out” on a different path to that
of other jurisdictions, when it would perhaps have been easier, faster and cheaper to
simply adopt a suitable existing statute (like the Canada Business Corporations Act)
with some minor amendments:
“We would have secured the benefits of more flexible legislation. We would be able
to draw on the existing Canadian jurisprudence, commentary and practical
experience … We could have moved further at far less cost, adopting reforms with
no obvious practical disadvantages, by making more use of a photocopier and less
of company lawyers and legislative drafters”.257
The perceived procedural complexity of the new law in some areas, particularly as it
applies to closely held companies, has also been criticised. Goddard notes that most
companies are very small and cost-sensitive, and therefore do not have the capacity
to comply with ongoing administrative requirements. He concludes that the 1993 Act
places too much emphasis on paper work and procedure258 and that many of the
mandatory and default rules of the Act are not appropriate to the needs of the
smallest companies. Instead, he claims, they appear to have been influenced by the
expectations of participants in public securities markets.259
                                                                                                                                         
1993, referring particularly to the plain language and conciseness of the statute, and the omission of
the “ministerial detail” that dominated the 1955 Act and which had become largely irrelevant to
modern corporate practice: Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd
(2000), p10. See also Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand
Experience” (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 241-242; and Elias, “Company
Law after Ten Years of Reform”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society and Institute of
Chartered Accountants of New Zealand Company Law Conference, Wellington and Auckland (1997),
p3.
257 Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand Experience” (1998) 16
Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 247. See also Elias, “Company Law after Ten Years of
Reform”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society and Institute of Chartered Accountants of
New Zealand Company Law Conference, Wellington and Auckland (1997), p4; and Dugan, McKenzie
and Patterson, Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd (2000), p737.
258 See, for example, the provisions on share buy-backs and major transactions (ss 58-67C and 129),
both discussed by Goddard at (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 242-244.
259 “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand Experience” (1998) 16 Company and
Securities Law Journal 236, 251-252. See also Dugan, McKenzie and Patterson, Closely Held
Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd (2000), p733-738.
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2 Reform to Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Remedies: The Private
Enforcement Model
Control of company directors, particularly by shareholders, has historically been
notoriously difficult to achieve.260 Directors have traditionally owed their duties to
the company rather than directly to shareholders, and therefore the right to take
action has generally lain with the company only (in practice the directors themselves)
unless the shareholders could justify their standing on the basis of a “fraud on the
minority”, or some other reason “of a very urgent character.”261 A further hurdle in
the way of shareholder enforcement was the principle of majority rule, under which
the courts were reluctant to intervene in a company's affairs to remedy conduct
which had been legitimately approved by a majority of shareholders, even if it was
damaging to minority interests.262 Although existing shareholder remedies have in
recent years been interpreted increasingly liberally,263 and despite the New Zealand
                                                
260 See Redmond, Companies and Securities Law (2nd ed.), The Law Book Co. Ltd (1992), p524;
Beck and Borrowdale, Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Law (7th ed.), CCH
New Zealand Ltd (2002), p287; Farrar and Russell, Company Law and Securities Regulation in New
Zealand, Butterworths (1985), p257-258; and Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern
Company Law (7th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell (2003), p443-449. Davies notes at p447 that English law
“has always been more impressed by the risk of derivative actions being motivated by personal
objectives than it has by the risk that confining derivative actions will lead to less litigation than the
company’s interests require. Accordingly, the [law] rendered individual access to the courts on behalf
of the company very difficult …”.
261 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 492.
262 See, for example, Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93; and Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v
Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1982] Ch 204, 210.
263 See, for example, Baxt, “The New Remedy in Oppression: A Reworded Provision or a New
Remedy?” (1985) 3 Company and Securities Law Journal 21; Shapira, “Statutory Protection of
Minority Shareholders: Towards the ‘Squeeze Out’?”, in Farrar (Ed.), Contemporary Issues in
Company Law, CCH New Zealand Ltd (1987), p205-225; and Berkahn, “The Oppression Remedy
and the ‘Group’ Approach to Shareholder Remedies in New Zealand” (1997) 10 Corporate and
Business Law Journal 1, where the recent liberalisation of the oppression remedy is discussed.
Shapira states at p207 that the turning point came with the revision of the oppression provision and
its replacement by the remedy for “unfair prejudice”. This occurred in New Zealand in 1980, and the
transition from a test requiring fraud or legal impropriety to one based on “fair dealing” and “wider
equitable considerations” was cemented by the Court of Appeal decision in Thomas v H.W. Thomas
[1984] 1 NZLR 686. This approach has since been mirrored in other remedies such as the derivative
action: See Sealy, “The Rule in Foss v Harbottle: The Australian Experience” (1989) 10 The
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Law Commission initially expressing doubt as to the inadequacy of these remedies,264
it was ultimately the view of the Commission that reform to this area of the law was
necessary.265
The most obvious supervening event to occur between these two pronouncements
was the October 1987 sharemarket crash,266 which appears to have influenced this
apparent turnaround:
“Interest in the powers and duties of directors tends to wax or wane according to
the climate of the time. One suspects that, during the excesses of the 1980s
leading to the share market crash of October 1987, many persons who were
directors of major companies, not only those described as ‘entrepreneurial’, gave
little thought to the powers and duties that flowed from that office. Post crash,
many of them found, I suspect rather to their surprise, that they were directly in
the firing line. In a large number of cases disgruntled shareholders and creditors
thought that the losses they had suffered should be reimbursed by directors whom
they considered had failed to exercise their duties in the manner the law
required.”267
Thus, a major goal of the 1993 reform package, now expressed in paragraph (d) of the
Long Title to the Companies Act 1993, was
                                                                                                                                         
Company Lawyer 52; and Berkahn, “The Derivative Action in Australia and New Zealand: Will the
Statutory Provisions Improve Shareholders’ Enforcement Rights?” (1998) 10 Bond Law Review 74,
83-88, on the growth of the wide ranging “interests of justice” exception to the rule in Foss v
Harbottle.
264 The Law Commission, Preliminary Paper No. 5: Company Law: A Discussion Paper, NZLC
PP5 (1987), para. 295-297.
265 NZLC R9 para. 564.
266 Although NZLC PP5 was not published until December 1987, much of it was presumably
written prior to the October crash. This conclusion is supported by Elias’s comments in “Company
Law after Ten Years of Reform”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society and Institute of
Chartered Accountants of New Zealand Company Law Conference, Wellington and Auckland (1997),
p11: “In assessing the reform, it has to be remembered that the work of the Law Commission began
when few were interested in company law reform. Our discussion paper [NZLC PP5], published in
1987, had to make out a case for change. The sharemarket crash transformed things. It made the whole
question of company law reform suddenly a burning issue”.
267 Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13.
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“To encourage efficient and responsible management of companies by allowing
directors a wide discretion in matters of business judgment while at the same time
providing protection for shareholders and creditors against the abuse of
management power.”
The Commission’s view was that the majority rule principle was not an effective
method of shareholder protection,268 and that individual shareholders should be given
greater rights of enforcement. The option that enforcement should largely be
conducted by a public authority such as the Registrar of Companies or a Companies
Commission was discarded early in the reform process in favour of a model based
predominately on private enforcement.269 The Law Commission saw state
enforcement as a “legitimate backstop to the remedies provided to shareholders under
the ... Companies Act”, but considered that that backstop should only be resorted to
when the wider public interest, rather than shareholders’ private interests, were at
stake.270
Instead, enforcement power was placed primarily in the hands of shareholders and
other “insiders” such as directors and “entitled persons”.271 The Commission
                                                
268 “The general meeting has not historically operated to protect shareholders from director abuse of
their powers of management, but rather has often been used as a cypher by directors to absolve
themselves of responsibility”: NZLC R9 para. 197. See also Farrar, Corporate Governance in
Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), p169-172. Farrar notes cases like
Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 and MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch 13, which illustrate the
courts’ traditional reluctance to question the business judgment of directors, even when this
disadvantages a minority of shareholders. In MacDougall Mellish LJ said at 25: “If the thing
complained of is a thing which in substance the majority of the company are entitled to do, or if
something has been done irregularly which the majority of the company are entitled to do regularly,
or if something has been done illegally which the majority of the company are entitled to do legally,
there can be no use in having litigation about it, the ultimate end of which is only that a meeting has
to be called, and then ultimately the majority gets its wishes”. The drawback to this approach was
that “the minority shareholders would be at the mercy of the majority, who could loot the company
with impunity”: Farrar, p172.
269 Shapira, “Shareholders’ Actions and Remedies”, in Morison’s Company and Securities Law,
LexisNexis (loose-leaf), vol. 2, para. 36.1.
270 NZLC R9 para. 318; Fitzsimons, “Australia and New Zealand on Different Corporate Paths”
(1994) 8 Otago Law Review 267, 285-286.
271 That is, non-shareholders who are given shareholder-like rights or powers under a company’s
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recommended that no enforcement power be given to creditors. Although
contributors to the company’s capital and therefore insiders in the wider sense, the
status of creditors is contractual rather than statutory and this, the Commission said,
should be emphasised. It recommended that the only protection given to creditors
should be via the duty of directors to the company to maintain solvency, and through
their standing to restrain conduct in breach of the Act or the company’s
constitution.272 This was designed to clarify the law in favour of the approach taken
in cases like Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v Multinational Gas and
Petrochemical Services Ltd273 and Kuwait Asia Bank v National Mutual Life
Nominees Ltd,274 where the existence of directors’ duties to creditors was denied, in
the face of doubts raised in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd275 and Hilton v Hilton
International Ltd,276 amongst others.277
As the basis for an enhanced private enforcement regime, the Law Commission
recommended the introduction of an extensive list of statutory directors’ duties and
shareholder remedies which would be available to shareholders in cases where the
company or its controllers took action which fell outside the agreed decision-making
structure.278
                                                                                                                                         
constitution: Companies Act 1993 sec 2(1).
272 NZLC R9 para. 214-222. See also Wishart, “Models and Theories of Directors’ Duties to
Creditors” (1991) 14 New Zealand Universities Law Review 323, 324. The provision giving creditors
the right to apply to the court for an injunction was deleted from the Companies Bill at the Select
Committee stage.
273 [1983] Ch 258, 288: “The directors indeed stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company ... and
they owe fiduciary duties to the company, though not to the creditors, present or future, or to
individual shareholders”.
274 [1990] 3 NZLR 513, 530-531, applied in ANZ Executors and Trustees Co. Ltd v Qintex
Australia Ltd (1990) 2 ACSR 677, 682 where it was held that directors have no “duty in law directly
owing to and enforceable by creditors, and sounding in debt or damages”.
275 [1985] 1 NZLR 242, 249.
276 [1989] 1 NZLR 442, 474.
277 The suggestion of a duty to creditors seems to be derived from Mason J’s statement in Walker v
Wimborne (1975) 137 CLR 1, 6: “The directors of a company in discharging their duty to the
company must take account of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors”.
278 NZLC R9 para. 198-199 and 564-585. The Commission was of the view that shareholder
“discipline” over directors in particular was an important aspect of company law, and one that ought
not to be restricted. See also Wishart, Company Law in Context, Oxford University Press (1994),
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The Commission’s aim was an enforcement regime which was enabling and
performance oriented, in accordance with the preferences of the business
community,279 rather than regulatory and conformance oriented.280 Although the
Companies Act 1993 as finally enacted represents an amalgam of regulatory and
enabling provisions,281 the Act’s enforcement regime is almost entirely enabling, in
the sense that it is the participants in corporate activity themselves, rather than any
regulatory agency, who are responsible for taking enforcement action.282
On the issue of directors’ duties, the Commission’s draft sought to draw together
those duties which had previously been found only in case law283 and to arrange them
                                                                                                                                         
p186. As well as the directors’ duties, the statutory solvency test, under which directors are obliged to
establish a company’s solvency before entering any transaction where wealth is transferred from the
company to shareholders, also reflects the Commission’s push towards greater director accountability:
see sec 4 of the 1993 Act, and Haynes, “The Solvency Test: A New Era in Directorial Responsibility”
(1996) 8 Auckland University Law Review 125.
279 See, for example, Fitzsimons, “Australia and New Zealand on Different Corporate Paths” (1994) 8
Otago Law Review 267, 286; Deane, “Besieged by Duties: Will the New Companies Act Work for
Directors?”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society and New Zealand Society of
Accountants Company Law Conference (1994); and Shirtcliffe, “Good Governance: A Case for
Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 66.
280 NZLC R9 para. 21.
281 Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 14; Hodder, “Whither the Companies Act 1993?” [1997] New
Zealand Law Journal 97, 98-100; and Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New
Zealand Experience” (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 240-244. This is due
largely to the changes made to the Law Commission’s draft Act by the Law Reform Division of the
New Zealand Department of Justice, which drafted the 1993 Act.
282 See Black and Kraakman, “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law” (1996) 109 Harvard Law
Review 1911, 1916 (note 45 above).
283 Sealy, “Company Law: Directors and the Company They Keep” [1990] New Zealand Law
Journal 434, 435 notes that there is little disagreement among different jurisdictions as to what the
substantive rules governing directors’ duties should be, although they may be expressed differently
and carry different consequences when breached: “When legislation replaces the common law the
statutory wording, whether it is formulated in broad terms or specified in quite elaborate detail, does
not differ substantially from the rules which have come through to us from our forefathers by the
doctrine of precedent and evolution in the common law. Different jurisdictions may prescribe different
sanctions, or play about with the onus of proof. But generally speaking, we find the new look
obligations include the same formulations which we find in the common law.”
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in a hierarchical structure. Those duties owed to and enforceable by “other interests”
such as shareholders, employees and creditors were expressly subordinated to the
directors’ “fundamental duty” — to act in good faith and in what the director
considers to be the best interests of the company.284 The proposed hierarchy, by
separating the duties owed to the company from those owed to shareholders and
others, implicitly equated “the company” with the business enterprise itself rather
than the collective shareholders.285
This was designed to make the law on directors’ duties more accessible and clear, to
thereby make directors more aware of precisely what their obligations were, and to
make enforcement of these obligations easier.
However, the Law Reform Division rejected the Law Commission’s hierarchical
structure in favour of a simple restatement of the existing common law duties.286 In
the absence of any explanation for this decision from the Law Reform Division, the
reasons for it are unclear,287 but the result is a set of enacted duties which are, in
many cases, no more precise than their common law predecessors. The major
difference is that now, with the duties set out in statutory form, they are much more
accessible and provide at least a “text of first resort” for directors to understand their
obligations.288 In addition, although it does not retain the hierarchical structure of
duties recommended by the Commission, the Companies Act 1993 does continue the
clear separation between corporate and personal rights (and hence the company and
its shareholders) by specifying which directors’ duties are owed to whom in sec
169(3).
                                                
284 NZLC R9 para. 194.
285 Law Commission draft Act ss 101 and 131(2) and (3), NZLC R9 p241 and 256.
286 See ss 131-149 of the Companies Act 1993. These include duties to act in good faith and in the
company’s best interests; to act for a “proper purpose”; not to create a substantial risk of serious loss
to creditors, or agree to an obligation unless the director reasonably believes that the company can
perform it; and a duty of reasonable care, diligence and skill.
287 Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 15-16. The Explanatory Note to the Companies Bill simply notes
that the Law Commission’s characterisation of the duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best
interests was not adopted, with no further comment: p vi.
288 Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 17 and 38-39.
77
The Commission’s recommendations on the expansion of shareholders’ enforcement
mechanisms,289 on the other hand, were followed closely in the 1993 Act, with the
exception of the recommendation that the Attorney General be given standing to
bring proceedings as if a shareholder when the public interest is affected.290 The Law
Reform Division was of the opinion that this recommendation had been overtaken by
the enforcement functions exercised by the Registrar of Companies and the Securities
Commission.291 Those provisions, modelled in part on existing North American
legislation,292 which are now available to shareholders to enforce directors’ duties
include:293
• Injunctions to restrain conduct which would contravene the company’s
constitution or the Act;294
• Derivative actions, with the leave of the court, in cases where the company
itself does not intend bringing proceedings or where it is not in the company’s
best interests to leave the conduct of proceedings in the hands of the board or
the general meeting;295
• Personal and representative actions for breaches of directors’ duties owed to
shareholders personally;296 and
• Proceedings for relief from oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or unfairly
prejudicial conduct.297 Failure to comply with certain provisions of the Act is
deemed to be unfairly prejudicial by sec 175.
                                                
289 NZLC R9 para. 564-585.
290 NZLC R9 para. 120 and 572; Law Commission draft Act sec 134, NZLC R9 p257.
291 Explanatory Note to the Companies Bill 1990, p viii.
292 The specifics of the relevant North American provisions are discussed above at p44-54.
293 See McKenzie, “Corporate Law Reform: The New Zealand Experience” (1994) 4 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 129, 140-141; Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of
Directors under the Companies Act 1993” (1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 36-37; and Fraser, “The
Companies Act 1993: Shareholders’ Remedies” (1994) 7 Auckland University Law Review 739.
294 Companies Act 1993 sec 164.
295 Sections 165-168.
296 Sections 169 and 173.
297 Section 174.
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3 Comment on the 1993 Reforms
Directors’ Duties
Opinion is divided on the current New Zealand enforcement regime, and on the
directors’ duties provisions in particular. Shirtcliffe strongly asserts that they go far
beyond what is necessary to ensure good corporate governance and that they have
resulted in “complexity, rising compliance costs, frustration and alarm” for company
managers.298 He complains that duties such as those now found in ss 135 and 136 of
the Act299 inhibit rather than encourage legitimate business risk taking, and should be
replaced with a lower minimum standard prohibiting fraud but not creating liability
for honest incompetence. Anything beyond that, he insists, should be a matter for
private negotiation:
“Creditors look at the credit risk of the company. They have the opportunity to
protect themselves by obtaining security or not extending credit to the company
at all. Each participant is a consenting party with the opportunity to opt in or
out. So why should company law need to dictate these standards for us? Who are
we protecting and why? Some answer that question by asking why we should care if
the minimum standards are set higher than freely contracting parties might choose
— doesn’t this result in better overall performance? There are two points to make
in response. First, the law should prescribe minimum standards that are efficient
and do not inhibit the key benefit of the corporate form [that is, limited liability].
Investors should be protected from fraud. But, assuming honesty, why does the law
protect against incompetence when investors could do so themselves? … Secondly,
the governance model prescribed by the Companies Act would not be problematic
if these standards were only a default option, which consenting investors and other
                                                
298 “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998] Company and
Securities Law Bulletin 66, 66.
299 Section 135, entitled “Reckless Trading”, provides that a director must not agree to the
company’s business being carried on, or cause or allow the company’s business to be carried on, “in a
manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors”. Section 136
(“Duty in Relation to Obligations”) prohibits a director agreeing to the company incurring an
obligation unless the director “believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be
able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so”. Both Watson (“Directors’ Duties in New
Zealand” [1998] Journal of Business Law 495, 501) and Gould (“Directors’ Personal Liability”
[1996] New Zealand Law Journal 437, 438) note that sec 135 is designed to capture a course of
conduct by a director, while sec 136 is aimed at one-off transactions.
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stakeholders could opt out of”.300
Others have also noted that, on their face, these provisions fail to take account of the
balance required between risk and return, as they focus only on risk rather than the
net expectation of gain.301 Perkins claims that the language of sec 135 “very
substantially undercuts the intent of the Act” as expressed in its Long Title,302 and
that sec 136 is also “inconsistent with the essential need for protection of risk-taking
decisions”.303
Tompkins, however, believes such concerns are overstated and that the statutory
duties are likely to lead to a commercially realistic approach from the courts:
“The words of emphasis in the phrase ‘a substantial risk of serious loss’ support
the view that a court is unlikely to consider a director in breach of that duty if the
risk of loss created is commensurate with the likelihood of profit”.
He also notes, however, that “if it is legitimate to balance the risk with the return, it
would have been preferable for the section to say so”.304 Gould is of the opinion that,
                                                
300 “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998] Company and
Securities Law Bulletin 66, 71. See also Oesterle, “Corporate Directors’ Personal Liability for
‘Insolvent’, ‘Reckless’ and ‘Wrongful’ Trading: A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung
Controlling Shareholders and Skittish Lenders” (2001) 7 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 20,
26 and 40-42.
301 Deane, “Besieged by Duties: Will the New Companies Act Work for Directors?”, paper presented
to the New Zealand Law Society and New Zealand Society of Accountants Company Law Conference
(1994), p2-3.
302 “(a) To reaffirm the value of the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits
through the … taking of business risks; and … (d) To encourage efficient and responsible
management of companies by allowing directors a wide discretion in matters of business judgment”.
303 “Corporate Governance and the Companies Act 1993”, paper presented to the New Zealand Law
Society and Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand Company Law Conference (1997),
p79-80. See also Goddard, “Directors’ Liability for Trading While Insolvent: A Critical View of the
New Zealand Regime”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Company Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading, CCH
Australia and Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (2000),
p185-187.
304 “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993” (1994) 2
Waikato Law Review 13, 26-28. Oesterle’s criticism of sec 135 is even harsher. He describes it as
demonstrating the “appalling mess that casual drafting can lead to on this issue”, and claims that, to
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if read correctly, sec 135 does require a balancing of risk and return. He concludes
that,
“In economic terms, ‘likely’ is intended to limit the scrutiny of sec 135 to the net
expectation created by the conduct of the business. A risk of loss in contravention
of the section is not likely unless the net expectation is a risk of loss … Unless
one is willing to treat the word ‘likely’ in sec 135 as superfluous, and ignore the
Long Title and commercial reality, the current wording cannot sensibly be
construed as inviting the plaintiff and the court to focus on the probability and
magnitude of loss to the neglect of the probability and magnitude of gain”.305
Although the courts have questioned this balancing approach to sec 135,306 on the
limited evidence of cases decided thus far under the reformed directors’ duties
provisions, it appears that liability will not be imposed unless the conduct in
question is obviously unreasonable and imprudent.307 In Nippon Express (New
Zealand) Ltd v Woodward, for example, Anderson J held two directors liable for
company debt accumulated as a result of their breach of duty. He held that their
conduct, in continuing to trade when the company was obviously hopelessly
insolvent with no prospect of a reprieve, was “almost beyond comprehension” and
amounted to “throwing good money after bad in blind hope”.308 A similar conclusion
                                                                                                                                         
apply it in a commercially realistic manner, requires courts to “torture the language to save Parliament
from embarrassment for a very poor job of drafting”: “Corporate Directors’ Personal Liability for
‘Insolvent’, ‘Reckless’ and ‘Wrongful’ Trading: A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung
Controlling Shareholders and Skittish Lenders” (2001) 7 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 20,
37.
305 “Directors’ Personal Liability” [1996] New Zealand Law Journal 437, 438. See also Watson,
“Directors’ Duties in New Zealand” [1998] Journal of Business Law 495, 500; Ross, Corporate
Reconstructions: Strategies for Directors, CCH New Zealand Ltd (1999), p40 and 45; and Farrar,
Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), p154.
306 O’Regan J in Fatupaito v Bates (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,583, 262,596 said: “Although it is not
directly relevant to the issue before me, I would hesitate to interpret sec 135 as allowing the kind of
balancing of risk and reward referred to by Tompkins J — it refers only to risk and does not qualify
the reference to risk by wording such as ‘except where the potential for substantial gain justifies the
taking of such risk’.”
307 The standard under sec 131, the duty to act “in good faith and in what the director believes to be
in the best interests of the company”, appears to be even lower, requiring only that a director
genuinely believes that an action is in the company’s interests.
308 (1998) 8 NZCLC 261,765, 261,774.
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was reached in Re Hilltop Group Ltd. The defendant director was held not to have
acted as a reasonable, prudent director would, with “the inevitable result … that the
creditors were funding the losses being continuously incurred by the company”.309
Shareholder Remedies
The 1993 Act’s shareholder remedies provisions, and their application by the courts,
have generally met with cautious approval,310 although some teething problems are
evident with the courts’ interpretation of the provisions. This is particularly true of
the statutory derivative action, the only “new” remedy,311 having no equivalent in the
previous legislation. The unfair prejudice remedy, which largely reproduces the
previous provision in sec 209 of the Companies Act 1955, continues to be applied
much as it was before the 1993 reforms.
Derivative Action
The derivative action312 is provided for in ss 165-168 of the Companies Act 1993,
which broadly follow ss 239-240 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.313
Section 165(1) provides that the court must grant leave before a shareholder or
director314 may commence, or intervene in, proceedings “in the name and on behalf of
                                                
309 (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,477, 262,489.
310 See, for example, Goddard, “Company Law Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand
Experience” (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236, 242; and Fernyhough,
“Effectiveness of Minority Shareholders’ Rights Under the Companies Act 1993”, paper presented to
the New Zealand Law Society and Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand Company Law
Conference (1997), p51.
311 The minority buy-out right is also new but, for the reasons set out at p44 above, is not discussed
in this thesis.
312 The following discussion is based in part on Berkahn, “The Derivative Action in Australia and
New Zealand: Will the Statutory Provisions Improve Shareholders’ Enforcement Rights?” (1998) 10
Bond Law Review 74, 90-97. See also Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand,
Oxford University Press (2001), p199-201.
313 See p48-54 above.
314 Note that the New Zealand Act’s grant of standing is considerably narrower than that given in
Canada. See the definition of “complainant” in sec 238 of the Canada Business Corporations Act,
refereed to at p49 above. The Canadian Act “reflects the view that corporate law should be self-
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the company”.315 In addition, sec 165(6) contains a provision not included in the
Canadian legislation, that a derivative action may not be brought unless sec 165 has
been complied with. Thus, all actions by shareholders or directors on behalf of
companies must now go through the statutory leave requirement of subsection (1),
and the common law action is now excluded. The intention seems to be to avoid the
uncertainty on this point which has arisen in Canada.316
Some confusion, however, about the nature and scope of the statutory derivative
action was apparent in the judgment of Fisher J in Vrij v Boyle,317 the first case to be
brought in New Zealand under sec 165. His Honour granted leave for the plaintiff to
commence proceedings on the company’s behalf, and noted that there was “no reason
why the company should not also have an independent claim against the Boyles,
which can be conducted at the same hearing as a derivative action”.318 This seems an
unusual statement, since a derivative action is itself an action on the company’s
behalf, ie. it is not separate from the company’s claim; and one of the rules for
granting leave in sec 165(3) (see below) is that the company does not intend to bring
proceedings itself.
This apparent confusion as to whether the derivative action is an action on the
shareholder’s behalf, or on the company’s, also seems to appear in the judgment of
                                                                                                                                         
enforcing so that all those who might be adversely affected by misconduct on the part of directors
should be able to take action in respect of it”: Taylor, “The Derivative Action in the Companies Act
1993” (1999) 7 Canterbury Law Review 314, 316. However, Taylor also notes the tendency of the
Canadian courts to limit standing to shareholders and directors, on the grounds that others generally
lack a “bona fide potential financial stake in the outcome of the derivative action”: Schafer v
International Capital Corp. [1997] 5 WWR 99, 104. See also Discovery Enterprises Inc. v Ebco
Industries Ltd (1997) 40 BCLR (3d) 43.
315 Although, in theory, the derivative action could be used to pursue any right of action that the
company has, whether against outside parties or its own errant directors, in practice its key role is in
the enforcement of directors’ duties: see Taylor, “The Derivative Action in the Companies Act 1993”
(1999) 7 Canterbury Law Review 314, 314; and Thai, “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions
in Australia? Comparisons with United States, Canada and New Zealand” (2002) 30 Australian
Business Law Review 118, 127.
316 See p50-51 above.
317 [1995] 3 NZLR 763.
318 Ibid at 767.
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Kerr J in a later application by Boyle to strike out certain parts of Vrij’s claim. His
Honour stated that
“the effect of Foss v Harbottle ... seems to be that ordinarily a wrong done to a ...
company may, prima facie, only be sued on by the company itself. But if the
wrong done amounts to a fraud on the minority ..., and the wrongdoers are in
control of the company,319 then the minority may bring an action themselves ...
[Section 165(6)] restricts a member’s ability to bring proceedings, but only ‘in the
name of and on behalf of the company’, and not on a member’s own behalf”.320
He then briefly noted the possibility of a member bringing a personal action against
the company or its directors for a breach of duties owed to members. If all of this
means that an action by a member arising from a fraud on the minority belongs in the
category of personal actions (as Kerr J appears, from the context, to be suggesting),
then this defeats the purpose of sec 165(6), and indeed the statutory derivative action
as a whole. Such an interpretation blurs the distinction, not only between personal
and derivative actions, but also between the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle and
the statutory provision of sec 165.
The judgment of Elias J in Techflow (NZ) Ltd v Techflow Pty. Ltd321 perhaps indicates
a better grasp of the true nature of the provision. In this case, a director of the
plaintiff company brought an action under the sec 165 procedure, hoping to be able
to recover costs pursuant to sec 166 (see below). Elias J held that:
“The significant matters the court has to address in deciding whether to invoke
the power under [sec 165] are whether the proceedings are in the interests of the
company, whether they will be maintained by those in control of the company,
and whether they are proceedings appropriately brought ... The advantage to [the
plaintiff] as a shareholder ... seems to me at best a fringe concern”.322
                                                
319 The two elements of the “fraud on the minority” exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, as set
out in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, 1067.
320 Unreported, High Court Auckland, CP 31/94; 14 March 1996, p11-12 (emphasis added).
321 (1996) 7 NZCLC 261,138.
322 Ibid at 261,141 (emphasis added).
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Under sec 165(2), in determining whether to grant leave, the court must have regard
to:
(a) The likelihood of the proceedings succeeding;
(b) The costs of the proceedings in relation to likely relief ;
(c) Any action already taken by the company to obtain relief; and
(d) The “interests of the company” in commencing or continuing the
proceedings.
These factors do not, however, limit the court’s discretion under sec 165(1). In
addition, under sec 165(3), the court must be satisfied that either:
(a) The company does not intend to bring or continue proceedings itself; or
(b) It is not in the company’s interests to leave the conduct of the
proceedings to the directors or the shareholders as a whole.
These criteria are likely to be met when the alleged wrongdoer(s) control the
company, either through a majority shareholding or control of the board.323 Although
the Canadian provisions contain broadly similar “rules for granting leave” as appear
in sec 165(3), the listing of matters to which the court must merely “have regard”
seems to be unique to the New Zealand Act. However, the Canadian case law is
probably still useful in interpreting subsection (2) as, although these matters are not
particularly mentioned in the Canadian legislation, they are still relevant factors in the
overall assessment of whether the action is in the company’s best interests, to which
sec 239(2)(c) of the Canadian Act does refer.
A similar approach to that employed in Canada324 was followed by Fisher J in Vrij v
Boyle, where his Honour said that it was not for him “to conduct an interim trial on
the merits” of the claim. He concluded that in relation to “the likelihood of the
                                                
323 Taylor, “The Derivative Action in the Companies Act 1993” (1999) 7 Canterbury Law Review
314, 323-324.
324 See p52 above.
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proceedings succeeding” under sec 165(2), the appropriate test was that set out in
Smith v Croft,325 ie:
“That which would be exercised by a prudent business person in the conduct of his
or her own affairs when deciding whether to bring a claim. Such a decision requires
one to consider such matters as the amount at stake, the apparent strength of the
claim and the prospect of executing any judgment”.326
Leave was granted in the Vrij case on the grounds that “it could hardly be contested”
that the defendant owed fiduciary duties to the company, and the affidavit evidence
presented would, if accepted, take the plaintiff’s claim that these duties had been
breached “some distance”. Applying the same test, Elias J in Techflow (NZ) Ltd v
Techflow Pty. Ltd refused to grant leave, holding that the financial advantage to the
plaintiff in using the sec 165 procedure would not have persuaded a “prudent
business person” to take action. In addition, the costs of the proposed litigation
would have been disproportionate to the amount realistically at issue and, in any
case, the derivative action was “unnecessarily cumbersome and inappropriate”, and a
more convenient course of action would be the taking of accounts between the
shareholders as part of the liquidation process.327
The “prudent business person” test has been criticised by Fitzsimons as too
conservative, given that in New Zealand shareholders are left to enforce their own
rights, rather than being able to rely on a strong state regulatory body as in, for
example, Australia. If the provision is to serve its stated purpose of increasing
shareholder protection, “the courts should take a robust approach to
applications”.328 Fitzsimons also describes Fisher J’s comment that an interim trial of
                                                
325 [1986] 1 WLR 580.
326 [1995] 3 NZLR 763, 765. See also Techflow (NZ) Ltd v Techflow Pty. Ltd (1996) 7 NZCLC
261,138, 261,140-261,141; AIDC Ltd v ANZ Banking Group New Zealand Ltd (1996) 1 BCSLR
194, 200 and 210; MacFarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261,470, 261,473; Thorrington v
McCann (1998) 8 NZCLC 261,564, 261,569; and McKay v PHC Holdings Ltd (1998) 8 NZCLC
261,603, 261,608.
327 It had already been decided that Techflow (NZ) Ltd should cease trading and be wound up and the
plaintiff, as a shareholder and director, could have made an application to the court for the
appointment of a liquidator on “just and equitable” grounds.
328 “The Companies Act 1993: A New Approach to Shareholder Litigation in New Zealand” (1997)
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the case’s merits should not be conducted as inconsistent with the requirement of sec
165(2)(a) to consider the likelihood of success. He suggests that “an arguable case” or
“reasonable prospects”, in line with the Canadian and Australian approaches,329
would be a more suitable test, although he concedes that Fisher J’s observation that
the evidence presented “might be thought to take the claim some distance” appears to
set a low threshold, lower perhaps that a prudent business person might employ.330
A statement made by Fisher J in the course of his judgment that the broad discretion
to grant leave conferred by sec 165(1) is “undiminished by the particular
considerations referred to in later subsections”, ie. subsections (2) and (3),331 seems
to indicate a lack of familiarity with the provision or its objectives. While this is true
of subsection (2), subsection (3) clearly states that leave may be granted only if the
company itself does not intend to bring proceedings, or if it is not in the company’s
interests to leave the conduct of the proceedings to the directors or the shareholders
in general. Such comments may merely have been a symptom of the provision’s
newness when the case was heard, but they could serve to defeat its purpose
somewhat if followed in subsequent cases.332
Section 166 provides that, when an application is made, the court must order that the
costs of the proceedings will be paid by the company, rather than the applicant
personally, unless this would be “unjust or inequitable”. In contrast, the Canadian
provision merely gives the court the discretion to make an order with regard to costs.
This provision seems to be designed to overcome the disincentive to litigate stemming
                                                                                                                                         
18 The Company Lawyer 306, 308. In contrast, Borrowdale believes that the Smith v Croft test is too
liberal, and that it “obscures the purpose of the legislation, which is that a derivative action should
not be allowed to proceed unless it is more likely than not to succeed in a practical sense. It is not
enough that the applicant is able to show that the company has an arguable case”: “The Statutory
Derivative Action” [2000] New Zealand Law Journal 409, 410.
329 Section 237(2)(d) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 requires that there be “a serious
question to be tried” before leave will be granted.
330 Note that in the later case of MacFarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261,470, 261,477, Master
Venning concluded that a “prudent business person” would bring a claim if he or she had an arguable
case.
331 Vrij v Boyle [1995] 3 NZLR 763, 767.
332 See Watson and Morgan, “A Matter of Balance: The Statutory Derivative Action in New Zealand”
(1998) 19 The Company Lawyer 236, 237.
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from the normal rule that the losing party will also pay the other side’s costs.
Arguments have, however, been raised regarding the effectiveness of the provision in
relieving this “deterrent effect”. For example, a comparison may be made  between
sec 166 and sec 18(5) of the Securities Markets Act 1988 (NZ),333 an apparently
more generous provision which provides that in a derivative action for insider trading
brought under that Act, the company will always be liable for the shareholder’s costs,
irrespective of the result. It is unclear whether liability for costs under sec 166
proceeds on the same basis, ie. whether the section includes the defendant’s costs,
which the applicant may be responsible for if the action is unsuccessful. It could be
argued that the policy arguments in favour of both provisions are similar, and that
therefore it should, despite the more vague wording of sec 166.
If the courts do adopt a generous approach to sec 166, this may in fact work against
an applicant’s chances of being granted leave under sec 165. In Re Wilson Neill Ltd, a
case brought under the Securities Markets Act 1988, Heron J said:
“It is no small matter to allow a free hand to a third party to undertake complex
litigation at the expense of a public company containing many shareholders quite
removed from this dispute ... The court should therefore act with considerable
caution in exercising this discretion in favour of applicants for leave”.334
Although comparisons with the derivative action under the Securities Markets Act
may provide some guidance as to the attitude which the courts will take in exercising
their discretion under sec 166, the comments of Heron J above highlight one
important difference between the two provisions. While an action for insider trading
may concern a dispute from which most of the shareholders are removed, under sec
165 of the Companies Act 1993 all shareholders (other than the wrongdoers) will, in
principle, have the same interest. This factor should lead to a higher threshold before
the cost to the company will dissuade a court from granting leave under sec 165.335
                                                
333 See Fitzsimons, “The Companies Act 1993: A New Approach to Shareholder Litigation in New
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Boyle was satisfied, the issue of costs was not seen as significant in determining that leave should be
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Fisher J’s treatment of costs in Vrij v Boyle336 seems to be in conflict with the
wording and intent of sec 166 on a number of counts. He held that questions of costs
and indemnity from the company should be reserved until after the substantive
proceedings had been concluded, whereas sec 166 in fact requires that the applicant
be indemnified at the time of the application for leave; and decided on the basis of the
outcome of the action on its merits, while sec 166 states that an order for costs must
be given unless this would be “unjust or inequitable”.
His Honour also ordered that the costs of the application for leave (as opposed to the
substantive proceedings) were to be paid by the first defendant, Mr Boyle, rather
than by the company. Section 166 refers to the company’s liability for costs
associated with “the proceedings” only, which may be interpreted as referring to the
trial itself but not to the application for leave. On its face, this is a reasonable
interpretation (given that whenever the term “the proceedings” is used in sec 165, it
refers only to the substantive proceedings), although perhaps not one which was
intended. There is arguably a certain injustice about absolving the company of those
costs, but awarding them in respect of the substantive trial.
Thai notes “the uncertainties in the interpretation of sec 166 regarding the
shareholders’ litigation costs” arising from Fisher J’s judgment and expresses concern
that
“The restrictive approach adopted by the court in Vrij v Boyle … has discouraged
[other applicants] from following suit. The case has projected a financial
disincentive for the shareholder litigant”.337
Section 167 gives the court power to make whatever orders it thinks fit regarding the
conduct of the proceedings, including matters such as the provision of information
and assistance to the applicant by the company or its directors, and the direct
                                                                                                                                         
granted. See also Watson and Morgan, “A Matter of Balance: The Statutory Derivative Action in New
Zealand” (1998) 19 The Company Lawyer 236, 240.
336 [1995] 3 NZLR 763, 768.
337 “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States,
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payment of any amount awarded in the proceedings to shareholders rather than to the
company itself.
Once leave has been granted under sec 165, the proceedings may not be settled,
compromised or discontinued without court approval.338 As with the equivalent
Canadian provision, this is designed to prevent the paying off of applicants in return
for discontinuing an action, and to discourage strike suits. Such court supervision
may also have the effect of encouraging equitable settlement. This possibility was
suggested by Fisher J in Vrij v Boyle. He advised the parties to consider mediation, as
an alternative to litigation, on the grounds that “the type of issues involved in this
case [basically an intra-corporate dispute between business partners] and no doubt
the desire of all parties to get on with more profitable activities than putting their
time and energy and money into litigation, make that a particularly suitable
course”.339 It has been observed that this is probably true only in cases involving
closely held companies, as “a claim against an officer of a listed company would not
necessarily be so amenable to mediation”.340 However, this is balanced by the fact
that claims of this type are much more likely to involve smaller companies, due to the
“intimate and illiquid” nature of the participants’ relationship in such cases.341 As
noted by Farrar, “the case for [shareholder enforcement] rights is strongest in relation
to small incorporated firms. In public listed companies, one can always sell one’s
shares”.342
Remedy for Unfair Prejudice
The approach taken by the New Zealand courts to sec 174 of the Companies Act
1993 can be traced to the judgment of Richardson J in Thomas v H.W. Thomas
                                                
338 Companies Act 1993 (NZ) sec 168.
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Ltd,343 a case brought under the equivalent provision in sec 209 of the Companies
Act 1955 after its amendment in 1980.344 Prior to this case, few actions had been
brought under sec 209 due to the restrictive approach adopted by the courts.345
However, since then Richardson J’s more liberal interpretation of the amended
remedy, in line with the approach taken by the Canadian courts to sec 241 of the
Canada Business Corporations Act,346 has led to a much greater use of the provision.
His Honour held that:
“The three expressions [oppression, unfair discrimination and unfair prejudice]
overlap, each in a sense helps to explain the other, and read together they reflect
the underlying concern of the subsection that conduct of the company which is
unjustly detrimental to any member of the company, whatever form it takes and
whether it adversely affects all members alike or discriminates against some only,
is a legitimate foundation for a complaint”.347
Richardson J also noted that, as the section gave the court jurisdiction to grant relief
when it was “just and equitable” to do so, equitable considerations should be applied
to the remedy as expressed in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries.348 He held that sec
209 was
“a remedial provision designed to allow the court to intervene where there is a
visible departure from the standards of fair dealing … in the light of the history
and structure of the particular company and the reasonable expectations of the
members”.349
The initial intentions and legitimate expectations of shareholders — whether
expressed formally or not — have been used as a basis for assessing what is just and
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equitable in a number of subsequent New Zealand cases brought under sec 209, for
example Vujnovich v Vujnovich350 and Lusk and Archive Security Ltd,351 and continue
to represent perhaps the overriding principles used in applying sec 174 of the 1993
Act. In Cornes v Kawerau Hotel (1994) Ltd Wild J cited both Thomas and Ebrahimi
and held that, as the plaintiff was being “excluded from the benefits he was intended
to receive from … the company”, a remedy under sec 174 was appropriate.352 In
Seimer v Paragon Oil Systems Ltd Hammond J took a similarly expansive view,
noting that
“By this remedy, this court is given a wide discretion to review any type of
corporate activity and grant a wide range of relief … The remedy is intended to
protect minority shareholders from exploitation and against being deprived of
their fair share of the enterprise”.353
Ramsay’s observations about the use of the remedy in Australia354 appear to apply
equally in New Zealand. He found that it is mainly used in disputes concerning
closely held companies; that often most or all of the shareholders in the companies
concerned are involved in management and that exclusion from management is among
the most common reasons for an application for relief; and that the courts have
adopted a fact-driven approach to the provision, “which inevitably results in tests of
board application being required to cover a wide range of facts which may constitute
oppression”.355
A new element of the remedy, introduced as part of the 1993 reforms, is the deeming
of certain conduct to be unfairly prejudicial. Section 175 provides that failure to
comply with a number of provisions356 “is conduct which is unfairly prejudicial for
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the purposes of section 174”. None of these breaches (except a failure of a director to
sign a certificate required before some actions can be taken under the Act)357
constitute offences. The policy behind sec 175 is to promote private action for
breaches of the specified provisions.
Despite its open-endedness and consequent uncertainty of application, the remedy
for unfair prejudice has largely escaped criticism, even from those commentators who
have complained bitterly about other aspects of the 1993 Act.358 This is probably
due to the provision’s long-standing place in New Zealand’s company law, and the
fact that it does not generally result in liability for company directors or managers.
Instead, more often than not, the remedy sought is a buy-out of the complaining
shareholder, allowing that person to depart from a company that no longer meets his
or her expectations.
4 Public Enforcement in New Zealand
The Registrar of Companies
The proposed role of the Registrar of Companies under the Law Commission’s draft
Companies Act was confined to receiving and filing documents and the maintenance
of various registers.359 The Law Reform Division of the Department of Justice,
however, decided against limiting the Registrar’s functions to this degree and re-
introduced into the Companies Act 1993 the existing powers to inspect relevant
documents for the purposes of detecting offences under the Companies, Financial
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Reporting and Securities Acts,360 and to prohibit any person from being involved in
the management of a company where that person’s mismanagement has contributed
to a company’s insolvency.361
The Registrar also has the primary enforcement role with regard to offences under the
Securities Act, including those involving offers and allotments of securities in breach
of the Act, and misstatements in registered prospectuses and advertisements for
securities.362
Other functions of the Registrar are mainly of an administrative nature. These include
the registration of companies under Part II of the Companies Act 1993 and the
reservation of company names under Part IV of the Act. With the simplification of
the registration process brought about by the 1993 Act, the Registrar’s functions in
these areas are not as extensive as they were previously.363
Any person aggrieved364 by any act or decision of the Registrar under the Companies
or Securities Act may appeal to the High Court.365 Almost all such appeals to date
have arisen from decisions relating to company names.366
The Securities Commission
The role of the New Zealand Securities Commission, established by sec 9 of the
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Securities Act 1978, has been described as giving “legal clothing to what is essentially
a coherent ... system of self regulation”.367 Section 10 of the Act sets out the current
functions of the Commission. These include:
• Reviewing the law and practice relating to bodies corporate and securities, and
recommending changes thereto that it considers are necessary. The Commission
may undertake in-depth investigations into particular transactions, although it
may only make recommendations to the Minister, or comment to any
“appropriate body” in such cases, rather than take any direct action;368
• Co-operation with overseas securities commissions, including the obtaining of
information to assist such bodies in performing their functions;
• The promotion of public understanding of securities law and practice; and
• Since 1 June 2001, the provision of administrative and support services to the
Takeovers Panel established under the Takeovers Act 1993.
The Commission is thus primarily concerned with law reform369 and acting as a
“watchdog” for the investing public, rather than with enforcement as such. The
authors of a leading securities law commentary categorically state that “the Securities
Commission is not an enforcement agency”;370 and a former chairman of the
Commission has stated that
“The Commission is a committee of the market place whose main function is to
facilitate the operation of a securities market. It is not consistent with that
function to impose an enforcement role on the Commission.”371
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However, as noted by the Ministry of Commerce in its 1997 review of the
Commission’s role,372 the Commission does have a number of powers which may be
categorised as powers of enforcement. These include the power to prohibit or
suspend the distribution of an investment statement, registered prospectus or
advertisement for securities on the grounds that it is misleading or deceptive or does
not comply with the Securities Act,373 and the power to apply to the court for orders
directing substantial security holders in public issuers to disclose their interests.374
In addition, the New Zealand government has recently embarked on a campaign to
“toughen up … securities law and improve confidence in the market”,375 including
significant increases in the enforcement powers of the Securities Commission. There
is a perception that New Zealand’s securities laws have hitherto not been effectively
enforced, with concern particularly being expressed about the enforcement of the
insider trading provisions in the Securities Markets Act 1988 (until 1 December 2002
known as the Securities Amendment Act 1988). Following a 1987 report from the
Commission, the 1988 Act initially did not include any provision for public
enforcement action.376 Instead, the conduct of such action fell to either the companies
whose shares were traded or their shareholders.377
In a 1995 article, Fitzsimons notes that, although the Commission then had no formal
enforcement role, it had “found itself playing an increasing role in the regulation and
detection of insider trading, in the almost total absence of shareholder and public
issuer actions”, by way of its powers of investigation. Investigations by the
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Commission have either suggested, or provided evidence of, insider trading.378
Fitzsimons suggested that the right of private action should be complemented by
“appropriate public enforcement” by the Commission, at least when there is no other
adequate avenue of remedy available or if the case affects a significant number of
market participants.379 Kirby, summarising the conclusions of the participants in two
symposia on insider trading and securities regulation hosted by the University of
Auckland in 1996, also notes that the law as it was then was not working and that a
greater enforcement role for the Commission was desirable:
“Because of the impediments demonstrated in the relatively few cases which have
been brought to the courts in New Zealand,380 it cannot be said that the New
Zealand legislation has operated as an efficient sanction and thus an effective
deterrent to those tempted to engage in insider trading … The New Zealand law …
represents a relatively weak link in the chain of legislation that exists in most
English-speaking developed countries. It gives the appearance of affording a
sanction; but in reality falls far short of that appearance”.381
In response to these concerns, the government enacted the Securities Markets
Amendment Act 2002, with effect from 1 December of that year. One of the key
changes to the previous law contained therein was the establishment of the Securities
Commission as a civil enforcement body for insider trading, and for new continuous
disclosure rules. Specifically, the renamed Securities Markets Act 1988 was amended
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by adding provisions allowing the Commission to exercise the public issuer’s right of
action against an insider, if it considers that it is in the public interest to do so.382 The
Commission is now entitled to bring proceedings without leave of the court if the
company itself or another person has not done so, and to commence action or take
over proceedings already initiated by the company or another person with the leave
of the court. The court will grant leave if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest
for proceedings to be brought or continued, and for the Commission to control those
proceedings.383 New continuous disclosure obligations, under which public issuers
and their directors and officers are required to disclose material inside information
that is not generally available to the market immediately after becoming aware of it,
are also enforceable by the Commission.384 These reforms represent a deliberate
attempt to move New Zealand’s securities laws closer to those of Australia.385
As well as the reform contained in the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002, the
government has also commenced a fundamental review of New Zealand’s securities
trading laws. Four discussion documents were released by the Ministry of Economic
Development between May and November 2002, including one reviewing the
penalties and remedies which apply to breaches of such laws.386 Submissions have
been invited on issues such as whether criminal penalties should be introduced for
insider trading and for breaches of continuous disclosure requirements; whether
                                                                                                                                         
381 “Ten Conclusions”, in Rickett and Grantham (Ed.), Essays on Insider Trading and Securities
Regulation, Brookers (1997), p274-275.
382 Section 18A of the Securities Markets Act 1988.
383 Section 18B of the Securities Markets Act 1988.
384 Sections 19I, 19L and 19X of the Securities Markets Act 1988.
385 See Diaz, “Securities Law to Rid Market of ‘Wild-west’ Image”, The Independent (Auckland), 14
November 2001, p15; Swain, “Trans-Tasman Regulatory Coordination: The Gains for New Zealand”,
speech to Institute for International Research Ltd, 13 March 2002; and “Improving Confidence in Our
Securities Markets: Protecting the Rights of Small Investors”, press release from the Office of the
Hon. Paul Swain, Minister of Commerce, 2 July 2002.
386 Ministry of Economic Development, Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume Three —
Penalties, Remedies and the Application of Securities Trading Law, Discussion Document (May
2002). See also Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume One — Insider Trading Fundamental
Review, Discussion Document (May 2002); Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume Two —
Market Manipulation Law, Discussion Document (May 2002); and Substantial Security Holder
Disclosure, Discussion Document (November 2002).
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criminal penalties should replace or be added to civil remedies;387 the burden of proof
that should apply to insider trading offences; and which body or bodies should have
the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting such offences.388
D Australian Reforms
While New Zealand seeks to strengthen its public enforcement regime (at least in the
area of securities law), Australian reforms have recently focused on increasing the
enforcement rights of private parties.
Enforcement of corporate rights and duties in Australia has traditionally been largely
the domain of state agencies like the ASIC. Farrar notes that:
“Each country approaches corporate governance from the background of its own
distinctive culture … In the case of Australia one sometimes has the impression
that this is based on either Ned Kelly or his jailor. We love a larrikin but we are
inclined to come down heavily on ‘tall poppies’ and to be excessively penal in our
approach. The attitude to the excesses of the 1980s and their aftermath reflects
this. We also have a tendency to over-legislate and the result is obese and user-
unfriendly legislation”.389
However, in a reform process that has been almost continuous since at least 1992,
attempts have been made both to rid Australian company law of much of its
unnecessary complexity, and to lessen its reliance on public enforcement. These
                                                
387 It is noted that “many regimes have moved toward adopting … both civil and criminal penalties
(for example the United States and Australia). Under these regimes criminal penalties provide
deterrence and the civil penalties provide a recourse for individuals who have suffered loss or where
the standard of proof for criminal proceedings is hard to meet. This dual regime gives some
flexibility”: Ministry of Economic Development, Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume Three
— Penalties, Remedies and the Application of Securities Trading Law, Discussion Document (May
2002), para. 165.
388 The Securities Commission, Registrar of Companies and Serious Fraud Office are all considered,
as well as the possibility that two or more of these bodies could work in tandem; for example the
Commission could utilise its expertise in detection and investigation, and another body with more
experience in conducting criminal proceedings could bring prosecutions: Ibid at para. 205-219.
389 Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), p6.
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reforms have been implemented, first as part of the Australian government’s
Corporations Law Simplification Program (“CLSP”) and, since March 1997, the
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (“CLERP”).390 Like New Zealand,
Australia has been influenced in these reforms by the North American company law
model. Although the company constitution is still regarded in Australia as a contract
between the company and its members, directors and company secretaries, and
between members inter se,391 the constitutional model under the Australian Act also
has key similarities to the North American and New Zealand models.392 Pursuant to
ss 134 and 135 of the Corporations Act 2001, a company is governed by the rules set
out in the company’s own constitutional document (if any) as well as statutory
“replaceable rules” which the constitution may displace or modify. This is, in effect,
a very similar arrangement to that which applies in New Zealand and Canada.
Sections 27 and 30 of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) provide that
“If a company has a constitution, the company, the board, each director and each
shareholder of the company have the rights, powers, duties and obligations set out
                                                
390 See Callinan, “The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program: An Overview”, paper presented to
the Corporations Law Update Conference, Sydney (1998); and Black, Bostock, Golding and Healey,
CLERP and the New Corporations Law, Butterworths (1998).
391 Corporations Act 2001 sec 140(1). In terms of the common law, the memorandum and articles of
association of a company only formed a contract between the company and its members and between
the members inter se: see discussion at p33-35 above. This arrangement was recognised by the
legislatures of the United Kingdom, New Zealand (until 1993), Australia (until 1986, when the
predecessor of sec 140(1)(b) was enacted) and South Africa: see Sealy, “The Enforcement of
Partnership Agreements, Articles of Association and Shareholder Agreements”, in Finn (Ed.), Equity
and Commercial Relationships, The Law Book Co. Ltd (1987), p92-93; and Stanham v National
Trust of Australia (NSW) (1989) 15 ACLR 87, 90. Under such an arrangement, the directors do not
have standing to enforce the constitution, but in Australia they do under sec 140(1)(b). This has the
following consequences. Firstly, directors and secretaries can derive contractual rights in relation to
the company directly from the constitution, and may avail themselves of the remedies available for a
breach of this contract in the same way as members. This is quite unique and different from other
common law jurisdictions where a separate contract between the director or secretary and the company
must exist before those parties can claim contractual rights and remedies. Secondly, the company also
derives similar contractual rights and remedies in relation to each director and the secretary from the
constitution.
392 Finlay notes the “New Zealand and United States influences on the CLERP proposals”: “CLERP:
Non-executive Directors’ Duty of Care, Monitoring and the Business Judgment Rule” (1999) 27
Australian Business Law Review 98, 98.
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in this Act, except to the extent that they are negated or modified, in accordance
with this Act, by the constitution of the company”;
and that
“the constitution of a company may contain —
(a) Matters contemplated by this Act for inclusion in the constitution of a
company; and
(b) Such other matters as the company wishes to include in its constitution”.
Of similar effect is sec 6(2) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, which
provides that “the articles [of incorporation] may set out any provision permitted by
this Act or by law to be set out in the by-laws of the corporation”.393
The net effect in each jurisdiction is that certain provisions in the legislation will
apply to a company unless a constitution is adopted and those provisions are
specifically displaced or modified. Replaceable rules are specifically designated as
such in Australia and are listed in sec 141 of the Corporations Act 2001. Provisions
that may be displaced or modified are identified in the New Zealand and Canadian
statutes by statements to the effect that they are “subject to the constitution” or
“subject to the articles and the by-laws”.
Section 136(1)(a) of the Australian Act provides a subtle disincentive for companies
to adopt a constitution by requiring that, for companies incorporated after 1 July
1998,394 all persons specified in the company’s application for registration as
members must agree “in writing to the terms of a constitution before the application
is lodged”. Section 136(1)(b) further provides that a special resolution is required to
                                                
393 In Canada the articles of incorporation set out the basic provisions concerning the corporation —
its name, the structure of its share capital, its registered office, the number of directors and any
restrictions on the business in which it may engage. Subordinate rules called by-laws may contain
more detailed rules. The articles and by-laws together constitute what is now described in the New
Zealand and Australian Acts as the “constitution”: see McGuinness, The Law and Practice of
Canadian Business Corporations, Butterworths Canada (1999), p123-125; and Welling, “From Our
Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of a Corporate Constitution” [1996] Company and Securities
Law Bulletin 123, 124-125.
394 See sec 135(1) of the Corporations Act 2001.
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adopt a constitution if one is not adopted on registration. It appears from this that
the norm for companies incorporated in Australia after 1 July 1998 is not to have a
constitution, in which case the internal management of such companies is governed
primarily by the statutory “replaceable rules”. In this regard the arrangement in both
Canada and New Zealand is fundamentally the same as in Australia.395
In addition to those provisions which may be modified by the constitution, the Act
sets out mandatory minimum standards for directors and remedies for shareholders
which cannot be contracted out of. Black, Bostock, Golding and Healey396 summarise
the key reforms in this area as follows:
• Clarification of the standard of care and diligence required of directors, taking
into account the particular circumstances of the company, and the director’s
office and responsibilities;397
• A reformulation of the duty to act “honestly”, in the form of a duty to act in
good faith and for a proper purpose;398
• The introduction of a statutory business judgment rule, providing protection
for business judgments made by directors if certain criteria are met;399
• The introduction of a “safe harbour” for directors who rely on information
and advice provided by others;400
• A statutory recognition of a director’s ability to delegate;401
• Clarification of the circumstances in which directors may be indemnified for
                                                
395 See ss 5 and 173(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act and ss 12(1)(f) and 32(1) of the
Companies Act 1993 (NZ). The Canadian position is slightly different to that of Australia or New
Zealand, in that every company must register articles of incorporation as part of the incorporation
process. However, although this means that every Canadian company has a constitution, “for many
corporations it is likely to be one page long and not particularly comprehensive”: Welling, “From Our
Canadian Correspondent: The Nature of a Corporate Constitution” [1996] Company and Securities
Law Bulletin 123, 125.
396 CLERP and the New Corporations Law, Butterworths (1998), p4.
397 Corporations Act 2001 sec 180(1).
398 Section 181.
399 Section 180(2).
400 Corporations Act 2001 sec 189.
401 Sections 190 and 198D.
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legal costs;402
• A limited reformulation of the provisions governing related party
transactions403 and the remedy for unfair prejudice;404 and
• The introduction of a statutory derivative action, allowing individual
shareholders to bring proceedings on behalf of a company for breaches of
directors’ duties or against third parties, with leave of the court, if the
company is unwilling to do so.405
1 Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Remedies
The Corporations Act 2001 Part 2D.1, Division 1 provides a list of statutory
directors’ duties similar to those found in ss 131-138 of New Zealand’s Companies
Act 1993 and sec 122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.406 Such duties have
appeared in Australia’s corporate legislation since the early 1960s.407 Australia has
also had a remedy for unfairly prejudiced shareholders since that time408 and, with
effect from 13 March 2000, now also has a statutory derivative action,409 continuing
                                                
402 Section 199A.
403 Chapter 2E.
404 Part 2F.1.
405 Part 2F.1A.
406 In addition to the duties set out in s 180 and 181 (noted immediately above), a director, officer or
employee must not improperly use his or her position, or information obtained by reason of that
position, to gain an advantage for him or herself or for someone else, or to cause detriment to the
corporation: ss 182-183. Sections 588G-588H (which appear in Part 5.7B: “Recovering Property or
Compensation for the Benefit of Creditors of Insolvent Company”) set out the duty of directors to
prevent the company incurring debts when it is insolvent.
407 See Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis (loose-leaf),
para. 8.065.
408 The original United Kingdom oppression remedy in the Companies Act 1948 was the model for
sec 186 of the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961.
409 Corporations Act 2001 Part 2F.1A, introduced by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program
Act 1999. See De Vere Stevens, “Should We Toss Foss? Towards an Australian Statutory Derivative
Action” (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review 127; and Berkahn, “The Derivative Action in
Australia and New Zealand: Will the Statutory Provisions Improve Shareholders’ Enforcement
Rights?” (1998) 10 Bond Law Review 74.
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what some commentators410 have interpreted as a move towards a more self-
regulatory approach to enforcing directors’ duties. As noted below,411 however, the
ASIC retains a very strong regulatory role.
The stated aim of the statutory derivative action is “to facilitate private parties to
enforce existing rights attaching to the company — effectively the action is designed
as a self-help measure”.412 The ASIC is therefore not included as an eligible applicant
under the derivative action, as
“the basic policy objective of derivative proceedings is to provide an effective
remedy for investors and to overcome the difficulties in Foss v Harbottle — there
is no proper role for the ASIC to bring such proceedings. In particular, the
statutory action is not intended to be regulatory in nature ... In this regard, a
statutory derivative action has the potential to remove some of the regulatory
burden from the ASIC by making it easier for investors to protect the interests of
the company.”413
Those persons who are entitled to bring proceedings on behalf of a company are
members, former members, persons entitled to be registered as members, officers and
                                                
410 See, for example, Farrar’s comment that one of the aims of the enactment of the statutory
derivative action was to “shift the role of corporate enforcer back to the private sector”: Corporate
Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), p197. Such a conclusion
(although it has not been borne out in practice, perhaps due to a spate of corporate collapses in 2001
and 2002) is not unreasonable, given statements made by government and law reform bodies which
seem to emphasise a preference for private over public enforcement. The Company and Securities
Advisory Committee notes, under the heading “The Goals of Law Reform”, that “in many respects,
private enforcement accomplished via shareholder litigation may be preferable to public enforcement”
and (quoting the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance) “when the legal
system assigns a substantial enforcement role to private litigation, there is less need to rely on public
agencies and, in turn, the tendency of such public agencies to expand their jurisdiction is less likely
to produce excessive bureaucratic regulation of private enterprise”: Report on a Statutory Derivative
Action (1993), p4-5. See also the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform
Program Bill 1998, para. 6.30, noted below.
411 See p125-134 below.
412 Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, para.
6.30.
413 Ibid.
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former officers of the company.414
The policies behind Australia’s latest reforms are discernible from the Treasury
discussion document, Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance: Facilitating
Innovation and Protecting Investors, produced in 1997. Among these policies were
the development of a flexible and adaptable regulatory framework, and the
achievement of an appropriate balance between state regulation and self regulation by
private parties. Private enforcement, through such means as the statutory derivative
action, was seen as “a more effective avenue of enforcement that has previously been
available”, as it would “provide strong encouragement for company managers to be
accountable to shareholders for the decisions they make”.415
2 Comment on the CLSP and CLERP Reforms
Directors’ Duties
As in New Zealand, it has been suggested by some that the statutory directors’
duties represent an overly regulatory approach to corporate governance, which has
the potential to inhibit legitimate business risk taking. Comment has centred mainly
on the duty of care and diligence now found in sec 180 of the Corporations Act 2001
(and the associated business judgment rule), and the potential for director liability for
insolvent trading.
Section 180(1) provides that company directors and officers must exercise powers
and discharge duties with
“the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation’s
circumstances; and
                                                
414 Corporations Act 2001 sec 236(1).
415 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance:
Facilitating Innovation and Protecting Investors, Proposals for Reform: Paper No. 3, Australian
Government Publishing Service (1997), para. 5.3.2.
105
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the
corporation, as the director or officer”.416
The duty is thus an objective one, designed to prevent the situation described by
Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co.,417 albeit allowing for subjective
considerations. Finlay notes, citing Ipp J in Vrisakis v Australian Securities
Commission418 and Lord Hatherley LC in Overend and Gurney Co. v Gibb,419 that
this requires “an ordinary degree of prudence”, but that “there is no uniform standard
applicable”.420 The different roles played by, for example, executive as opposed to
non-executive directors, and directors of large listed companies as opposed to those
of small closely held companies, are recognised and allowance is made for them.421
This has certainly raised the standard from that expected under the traditional
common law, where the duty was related to the director’s own knowledge and
experience, and only a gross failure to take care was actionable.422 The statutory duty
is in line with more recent authority like Daniels v Anderson, where the New South
Wales Court of Appeal held that the law
“can accommodate different degrees of duty owed by people with different skills
[but] a director owes to the company a duty to take reasonable care in the
performance of the office … That duty will vary according to the size and business
                                                
416 The corresponding duty until 13 March 2000 was substantially similar, though the business
judgment rule which now applies to it (sec 180(2)) was introduced on that date by the Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program Act 1999.
417 “You might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the company … in a manner perfectly bona
fide yet perfectly irrational”: (1883) 23 ChD 654, 671.
418 (1993) 9 WAR 395, 451.
419 (1872) LR 5 HL 480, 486-487.
420 “CLERP: Non-executive Directors’ Duty of Care, Monitoring and the Business Judgment Rule”
(1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review 98, 101-102.
421 Santow J in Re HIH Insurance Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 72, 167 notes that “although the standard of
reasonable care [required under sec 180] is generally said to be that of an ordinary prudent person, …
there is some suggestion that [for example] directors of a professional trustee company owe a higher
duty of care”.
422 Lagunas Nitrate Co. v Lagunas Nitrate Syndicate Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 392; Re Equitable Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd [1925] Ch 407.
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of the particular company and the experience or skills that the director held
himself or herself out to have in support of appointment to the office”.423
Some concern has been raised that this higher standard might discourage suitably
qualified people from acting as directors, or force them to be extremely risk-averse.
Riley believes that an objective standard
“would place on a director the risk that, given the person she is, her best would
simply not be good enough … How well would an objective standard meet the twin
requirements of incentivising the director to fulfil the functions of her role,
without imposing liability for risks which are beyond her control? One familiar
complaint against such a standard is that it renders directors excessively cautious in
the stewardship of the company”.424
In a similar vein, it has been noted that there appears to be a conflict between the
duty to exercise powers and discharge duties in good faith in the best interests of the
corporation and for a proper purpose in sec 181(1)425 and the business judgment rule
in sec 180(2). The latter provision protects directors from liability for breach of the
duty of care and diligence if, inter alia, he or she makes a business judgment in good
faith for a proper purposes and with a rational belief that the judgment is in the
corporation’s best interests.426 However, a rational belief is not an element of the
standard set by sec 181.427 As one commentator puts it:
                                                
423 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438, 502 and 505.
424 “The Directors’ Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous but Subjective Standard” (1999)
62 Modern Law Review 697, 700 and 709. See also Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility:
Issues in the Theory of Company Law, Clarendon Press (1993), p109: “At least in the eyes of the
court, too close a scrutiny of business decisions  may … be dangerous, since it may inhibit legitimate
risk taking”; and Lockhart J in Australian Innovation Ltd v Petrovsky (1996) 21 ACSR 218, 222: “It
is important that the courts do not impose burdens upon directors which make their task so onerous
that capable people would be deterred from serving as directors”.
425 Until the coming into force of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on 13
March 2000, the corresponding duty in sec 232(2) of the Corporations Law required a director or
officer of a corporation to “at all times act honestly in the exercise of his or her powers and the
discharge of the duties of his or here office”. The intention of the amendment was clarification, not a
change in meaning: see Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law,
LexisNexis (loose-leaf), para. 8.065.
426 Section 180(2) reads in full: “A director or officer of a corporation who makes a business
judgment is taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1) [the duty of care and diligence] and their
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“Even though courts will probably remain reluctant to second guess board
decisions, we may expect directors’ justifications of their action to be exposed to
more rigorous analysis [under sec 181] than previously; and the new business
judgment rule may evaporate just when it is needed most. It would be a grievous
disappointment for directors who rationally believe that a sound judgment was
made in the circumstances to find that, in the judicial view, the decision was not in
the best interests of the corporation”.428
                                                                                                                                         
equivalent duties at common law and equity, in respect of the judgment, if they: (a) make the
judgment in good faith and for a proper purpose; and (b) do not have a material personal interest in
the subject matter of the judgment; and (c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the
judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and (d) rationally believe that the
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. The director or officer’s belief that the judgment
is in the best interests of the corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable
person in their position would hold”. The rule is lifted straight from North American corporate law:
see p42-43 above. Most commentators are of the opinion that the rule’s inclusion in statutory form in
the Corporations Act 2001 does not change the law in Australia, but that it is still beneficial as a
“lighthouse”, providing directors with explicit guidance as to the appropriate standard to be followed
in their decision making process: see Baxt, “Directors’ Duty of Care and the New Business Judgment
Rule in the Twenty-first Century Environment”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Key Developments in Corporate
Law and Trust Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Harold Ford, LexisNexis (2002), p151-152;
Bird, “The Duty of Care and the CLERP Reforms” (1999) 17 Company and Securities Law Journal
141, 150-153; Finlay, “CLERP: Non-executive Directors’ Duty of Care, Monitoring and the Business
Judgment Rule” (1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review 98, 111; Greenhow, “The Statutory
Business Judgment Rule: Putting the Wind into Directors’ Sails” (1999) 11 Bond Law Review 33,
54-56; and Berkahn, “A Statutory Business Judgment” (1999) 3 Southern Cross University Law
Review 215, 224-232. Others, however, see the statutory rule as unnecessary on the grounds that it
merely reflects the standard required under existing statutory provisions and general law principles;
that, if anything, it only lowers further the already undemanding standard of care expected of
directors; and that it make the law more complex, in contrast to the goal of the reforms: see Keller,
“Australia’s Proposed Statutory Business Judgment Rule: A Reversal of a Rising Standard in
Corporate Governance?” (2000) 4 Deakin Law Review 125, 140-150; Clarke, “The Business Judgment
Rule — Good Corporate Governance or Not?” (2000) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 85;
and Redmond, “Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business
Judgment Rule?”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Corporate Governance and the Duties of Directors, Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (1997), p198-204.
427 The subjective element of sec 181 was removed when the Bill was before the Senate:
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 13 October 1999, p9624-9626.
428 Greenwood, “Directors’ Duties in the Light of CLERP and Recent Legal Developments: The Four
Commandments, the Four Pillars of Wisdom and the Not So Golden Silence”, Australian Institute of
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The same author notes that the “best interests” of the corporation is an elusive
concept — is there only one “best”, and must the court come to a conclusion about
what is objectively best for the purposes of sec 181? If so, does this mean that a
director’s rationally held belief as to what is best for the corporation is open to
objective review by the court? His conclusion is that the uncertainty surrounding sec
181 “gives litigiously minded shareholders increased encouragement to challenge
board decisions”.429
These points are supported by the comments on the effect of ss 180 and 181 in
Talbot v NRMA Ltd, where Hodgson CJ said:
“The duty to act bona fide in the interests of the corporation … requires both a
proper purpose and absence of conflict of interests, and also some measure of
objective reasonableness … In my opinion it is clear that it is insufficient that the
director honestly believes that [the action in question] is required; the director
must also be acting reasonably”.430
Regarding sec 180, he continued:
“In my opinion, plainly this [the business judgment rule] does not mean that a
director could reason that his or her duty can require [an action to be taken] only
if no reasonable person could think otherwise. In my opinion, although a court
would find that a director has breached a duty of making a proper business
judgment only if that test is not met, I do not think that a director should identify
the directors’ own duty by considering what other persons might reasonably
think”.431
Thus, his Honour was of the view that, although an action under sec 180 could be
defended without reference to reasonableness (apart from the very low standard of
                                                                                                                                         
Company Directors and Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Seminar, Melbourne
(2000), p2.
429 Ibid, p3-5. See also Heath, “The Corporations Law Section 181: A Two-edged Sword” (2000) 18
Company and Securities Law Journal 377.
430 (2000) 34 ACSR 650, 654-655. His Honour was referring to the general law duty to act bona
fide, but he was of the opinion that sec 181 does not alter these principles: Ibid at 656.
431 Ibid at 656.
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“rational belief” required by sec 180(2), namely a belief that no reasonable person
could hold), liability under sec 181 might still exist in cases where the director’s
conduct is not objectively reasonable.432
In response to arguments against an objective standard (at least as they apply to the
duty of care and diligence),433 other commentators contend that, although the
objective duty is more demanding than has previously been the case, it is unlikely to
seriously deter suitable directorial candidates. Bird notes that this is particularly the
case in light of the high levels of remuneration available to directors, at least in larger
companies, and the widespread availability of directors’ liability insurance. She also
makes the point that purely subjective duties may be so lenient that they fail to
discourage unqualified or incompetent persons from acting as directors, as
undoubtedly occurred at times when the traditional common law standard was
applied. She concludes that:
“The Australian cases of the last decade [whose approach is now reflected in the
statutory duties] come closer to striking the right balance between the two aims
                                                
432 See also Re HIH Insurance Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 72, 234: “I consider that the standard of
behaviour required by sec 181(1) is not complied with by subjective good faith or by a mere
subjective belief that his purpose is proper, certainly if no reasonable director could have reached that
conclusion. This is made clear by the new provision in sec 184(1) which by contrast imposes the
additional elements of being ‘intentionally dishonest’ or ‘reckless’ for the purposes of criminal
sanctions”. This is in contrast to the interpretation of the previous duty to “act honestly” in
Fitzsimons v R (1997) 23 ACSR 355, 364-365, where Parker J preferred the approach in Marchesi v
Barnes [1970] VR 434, 438, that “a breach of the obligation to act bona fide in the interests of the
company involves a consciousness that what is being done is not in the interests of the company, and
deliberate disregard of that knowledge”, to that taken in Australian Growth Resources Corp. Pty. Ltd
v Van Reesema (1988) 6 ACLC 529, 539, that “a director who exercises his powers for a purpose
which the law deems to be improper infringes [the duty to act honestly], notwithstanding that
according to his own lights he may be acting honestly”.
433 Greenwood notes that “so far none of the leading text writers have analysed this new hot potato
created by the Senate’s finishing touch to sec 181”, the “hot potato” being the removal of subjective
considerations from the duty to act in the best interests of the corporation: “Directors’ Duties in the
Light of CLERP and Recent Legal Developments: The Four Commandments, the Four Pillars of
Wisdom and the Not So Golden Silence”, Australian Institute of Company Directors and Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Seminar, Melbourne (2000), p3.
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[the encouragement of risk taking and the need to ensure accountability] than the
English cases of the late 19th and early 20th centuries”.434
Cassidy is of a similar view, stating that:
“Imposing an objective standard of care and skill has … been blamed for a growing
dearth of persons who are prepared to accept directorships [but] if this is the price
that has to be paid for ensuring that directors maintain proper standards of care
and competence, it is a price worth having”.435
Australia’s current insolvent trading provisions, ss 588G and 588H,436 were
introduced by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992.437 Enforcement powers are
given to both a liquidator and (with the liquidator’s or the court’s consent) creditors,
as well as the ASIC.438 The arguments against these provisions largely mirror those
made in relation to ss 135 and 136 of the New Zealand Act; namely that the existence
of such a duty discourages honest and competent people from taking on the role of
                                                
434 “The Duty of Care and the CLERP Reforms” (1999) 17 Company and Securities Law Journal
141, 148-149.
435 “Has the ‘Sleeping’ Director Finally Been Laid to Rest?” (1997) 25 Australian Business Law
Review 102, 113.
436 Section 588G(1) and (2) provides that a director of a company that “incurs a debt” (inexhaustively
defined in subsection (1A)) when insolvent , or that becomes insolvent by incurring the debt, is liable
if he or she fails to prevent the incurring of the debt and either knew that there were grounds to
suspect that the company was (or would become) insolvent, or should reasonably have known.
Dishonest contravention of the section is an offence: 588G(3). Section 588H provides defences where
the director had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was solvent and
would remain so if the debt was incurred; if he or she relied on information as to the company’s
solvency provided by a person reasonably believed by the director to be competent and reliable; if the
director did not, because of illness or some other good reason, take part in the company’s
management at the relevant time; or if the director “took all reasonable steps to prevent the company
from incurring the debt”.
437 See Pollard, “Fear and Loathing in the Boardroom: Directors Confront the New Insolvent Trading
Provisions” (1994) 22 Australian Business Law Review 392, 393-394; and Coburn, “Insolvent
Trading in Australia: The Legal Principles”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Company Directors’ Liability for
Insolvent Trading, CCH Australia and Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation,
University of Melbourne (2000), p73-89, for a details of previous insolvent trading regimes in
Australia.
438 Sections 588M and 588R-588U.
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director and the taking of legitimate business risks, and that the uncertainties in the
language of the sections exacerbates these problems.
Oesterle, an American law professor, notes the “profound incredulity” of United
States academics and lawyers when asked their opinions on the wisdom of insolvent
trading provisions.439 Australia, in his opinion, has a very low standard of liability,
requiring only that a company incurs a debt where there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the company is or will become insolvent, and that the director is, or
reasonably ought to be, aware of this. The director need not actively participate in
the transaction, but is liable if he or she does not act to prevent it. This, he claims,
has resulted from a misguided eagerness on the part of the legislature to “appear to be
doing something helpful” for defrauded company creditors:
“The goal of the concerned law-makers seems to be that, given the sizeable
temptations on managers to defraud creditors when their firms face insolvency,
the law will conclusively presume it whenever a firm attempts to resuscitate itself
outside of insolvency proceedings. Rather than require proof of a culpable state of
mind, legislatures reduced the definition of culpable conduct in civil actions from
intentional fraud or even reckless behaviour to something more akin to ordinary
negligence … While one can understand how seductive the progression is to well-
meaning legislators, they went too far. They lost sight of a defining principle that
distinguishes fraudulent trading from insolvent trading”.440
He then goes on to note some situations where trading while insolvent is not a simple
manifestation of the “broke gambler’s scenario”441 which sec 588G seems to assume,
including the “high-tech start-up company”, with low or negative earnings expected
in the short term but possible high profits in the longer term; the over-leveraged
company with strong gross revenue but high debt-servicing costs, which wishes to
                                                
439 Oesterle’s informal poll on the issue records “who would want to be a director?” as the most
common response: “Corporate Directors’ Personal Liability for ‘Insolvent’, ‘Reckless’ and ‘Wrongful’
Trading: A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung Controlling Shareholders and Skittish Lenders”
(2001) 7 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 20, 21.
440 Ibid at 25-26.
441 “The gambler has nothing to lose and everything to gain. Since he is already broke, owing
another hundred dollars that he cannot pay is costless. Yet his chance of winning, even if small, an
amount that will repay all his debts with some left over for his pockets, has positive value”: Ibid at
25.
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raise additional funds by expanding its productive facilities; and the company
suffering from temporarily adverse market conditions, which incurs debt to keep
operating until economic conditions ease. He concludes that, in each case, if the
company should fail, its directors would be personally liable under sec 588G, despite
making what are arguably legitimate business judgments in the circumstances.442
Ambiguities in the provisions are also of concern to Oesterle, particularly the lack of
certainty and predictability inherent in the requirements that a director must act when
he or she is, or ought to be, suspicious that the company is insolvent; and that a debt
must be incurred. Of the latter, Oesterle states that “the variety of obligations entered
into by even a normal business make application of the language a nightmare”.443
Pollard, however, suggests that, although the provisions do arguably make it easier
for directors to be held liable, by “increas[ing] the reach of the insolvent trading
provisions”, “the risk profile of directors may in fact have become more acceptable to
them because of the increased certainty they will experience as a result of the
reform”. His view is that, despite some areas of uncertainty such as those identified
by Oesterle, the comprehensive description of the requirements for liability in sec
588G, and of the defences in sec 588H, actually reduces the likelihood of
contravention.444 Yeo and Lin come to a similar conclusion, noting that the Australian
provisions are more specific than those of jurisdictions with similar duties on issues
like the activities captured by the legislation; the financial state of the company when
the activities occur; the standard of care required of the director; and the availability
of defences. Comparable provisions in other jurisdictions tend to be couched in more
                                                
442 Ibid at 26-29.
443 Ibid at 37. Section 588G(1A) assists by providing a table of actions which are deemed to
constitute the incurring of a debt, but it does not provide a complete solution as it operates in
addition to what are described by Ford as “ordinary debts”, the features of which are discernable only
from case law: Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis
(loose-leaf), para. 20.090. See also Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand,
Oxford University Press (2001), p147.
444 “Fear and Loathing in the Boardroom: Directors Confront the New Insolvent Trading Provisions”
(1994) 22 Australian Business Law Review 392, 393, 399 and 410.
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general language, which the authors see as potentially troublesome for both directors
and those seeking to enforce the provisions.445
This less fearful view of the insolvent trading regime appears to be the one borne out
in practice, though perhaps not for the reasons suggested above. Since its enactment a
decade ago, only a small handful of cases have been brought against directors under
sec 588G; far fewer that under its predecessor. The first reported decision (apart from
an application for summary judgment in 1994)446 was Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty.
Ltd v Miller,447 decided almost four years after sec 588G came into force. Herzberg
attributes this, not to greater certainty as to when the section applies,448 but to the
decline in the number of insolvent liquidations449 since it commenced and the
increased use of voluntary administrations under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act
during the same period. Part 5.3A was also put into place by the Corporate Law
Reform Act 1992. The decision to place a company into administration may be made
by either the directors, a liquidator or a secured creditor,450 but the process is most
often initiated by directors, due in part to the Act’s policy of encouraging “early and
orderly steps to deal with an existing or impending state of insolvency”.451 The threat
of liability under sec 588G is a major incentive for directors to take these steps,
according to Herzberg.452
                                                
445 “Insolvent Trading — A Comparative and Economic Approach” (1999) 10 Australian Journal of
Corporate Law 216.
446 Stargard Security Systems Pty. Ltd v Goldie (1994) 13 ACSR 805.
447 (1997) 23 ACSR 699.
448 Indeed, he refers to the drafting style of the provision as “extremely cumbersome” and highlights
the same uncertainties raised by Oesterle above: “Why are there So Few Insolvent Trading Cases?”, in
Ramsay (Ed.), Company Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading, CCH Australia and Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (2000), p150-152.
449 A prerequisite for recovery of compensation from directors for a breach of sec 588G: sec
588M(1)(d).
450 Sections 436A-436C.
451 Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No. 45 (1988), para.
54.
452 “Why are there So Few Insolvent Trading Cases?”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Company Directors’
Liability for Insolvent Trading, CCH Australia and Centre for Corporate Law and Securities
Regulation, University of Melbourne (2000), p158-160.
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Herzberg’s view is supported by Goode, who is mildly critical of what he sees as the
effective “embargo on continued trading” (other than by payment of cash on
delivery) that sec 588G requires. Goode notes that in other jurisdictions it is neither
an offence nor breach of duty to merely continue trading while insolvent, provided
the trading is neither fraudulent nor done with no reasonable prospect of the
obligations incurred being met:
“Indeed, the ability to continue trading is seen [in the United Kingdom] as an
essential part of the rescue culture promulgated by the Bank of England in the so-
called ‘London Approach’, the objective being to focus on recovery or, if that is
not possible, then on maximising dividends for creditors in a winding-up, rather
than on a cessation of trading and liquidation”.453
An immediate requirement to cease trading, as soon as insolvency is suspected,
removes such a possibility. He does also note, however, that trading may continue if
an administrator is appointed under Part 5.3A, the object of which is also to maximise
the chances of the company continuing in business or to achieve a better return to the
company’s creditors and shareholders than would be achievable from an immediate
liquidation.454
Shareholder Remedies
The reforms to shareholder remedies, particularly the newly introduced statutory
derivative action, have also prompted much comment, both before and since their
enactment. This has generally been positive (in the sense that improvements to
shareholders’ enforcement rights are supported), but concerns have been raised about
possible procedural hurdles associated with derivative proceedings, financial
disincentives to their use by minority shareholders and (to a lesser extent) the
possibility of vexatious or improperly motivated litigation under the provision.455
                                                
453 “Insolvent Trading Under English and Australian Law” (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law
Journal 170, 171-172.
454 Section 435A.
455 The latter issue is mentioned briefly by the Company and Securities Advisory Committee, Report
on a Statutory Derivative Action (1993), p5; Kluver, “Derivative Actions and the Rule in Foss v
Harbottle: Do We Need a Statutory Remedy?” (1993) 11 Company and Securities Law Journal 7, 17
and 20-21; and Thai, “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with
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Derivative Action
Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act 2001 — “Proceedings on Behalf of a Company
by Members and Others” — is modelled on the equivalent Canadian provisions456
and therefore also has much in common with ss 165-168 of New Zealand’s
Companies Act 1993.457 Farrar notes the purposes of the statutory action as follows:
• To overcome the problems associated with the rule in Foss v Harbottle,458
particularly the ability of a majority of shareholders to ratify alleged wrongs
done to the company;459
• To clarify the procedure and funding of derivative actions;
• To reconcile such actions with the new business judgment rule in sec 180(2)
and to achieve director accountability. Farrar describes Part 2F.1A as the
political “price to be paid for the introduction of the Business Judgment Rule”;
and
• To “shift the role of corporate enforcer back to the private sector”.460
                                                                                                                                         
United States, Canada and New Zealand” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 118, 131. All
conclude that the preconditions for the granting of leave to commence proceedings in sec 237(2) (see
below) are more than adequate to prevent abuse of the provision.
456 See Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action
(1993), p12; and Thai, “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons
with United States, Canada and New Zealand” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 118, 124.
The Canadian provisions are discussed at p48-54 above.
457 See p81-89 above. The general similarity between the New Zealand and Australian provisions is
acknowledged by Prince, “Australia’s Statutory Derivative Action: Using the New Zealand
Experience” (2000) 18 Company and Securities Law Journal 493; and by Palmer J in Swansson v R.
A. Pratt Properties Pty. Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 317.
458 (1843) 2 Hare 461. See p49 and 71 above.
459 Section 239 states that ratification of conduct does not prevent a person from bringing derivative
proceedings. The court may, however, take the ratification into account when deciding what order to
make in such proceedings, having regard to how well-informed the members were when they ratified
the conduct and whether they were acting for a proper purpose.
460 Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), p196-
197.
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Section 236(1) grants standing to members, former members, officers and former
officers to bring proceedings on the company’s behalf,461 to intervene in existing
proceedings for the purpose of taking responsibility on the company’s behalf for
those proceedings or to take a particular step in such proceedings, for example
compromising or settling them. As in New Zealand, the common law right of action is
specifically abolished,462 and proceedings may only be brought with leave of the
court.463
In contrast to New Zealand, where leave may be granted if one or other of two
specified conditions are satisfied, with regard being given to certain other factors,464
the Australian provisions state that leave must be granted if the court is satisfied that
all of the criteria set out in sec 237(2) are met:
(a) It is probable that the company will not itself bring, or properly take
responsibility for, the proceedings;
(b) The applicant is acting in good faith;
(c) It is in the company’s best interests that leave be granted;465
(d) In cases where leave to commence proceedings is sought, there is a serious
question to be tried; and
                                                
461 Proceedings on the company’s behalf are brought in the company’s name: sec 236(2). This is
satisfied if “the representative nature of [the] proceedings as pleaded is clear”; the company need not
actually be named as a plaintiff: Keyrate Pty. Ltd v Harmarc Pty. Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 396, 399-
400.
462 Section 236(3). It was confirmed in the first case to be brought under Part 2F.1A, Karam v
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 545, 553-554, and in Chapman v
E-Sports Club Worldwide Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 462, 463; and Advent Investors Pty. Ltd v
Goldhirsch (2001) 37 ACSR 529, 539-541, that this abolition applies to rights of action accruing
prior to the introduction of the new sections, as well as those accruing post 13 March 2000.
463 Sections 236(1)(b) and 237(1).
464 See sec 165(2) and (3) of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ), discussed at p84-86 above.
465 Section 237(3) provides for a rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the company’s
best interests if (a) the proceedings are against a third party, ie. someone other than the company’s
controller(s), its directors and their spouses and families (see ss 228 and 237(4)); (b) the company has
decided not to bring, defend or discontinue the proceedings; and (c) the directors that participated in
that decision satisfy the same elements required under the business judgment rule in sec 180(2).
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(e) At least fourteen days notice of the application has been given to the company,
or the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant leave without such notice
having been given.
Ironically, given the aim of the statutory action to “provide a more effective avenue
of enforcement than has previously been available”,466 it has been suggested that
shareholders may have less chance of being granted standing to commence
proceedings under these conditions than under the common law. Prince suggests, with
reference to cases decided under the equivalent New Zealand provision, that criteria
like the “company’s best interests” and the existence of a “serious question to be
tried” in sec 237(2)(c) and (d) are likely to be interpreted to allow only actions that
are economically advantageous to the company.467 This, he argues, means that the
new provisions will
“at most … perform a ‘compensatory’ function rather than contributing to better
corporate governance [by encouraging greater director accountability], enabling
shareholders to take action in the company’s name only where the immediate
return from successful litigation outweighs the likely cost of proceedings”.468
Worse still, Prince also foresees the possibility of even cost-effective actions being
refused for lack of good faith on the part of the applicant under sec 237(2)(b), if
“good faith” is defined to require that the applicant is acting only for the company’s,
rather than for any personal, interest.469 He suggests that a simple “honesty of
                                                
466 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance:
Facilitating Innovation and Protecting Investors, Proposals for Reform: Paper No. 3, Australian
Government Publishing Service (1997), para. 5.3.2.
467 “Australia’s Statutory Derivative Action: Using the New Zealand Experience” (2000) 18 Company
and Securities Law Journal 493, 500-506. He bases his conclusions in part on the “prudent business
person” test adopted in New Zealand in Vrij v Boyle [1995] 3 NZLR 763 and followed in all
subsequent New Zealand cases. The factors to be considered under this test include the amount at
stake, likely costs and the prospect of executing any judgment: see p84-86 above.
468 Ibid at 493. The role of derivative suits as “the major policeman of managerial integrity” was
noted as a key objective of the reform by the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report
on a Statutory Derivative Action (1993), p4.
469 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, para.
6.37 notes that “the good faith requirement is designed to prevent proceedings being used to further
the purposes of the applicant, rather than the company as a whole”.
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purpose” standard under sec 237(2)(b) would be more appropriate.470 He concludes
that, if these are the standards that must be met before leave can be granted, then even
in comparison with the common law exceptions to Foss v Harbottle, there is little
scope for bringing a derivative action.471
Fletcher is less pessimistic about how sec 237(2) will be interpreted by the courts.
His view is that the “good faith” requirement is designed to ensure only that actions
are not brought by persons whose interests are inimical to those of the company,
rather than to prevent actions that are in the applicant’s, as well as the company’s,
interests.472 This interpretation is supported by the limited case law to date dealing
with sec 237. For example, in Chapman v E-Sports Club Worldwide Ltd, Mandie J
held that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith, on the grounds that no direct
evidence had been presented to support the plaintiff’s contention that he had not
consented to an allegedly improper transfer of property from one company to
another. The evidence, in fact, seemed to support the opposite conclusion. In
addition, the transaction in question had not harmed the plaintiff, and the proceedings
appeared to be an attempt to put pressure on the defendants to buy him out, rather
than being based on genuine concern as to the propriety of the transaction.473 The
discussion of sec 237 in Swansson v R. A. Pratt Properties Pty. Ltd also favours
Fletcher’s interpretation of “good faith” over Prince’s. Palmer J said that,
“in my opinion, there are at least two interrelated factors to which the courts will
always have regard in determining whether the good faith requirement of sec
237(2)(b) is satisfied. The first is whether the applicant honestly believes that a
good cause of action exists and has a reasonable prospect of success. Clearly,
whether the applicant honestly holds such a belief would not simply be a matter of
bald assertion: the applicant may be disbelieved if no reasonable person in the
circumstances could hold that belief. The second factor is whether the applicant is
                                                
470  “Australia’s Statutory Derivative Action: Using the New Zealand Experience” (2000) 18
Company and Securities Law Journal 493, 506-509.
471 Ibid at 510-511.
472 “CLERP and Minority Shareholder Rights” (2001) 13 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
290, 297.
473 (2000) 35 ACSR 462, 464.
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seeking to bring the derivative suit for such a collateral purpose as would amount
to an abuse of process.”474
Rather than disqualifying applicants who act in their own self-interest, Palmer J held
that some measure of self-interest should count in favour of an applicant being found
to be acting in good faith. His Honour stated that applications by, for example,
current shareholders or directors, whose shares would increase in value following a
successful derivative action or who otherwise have a “legitimate interest in the
welfare and good management of the company” would be looked at more favourably
than applications by parties “with nothing obvious to gain directly by the success of
the derivative action”.475
Prince’s fear that the “best interests of the company” will be limited to economic
interests only is also not borne out by the Swansson case. Palmer J noted that this
factor requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the character of
the company and (in the case of small closely held companies) the effect of the
proposed litigation on the purpose for which the company was formed and on its
shareholders; the effect on the company’s business and “proper conduct”; whether
the relief sought can be achieved without requiring the company to litigate against its
will; and the practical prospects of the defendant being able to meet at least some of
any judgment in the company’s favour.476
Fletcher does, however, recognise that the steps to obtain leave to bring proceedings
are “many and taxing” and that arguably “shareholders have been shortchanged by
these legislative developments”,477 though he also notes that
                                                
474 (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 320. See also Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty. Ltd (2002)
42 ACSR 534, 546-548.
475 (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 320-321.
476 Ibid at 324.
477 “CLERP and Minority Shareholder Rights” (2001) 13 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
290, 296 and 300. This is perhaps borne out by comments such as those by Palmer J in Swansson v
R. A. Pratt Properties Pty. Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 318 and 324, that leave to commence
proceedings “must not be given lightly”, and that the requirement that the court be satisfied that leave
is in the company’s best interests (“not that the proposed derivative action may be, appears to be, or
is likely to be in the best interests of the company”) sets a “far higher threshold” than the equivalent
New Zealand or Canadian provisions.
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“a broad view needs to be taken before a final judgement can be made. It is at least
arguable that regard should be had to any effect upon other provisions for the
protection of minority interests that could be attributable to this legislative
action”.478
Chief among these other provisions is the unfair prejudice remedy in Part 2F.1 of the
Act (see below). Fletcher concludes that this remedy covers many of the situations
formerly actionable under the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle — and by a simpler and
more direct route than the statutory derivative action — and that therefore any
restrictions in the latter provision will not be as adverse to the enforcement rights of
shareholders as they may appear in isolation to be.479
Permission of the court is required for a derivative action to be discontinued or settled
under sec 240, and the court is given wide powers to make any order or give any
directions it considers appropriate in connection with the proceedings under sec 241.
In particular, the court may make interim orders; directions about the conduct of the
proceedings, including an order requiring mediation; orders directing the company or
its officers to do, or not do, any act; and an order appointing an independent person
to investigate the financial affairs of the company, the facts giving rise to the
proceedings or the costs incurred by the parties, and to report such to the court.
Under sec 242, the court may also make orders about the costs of the proceedings. In
contrast to the situation in New Zealand, where the costs of the action must be met
by the company if leave is granted,480 the court is empowered to make any order it
thinks appropriate including, but not limited to, an order that the applicant be
indemnified by the company.481 This discretion was criticised prior to the
provision’s enactment, for example by Ramsay and Kluver, both of whom saw the
                                                
478 Ibid at 300.
479 Ibid at 301-303.
480 See sec 166 of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ), discussed at p86-88 above.
481 This is similar to the equivalent Canadian provision, sec 240(d) of the Canada Business
Corporations Act, under which “the court may at any time make any order it thinks fit including …
an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the
complainant in connection with the action”.
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cost of litigation as the “real problem” that the statutory action should deal with.
Ramsay notes that
“the main impediment to shareholders contemplating litigation is not deficiencies
in the common law concerning standing but a lack of incentives to commence
litigation deriving from a number of factors including the cost of litigation and the
fact that if the action is successful any recovery accrues to the company and not
the plaintiff shareholder … [Without such incentives] the use of the shareholders’
derivative action will rarely, if ever, be economically rational”.482
Kluver agrees, stating that
“there should be some clearly recognised avenue by which a company is required to
support a shareholder action genuinely taken on its behalf and for its benefit”.483
These same concerns have also been raised in more recent commentary on Part 2F.1A.
Thai considers that the new provisions satisfactorily address all the problems
inherent in the common law derivative action, with the exception of the issue of
costs:
“Shareholders are at the mercy of the courts’ decision as to what is ‘appropriate’
pursuant to ss 241 and 242 … It is unclear … as to how far the court will go in
deciding certain actions to be doubtful and so denying indemnity”.484
                                                
482 “Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospect for a Statutory Derivative
Action” (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 149, 150 and 164.
483 “Derivative Actions and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle: Do We Need a Statutory Remedy?” (1993)
11 Company and Securities Law Journal 7, 25. See also De Vere Stevens, “Should We Toss Foss?
Towards an Australian Statutory Derivative Action” (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review 127,
131, where an “onslaught” of derivative actions in Japan following a reduction in filing fees is noted
in support of keeping applicants’ costs to a minimum.
484 “How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States,
Canada and New Zealand” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 118, 136. The obiter
comments of Palmer J in Swansson v R. A. Pratt Properties Pty. Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 326-327
are not encouraging. His Honour held that, if leave had been granted under sec 237, he would have
declined an order under sec 242, on the grounds that the applicant’s means, “though not very
substantial, are better able to bear the costs of a derivative action than those of [the company]”.
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She submits that “a vast number of the shareholders’ derivative actions in the United
States stem from the flexibility in the costs formula”, and suggests that United States-
style contingency fees arrangements, whereby attorneys’ fees are calculated as a
proportion of the amount recovered in a successful judgment, should be introduced
into Australia to encourage use of the statutory derivative action.485
McConvill agrees that the current rule in sec 242 is a strong deterrent to potential
applicants under Part 2F.1A. However, he believes that the answer to this problem
lies not in “such a radical reform as implementing a contingency fee system in
Australia”, but rather by amending sec 242 to make it clear that the costs of an action
that is not unmeritorious or doubtful will be paid by the company rather than the
applicant personally.486 The alternative, he contends, is the complete repeal of Part
2F.1A, on the grounds that the provision in its current form is under-utilised and
ineffective and that other remedies, including the unfair prejudice provision in Part
2F.1 and the right to apply under sec 1324 for an injunction and/or damages for
conduct that has constituted, constitutes or would constitute a contravention of the
Act, are more effective than derivative actions in protecting the interests of
corporations.487
Remedy for Unfair Prejudice
Despite some rewording with effect from 13 March 2000, the remedy for unfair
prejudice in Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act 2001488 remains substantially the
same as before the CLSP and CLERP reforms.489 The approach taken to it by the
                                                
485 Ibid at 123 and 137.
486 “Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act: Insert a New sec 242(2) or Give it the Boot?” (2002) 30
Australian Business Law Review 309, 311-312.
487 Ibid at 312-314.
488 As in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the remedy was widened in 1983 so that “unfair
prejudice” and “unfair discrimination”, as well as “oppressive” conduct, are now covered by Part 2F.1.
The heading for Part 2F.1, however, retains the old terminology: “Oppressive Conduct of Affairs”.
489 See Black, Bostock, Golding and Healey, CLERP and the New Corporations Law, Butterworths
(1998), p166; and Fletcher, “CLERP and Minority Shareholder Rights” (2001) 13 Australian Journal
of Corporate Law 290, 301. Black et al note that “whether conduct falls within [the scope of Part
2F.1 as amended] will be determined by reference to case law concerning sec 260 [the relevant section
until 1998] and its predecessors”; while Fletcher states that “since [1983] the numbering of the
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Australian courts is also very similar to that employed in New Zealand;490 Farrar, for
example, discusses the two jurisdictions’ unfair prejudice sections together, and
devotes much of his discussion to the New Zealand case of Thomas v H. W. Thomas
Ltd.491 He notes that Richardson J’s reasoning in Thomas was followed by the High
Court of Australia in Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd,492 the most
commonly cited Australian unfair prejudice case,493 and has also been applied in a
number of subsequent Australian cases.494
For example, in Re Norvabron Pty. Ltd Derrington J considered the principles which
were applied to a just and equitable winding up in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries
Ltd495 (the same principles applied by Richardson J in Thomas), and concluded that
“precisely the same considerations apply to sec 320 [of the Companies Code, now
superseded by Part 2F.1], where the relationship of those persons inter se is the
foundation of the remedy”.496 Similarly, in Re Dalkeith Investments Pty. Ltd
McPherson J implied that in cases where the facts justified a just and equitable
winding up, relief would also be available under the unfair prejudice provision. The
basis for this finding was that the parties had
                                                                                                                                         
provision has been altered a number of times as a result of corporate reform and legislative
reorganisation but its substance has been virtually unaffected. The current Part 2F.1, ss 232-235,
although amended in minor ways by the CLERP Act 1999 (Cth) is little changed from its 1983
precursor”.
490 See p89-92 above.
491 [1984] 1 NZLR 686.
492 (1985) 180 CLR 459, 468-472.
493 Ramsay notes that, in eighty eight judgments between 1961 and 1997, Wayde was applied or
referred to twenty six times (29.6% of cases), ten more times than the next most cited case; while
Thomas was applied in a further six cases (6.8%): “An Empirical Study of the Use of the Oppression
Remedy” (1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review 23, 29 and 37.
494 Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001),
p183-185. Farrar lists a total of seventeen Australian cases which have followed Thomas between
1985 and 2000, suggesting that some of the citations of Wayde noted by Ramsay also include at least
indirect reference to Richardson J’s comments in Thomas.
495 [1973] AC 360.
496 (1987) 5 ACLC 184, 214.
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“entered into an arrangement, which was no doubt implied rather than expressed,
the substance of which was that they constituted a partnership in corporate
form.”497
In more recent Australian cases too,498 the liberal attitude taken by Richardson J in
Thomas and in later New Zealand cases to oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly
discriminatory conduct continues to be applied. In Raymond v Cook the court relied
on Thomas, Wayde and Ebrahimi in concluding that equitable considerations should,
where appropriate, be superimposed upon the dealings between company
shareholders and that, while conduct that will justify a winding up on just and
equitable grounds will not necessarily always secure relief on an unfair prejudice
application, “there is a considerable area of overlap”.499 Fexuto Pty. Ltd v Bosnjak
Holdings Pty. Ltd was another case involving a company that was in substance a
corporate “partnership” between family members, where the appellant claimed that
he had been “alienated from decision-making” contrary to the principle of equality
and consensus management upon which the company had been founded. The court
agreed, with Spigelman J noting the possibility of an “understanding” between
shareholders which, though established only by a process of inference, could still give
rise to a legitimate expectation of continued participation in management.500 Priestley
JA held that
“the conduct of all concerned parties … in my opinion showed a set of mutually
accepted understandings giving rise to a situation [where] … it would be arguable
that it would properly be unjust, inequitable or unfair for a majority in [the
defendant company] to use their voting power to exclude [the appellant] from
participation in the management without giving him the opportunity to remove
his capital upon reasonable terms”.501
                                                
497 (1985) 3 ACLC 74, 79.
498 See also, for example, Parker v National Roads and Motorists Association (1993) 11 ACSR
370, 380; Coombs v Dynasty Pty. Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 60, 82; and Re D. G. Brim and Sons Pty.
Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 559, 588.
499 (1998) 29 ACSR 252, 264.
500 (2001) 37 ACSR 672, 678-679.
501 Ibid at 749.
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The major part played by the appellant in building the business, and its family
nature, were considered significant factors contributing to the appellant’s case that he
had a legitimate expectation of not being excluded from management.
A study by Ramsay confirms that the use of the unfair prejudice remedy in Australia
has steadily increased since its introduction. In the 1960s there were only four
judgments. By the 1980s — when the remedy was expanded as a result of the 1983
amendment and a more liberal judicial approach to the provision — this had increased
to twenty five judgments, and between the years 1990 and 1997 there were a total of
fifty two judgments.502 Ramsay also notes the particular value of the provision to
shareholders in closely held companies. In around 55% of Australian unfair prejudice
cases to 1997,503 the company concerned had ten or fewer shareholders, and in 43%
of cases most or all of the shareholders were involved in the company’s management.
The most common allegation was that the applicant had been unfairly excluded from
a management role. Only six of the eighty eight judgments considered by Ramsay
involved listed companies.504
These findings are not surprising, given the courts’ emphasis on applicants’
expectations about participation in management. Such expectations will generally
only arise in a “quasi-partnership” type situation.
3 Public Enforcement in Australia — The Role of the ASIC
The ASIC (then known as the Australian Securities Commission) received
responsibility for the regulation of Australia’s corporations and securities laws from
1 January 1991. At that time it was perceived that the so-called “excesses of the
1980s”505 had gone unchecked by the then corporate regulators,506 and that a more
                                                
502 “An Empirical Study of the Use of the Oppression Remedy” (1999) 27 Australian Business Law
Review 23, 26.
503 Possibly much more than this, as in a further 24% of cases the number of shareholders was not
clear: Ibid at 27 and 31.
504 Ibid at 28 and 33.
505 See Cameron, “Enforcement: Getting the Regulatory Mix Right” (1994) 4 Australian Journal of
Corporate Law 121, 121; and Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford
University Press (2001), p6 and 275-276.
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proactive regulatory stance should be taken by the new national body. In the words
of a former chairman of the ASIC,
“Its mission is to achieve maximum credibility of Australian corporations and
securities markets … The surveillance programs and the enforcement strategy of
the Commission seek to foster a ‘climate of compliance’ in the markets by
providing an effective deterrent against abuse by market participants, and they
seek to facilitate the detection of market abuse and corporate misconduct at an
earlier stage [than the previous regime]”.507
It has also been noted by the current deputy chair of the ASIC that more recent
corporate collapses in Australia, including those of insurance company HIH
Insurance Ltd, telecommunications company One.Tel Ltd, retailer Harris Scarfe
Holdings Ltd and airline Ansett Australia Ltd in 2001 and 2002, “have refocused the
community’s attention on issues of corporate governance, self-regulation and the role
of the regulator”, indicating a continuing desire on the part of the government to
maintain a highly regulatory corporate law enforcement system.508
                                                                                                                                         
506 The National Companies and Securities Commission and the State and territorial Corporate
Affairs Commissions. All of the powers previously shared by these bodies are now exercised by the
ASIC.
507 Cameron, “Enforcement: Getting the Regulatory Mix Right” (1994) 4 Australian Journal of
Corporate Law 121, 121. See also the similar comments of the ASIC’s current chairman in Knott,
“Corporate Governance — Principles, Promotion and Practice”, Monash Governance Research Unit
Inaugural Lecture, 16 July 2002, p3 and 6-8; the ASIC’s deputy chair in Segal, “Institutional Self-
regulation: What Should be the Role of the Regulator?”, address to the National Institute for
Governance Twilight Seminar, Canberra, 8 November 2001, p13; and the Principal Lawyer at the
ASIC’s Queensland Regional Office in Coburn, “Insolvent Trading in Australia: The Legal
Principles”, in Ramsay (Ed.), Company Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading, CCH Australia
and Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (2000), p123.
Knott notes that “so called ‘light touch’ regulation [has] played its part in abetting a decline in
standards of governance” in some countries, and that visible enforcement activity is important in
deterring breaches of corporate law. Segal states that, while the ASIC believes there should not be
“unnecessary intrusion into the market, public sentiment is such that [the ASIC] needs to undertake
mechanisms to enhance consumer and business confidence”. Coburn states that “rigorous law
enforcement in this area [the directors’ duty to prevent insolvent trading] has become a necessity”.
508 Segal, “Institutional Self-regulation: What Should be the Role of the Regulator?”, address to the
National Institute for Governance Twilight Seminar, Canberra, 8 November 2001, p1.
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The ASIC fulfills the roles of Registrar of Companies, corporate regulator and
enforcement agency in Australia. Its specific functions include the following:
• Registration of companies under Part 2A.2 of the Corporations Act 2001;
• Registration of auditors and liquidators under Part 9.2;
• Gathering, processing and making available to the pubic information about
companies and other investments;509
• Exercising the discretionary power to grant exemptions from, or to modify the
application of, certain provisions of the Corporations Act;510
• Regulating the securities industry, including the licensing of professional
participants511 and the policing of relevant statutory provisions;512 and
• Investigating suspected contraventions of, and enforcing compliance with, the
Corporations Act.
In fulfilling these functions, the ASIC must strive to satisfy a number of objectives,
including:
• Maintaining, facilitating and improving the performance of the financial system,
and the entities therein, in the interests of commercial certainty, reducing
business costs, and the efficiency and development of the economy;
• Promoting the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers
in the financial system; and
• Taking whatever action is necessary to enforce and give effect to the laws that
                                                
509 These powers are derived from many different provisions in both the Corporations Act 2001 and
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001: see Ford, Austin and Ramsay,
Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis (loose-leaf), para. 3.170-3.210.
510 For example, Chapter 2M, dealing with Accounts and Audit; Chapter 6 (Takeovers); Chapter 6A
(Compulsory Acquisitions and Buy-outs); and Chapter 6C (Information about Ownership of Listed
Companies and Managed Investment Schemes): see Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ibid, para. 3.220-
3.280.
511 See, for example, Parts 7.2, 7.3 and 7.6 of the Corporations Act 2001, dealing with the licensing
of financial markets, clearing and settlement facilities and providers of financial services respectively.
512 Including Chapters 6CA (Continuous Disclosure), 6D (Fundraising) and 7 (Financial Services and
Markets) of the Corporations Act 2001; and Part 2, Division 2 of the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Consumer Protection in Relation to Financial Services).
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give functions and powers to the ASIC.513
Even with the reforms to directors’ duties and shareholder remedies described
above,514 the Australian corporate law enforcement system arguably remains
basically regulatory or “conformance” oriented (in the sense that regulation is still
largely undertaken by a public enforcement body, namely the ASIC) rather than
“performance” oriented.515 Sealy concludes that, although there are recent signs of
some “second thoughts” in this area,
“in Australia ... the thinking is not focused on self regulation and codes of good
practices; there is a concern to make public examples of the directors of
companies whose affairs have been allowed to go wrong, and to close up the
loopholes and weaknesses in the law which experience has revealed”.516
Wishart, referring particularly to takeovers regulation (though his comments are
pertinent to companies regulation in general), notes that “not to have substantial
regulation was never a serious proposition ... Clearly, attempts to emulate New
Zealand ... in experimenting with not having direct regulation is not on the ...
agenda.”517
The ASIC has the general power to make such investigations as it thinks fit where it
has reason to suspect a breach of any provision of Australia’s corporate legislation,
or of any other law where that breach concerns a body corporate, managed
investment scheme or other financial product.518 It also has standing to enforce
                                                
513 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, sec 1(2)(a), (b) and (g). The Act is
to be given effect and interpreted in accordance with these objectives: sec 1(3).
514 See p102-125 above.
515 Francis, “The Responsibilities of Corporate Governors: Conformance or Performance?” [1995] 12
Butterworths Corporation Law Bulletin 8.
516 “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties” (1995) 1 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 92,
98.
517 “From Our Australian Correspondent” [1995] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 121.
Admittedly, the comments of both Sealy and Wishart were made before the latest round of reform
activity in Australia, but see also the more recent comments of Farrar on Australia’s “excessively
penal” approach: Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press
(2001), p6, noted at p98 above.
518 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 sec 13.
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directors’ duties and other provisions by means of both criminal proceedings and civil
penalty proceedings. Until 1 February 1993 the statutory directors’ duties were
sanctioned by criminal penalties only. However, these were found to have “more
bark than bite”, due in part to the difficulty in establishing, to the required standard,
that a director’s business decision was dishonest or lacking in due care and
diligence.519
The Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 introduced into the Australian legislation what
Sealy describes as “an even more formidable deterrent”, namely civil penalties of up
to $200,000 or prohibition from managing a company.520 As civil proceedings, the
standard of proof applicable to civil penalty actions has been lessened from beyond
reasonable doubt to the balance of probabilities.521 On this point, Segal notes that
“the mental element that needs to be proved in a criminal proceeding is a high bar for
the prosecution” and that, because of the longer investigation process necessary
before laying criminal charges,
“the outcome achieved by criminal prosecution is too late to rectify the harm
caused to the market and its participants … The damage to the market may
[therefore] be better rectified by other means (eg. civil penalties)”.522
                                                
519 Sealy, “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties” (1995) 1 New Zealand Business Law
Quarterly 92, 97-98,
520 Corporations Act 2001 ss 206C, 1317E and 1317G. See Welsh, “The Corporations Law Civil
Penalty Provisions and the Lessons that can be Learnt from the Trade Practices Act 1974” (2000) 11
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 298; and Moodie and Ramsay, “The Expansion of Civil
Penalties under the Corporations Act” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 61.
521 Corporations Act 2001 sec 1332. The test in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 363
and 372 has been applied in cases involving civil penalties under the Corporations Act, such as
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Doyle (2001) 38 ACSR 606, 622; and Re HIH
Insurance Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 72, 180 and 184, on the grounds that such proceedings are penal in
nature. The High Court of Australia in Briginshaw held that, in civil proceedings, “the gravity of the
consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the
question whether the issue has been proved” on the balance of probabilities, and that “the strictness of
the proof of an issue should be governed by the nature of the issue and its consequences”.
522 Comment on Valentine, “Regulating in a High-tech Marketplace — The Import for Remedies”,
paper presented to the Australian Law Reform Commission Conference (2001), p3.
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Provisions beside directors’ duties which are subject to civil penalties include the
following:523
• The requirement that a public company obtain the approval of its members
before giving a financial benefit to a related party;524
• The formalities required for share capital transactions such as redemption of
shares, reductions in capital, self-acquisition of shares and financial assistance
for acquiring a company’s own shares;525
• Financial record keeping and reporting requirements;526
• Duties associated with managed investment schemes, including duties of the
responsible entity, its officers, employees and members;527
• Continuous disclosure requirements for listed (and certain other) entities;528
• Misconduct in financial markets, including price manipulation and insider
trading;529 and
• Notice requirements for proposed demutualisations.530
Criminal liability remains in cases where a company’s directors or officers are
reckless or intentionally dishonest, and fail to act in good faith or for a proper
purpose; where they use their positions dishonestly with the intention of gaining an
advantage for themselves or others or causing detriment to the company; or where
they dishonestly fail to prevent insolvent trading by the company.531 Criminal
charges may only be laid by the ASIC, an ASIC delegate or another person
                                                
523 A full list is given in sec 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. The provisions listed in sec
1317E(1)(ja)-(jg), dealing with continuous disclosure and misconduct in financial markets, were added
by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 with effect from 11 March 2002.
524 Corporations Act 2001 sec 209(2).
525 Sections 254L(2), 256D(3), 259F(2) and 260D(2).
526 Section 344(1).
527 Sections 601FC(5), 601FD(3), 601FE(3), 601FG(2) and 601JD(3).
528 Sections 674(2) and 675(2).
529 Sections 1041A, 1041B(1), 1041C(1), 1041D and 1043A(1) and (2).
530 Schedule 4, clause 29(6).
531 Corporations Act 2001 ss 184 and 588G(3). See Gething, “Do We Really Need Criminal and
Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors’ Duties?” (1996) 24 Australian Business Law Review
375, 382-385.
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specifically authorised in writing to do so by the Minister,532 while civil penalty
provisions may be enforced either by the ASIC or the affected company.533
The distinction between actions by private parties such as the company or
shareholders for damages for breach of statutory or common law directors’ duties,
and actions by the ASIC for civil penalties, should be noted. McConvill and Smith
draw this distinction while discussing the possibility of shareholders and the ASIC
joining their respective causes of action on the grounds that they share common
questions of law or fact. They observe that, while both types of action might arise
from the same transaction or series of transactions in which a director is involved, and
both may be due to the same contraventions of the Corporations Act, civil penalty
actions involve questions of law and of fact very different to those of actions by
private parties:
“ASIC’s civil penalty action is primarily concerned with ensuring that
corporations are managed in a manner which is not contrary to the public
interest, with ASIC seeking relief by way of disqualification orders, pecuniary
penalties and compensation orders to uphold the public interest. By comparison,
the minority shareholders’ action involves seeking recognition for the way in
which their interests have been affected due to the contravention of the
Corporations Act by the company’s directors”.534
The ASIC has played a prominent role following the recent spate of high profile
corporate collapses in Australia, notably that of HIH Insurance Ltd,535 described by
                                                
532 Though, under sec 1315(1), the ASIC may lay criminal charges in relation to offences against the
Corporations Act 2001, the resulting proceedings are brought by the Commonwealth Directors of
Public Prosecutions: see Du Plessis, “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian
Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 235.
533 Corporations Act 2001 ss 1315 and 1317J. The provision allowing enforcement by the affected
company was added by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999. Previously only the
ASIC had standing: see Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters Pty. Ltd (1996) 19 ACSR 483.
534 “Can Minority Shareholders ‘Free Ride’ on ASIC’s Civil Penalty Litigation?” (2002) 20
Company and Securities Law Journal 302, 303 (emphasis added).
535 Civil penalty proceedings brought by the ASIC in relation to other recent major corporate
collapses include those brought against the executive directors and chairman of One.Tel Ltd for breach
of the statutory duty of care and diligence in sec 180 of the Corporations Act 2001: see Australian
Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341; and Re One.Tel Ltd (2003) 44
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Du Plessis as “the worst corporate collapse in Australia’s corporate history”.536 The
major companies in the HIH group were placed into provisional liquidation on 15
March 2001 and formal winding up orders were made on 27 August 2001. By then
the deficiency of the group was estimated to be between A$3.6 billion and A$5.3
billion. In his report on the collapse, Owen J stated that “if the ultimate shortfall is
anywhere near the upper end of that range, the collapse of HIH will be the largest
corporate failure Australia has endured to date”.537
The action taken by the ASIC is detailed by Du Plessis:538 after news broke of the
group’s provisional liquidation, court orders were obtained freezing all former
directors’ personal assets and requiring undertakings from the directors that they
would not deal with, or transfer out of Australia, any funds or property without first
giving 30 days prior notice to the ASIC. The ASIC also obtained an undertaking that,
should the directors wish to travel outside Australia, seven days notice would be
given.539 Both civil penalty and criminal proceedings have since been initiated against
the directors by the ASIC. In Re HIH Insurance Ltd,540 declarations were sought that
the directors had contravened a number of directors’ duties provisions,541 as well as
                                                                                                                                         
ACSR 682. Criminal charges for breaches of various directors’ duties, arising from an ASIC
investigation into the collapse of Harris Scarfe Holdings Ltd, have been brought against the Executive
Chairman and Chief Operating Officer of that company: see Du Plessis, “Reverberations After the
HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian
Journal of Corporate Law 225, 236; and “Former Chairman of Harris Scarfe Charged”, Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Media and Information Release No. 03-229, 18 July 2003.
536 “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of
ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 225.
537 The Failure of HIH Insurance, Report of the HIH Royal Commission (2003), p xiii.
538 “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of
ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 232-236.
539 These orders were sought by the ASIC under sec 1323(1)(a) and (c) of the Corporations Act 2001,
under which the court may make orders to preserve assets in cases where an investigation is being
carried out, or where civil proceedings have been begun, by the ASIC. The orders were sought on an
ex parte basis (which was denied by the court) but the matter was settled after undertakings were given
by the defendants without admissions: Re HIH Insurance Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 266.
540 (2002) 41 ACSR 72.
541 The duty of care and diligence (sec 180); the duty of good faith (sec 181); and the duties not to
improperly use a directors’ position or information to gain an advantage for themselves or others (ss
182 and 183). All of these provisions are stated to be civil penalty provisions in sec 1317E(1)(a).
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the requirement that a public company obtain the approval of its members before
giving a financial benefit to a related party and the provisions governing financial
assistance to purchase the company’s own shares.542 The court made orders that all
of these provisions had been breached and, in a later judgment, that the directors
should be disqualified for periods of up to 20 years, pay pecuniary penalties of up to
$450,000 each and pay compensation to the company of $7.9 million in total.543
Criminal charges have also been laid against one of the directors of HIH in relation to
securities offences.544 Further civil proceedings and criminal charges are likely in the
near future, as a result of the ASIC’s own investigations and the recommendations of
the HIH Royal Commission chaired by Owen J.545
The ASIC’s action in response to the HIH collapse, and other recent major corporate
failures where director misconduct has been a factor, indicates that the ASIC is taking
its regulatory and enforcement roles very seriously. Baxt notes that it is clear from
the successful ASIC action against the HIH directors that
“if the regulators do have before them the appropriate evidence in a particular
matter, they will be able to pursue that matter with vigour and with some
anticipation that success will come their way”.546
There has been some speculation as to whether the ASIC is equally willing to take
action against directors of smaller companies, or in situations where the loss suffered
(and relief sought) by investors is not so great, but where a company’s collapse is as
attributable to bad management and breaches of the law as the collapse of HIH
                                                
542 Corporations Act 2001 ss 208-209 and 206A-206D respectively.
543 Re HIH Insurance Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 80. These sanctions were upheld on appeal: Adler v
Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131 (8 July 2003); see “Court
Upholds Penalties Against HIH Directors”, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Media
and Information Release No. 03-217, 8 July 2003.
544 “Rodney Adler Committed to Stand Trial”, Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Media and Information Release No. 03-220, 11 July 2003.
545 The Failure of HIH Insurance, Report of the HIH Royal Commission (2003). See Costello,
“Report of the HIH Royal Commission”, press release from the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 16 April 2003. Owen J identified a total of 56 possible breaches of either the Corporations
Act 2001 or the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which he recommended should be referred either to the
ASIC or Director of Public Prosecutions for further examination.
546 “The HIH Litigation” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 145, 146-147.
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Insurance Ltd.547 As noted below, the research for this thesis reveals that the ASIC
does involve itself over the whole spectrum of corporate failures, including those
involving smaller closely held companies.548
E Proposed United Kingdom Reforms
The United Kingdom is following a similar pattern to that recently undergone in
Australia. Public enforcement by both the Registrar of Companies and the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is currently available in many areas, with
the DTI able to bring proceedings to, for example, enforce both civil and criminal
liability for breaches of directors’ duties. However, as in Australia, moves are afoot
to give greater emphasis to private enforcement mechanisms.
1 The Company Law Review 1998-2002
As in New Zealand,549 reform to company law in the United Kingdom has
traditionally taken the form of periodic reviews and amendments, designed to combat
particular current needs or abuses. Re-examination of the basic structure of existing
company legislation has been rare, resulting in what one commentator describes as
“an incoherent, overdetailed and inaccessible jumble of provisions, many of them
outmoded, deriving from the vicissitudes of [the United Kingdom’s] economic
history since the Victorian age. Moreover, much of [the United Kingdom’s]
company law was to be found in the voluminous and contentious (and therefore
costly) case law, in many cases with an even longer history and even less pertinent
provenance”.550
                                                
547 This question is posed by Du Plessis, “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian
Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 242-
243.
548 See p173 below.
549 See p66-67 above.
550 Rickford, “A History of the Company Law Review”, in De Lacy (Ed.), The Reform of United
Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002), p7. See also Arden, “Reforming the
Companies Acts — The Way Ahead” [2002] Journal of Business Law 579, 580-581. Very similar
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In response to this state of affairs, the government announced a fundamental and
comprehensive review of company law in the United Kingdom in March 1998, with a
view to new legislation being introduced in the following Parliament, that is after
2001.551 A “Steering Group”, made up of distinguished legal and economic
practitioners, leading academics in law and business and experienced small and large
business executives, was appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
to control the review and to prepare consultation documents552 and a final report
containing recommendations for reform.553 The Steering Group, in turn, set up a
number of smaller working groups to consider specific topics.
The review’s terms of reference, as set out in the initial launch document, included
the consideration of how “core” company law554 could be modernised to provide a
simple, efficient and cost-effective framework for carrying out business activity
which would:
• Permit the maximum amount of freedom and flexibility to those managing and
                                                                                                                                         
comments were made about New Zealand’s company law prior to the 1993 reforms: see, for example,
NZLC R9, para. 122.
551 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy,
Department of Trade and Industry (1998), para. 8.1-8.3; Beckett (Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry), speech to the Pensions and Incomes Research Consultants Ltd Sixth Annual Corporate
Governance Conference, London, 4 March 1998,    http://www.pirc.co.uk/mbspeech.htm    .
552 A total of nine consultation documents were published as part of the review, some dealing with
the reform of company law in general and others with more specific subjects such as the law
concerning overseas companies, company charges and capital maintenance. Those that referred to the
enforcement of corporate rights and duties were as follows: Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (1999); Modern Company
Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, Department of Trade and Industry
(2000); and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure,
Department of Trade and Industry (2000). All are available at    http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/review.htm    .
553 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, Department of Trade and
Industry (2001).
554 Defined, for the purposes of the review, as “the fundamental rules governing the procedures for
incorporation, the basic constitutional structure and cessation of existence”: Modern Company Law
for a Competitive Economy, Department of Trade and Industry (1998), para. 6.2. See p69 above for
the application of the same principle in New Zealand’s 1993 reforms.
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directing companies;
• At the same time protect, through regulation where necessary, the interests of
parties such as shareholders, creditors and employees; and
• Be drafted clearly, concisely and unambiguously so as to be readily understood
by those involved in companies.555
Among the guiding principles followed by the Steering Group was the principle that
company law should be primarily enabling and facilitative, with regulatory
intervention being required only in situations where there is a substantial risk of
market failure such that parties are unable to protect themselves through private
action, or where there is a public interest in such intervention. The review also
heavily emphasised the needs of smaller companies, noting that they make up the
vast majority of companies in the United Kingdom (as in other countries) and that
therefore the default company law regime imposed by the Companies Act should be
formulated with these companies in mind.556
The Steering Group’s final report was published in July 2001, and the
implementation of its recommendations was begun in July 2002 with the release of a
White Paper by the United Kingdom government, including a partial draft Companies
Bill, inviting public comment by 29 November 2002.557 The proposals set out in the
White Paper largely mirror those recommended by the DTI’s review.
The reception given to the review, and the resulting White Paper, has been, in the
words of the review’s Project Director, “practically unanimously supportive”.558
                                                
555 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Department of Trade and Industry (1998),
para. 5.2.
556 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, Department of Trade and
Industry (2001), para. 1.10-1.11, 1.16-1.17, 1.26-1.27 and chapter 2; Arden, “Reforming the
Companies Acts — The Way Ahead” [2002] Journal of Business Law 579, 583-584.
557 Modernising Company Law, presented to the United Kingdom Parliament by the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry, July 2002.
558 Rickford, “A History of the Company Law Review”, in De Lacy (Ed.), The Reform of United
Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002), p40, citing press releases welcoming the
Steering Group’s final report by the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, the
National Association of Pension Funds, the Law Society and the Trade Union Congress, amongst
others.
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The only major criticism about the review in general appears to be that the outcomes
achieved are insufficient in view of the time and effort involved. However, even this
criticism has been limited to some members of the academic community,559 and the
intended users of the reforms — particularly those representing small businesses —
appear happy with the Steering Group’s proposals.560
2 Proposals on Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Remedies
In its first consultation document, the Steering Group made the general statements
that:
• It favoured civil enforcement, with costs borne by the wrongdoer, or self-
regulatory rules over criminal sanctions “which require public resource which is
already overstretched”; and
• It believed that a statutory statement of directors’ duties was desirable to
improve directors’ understanding of their legal obligations.561
                                                
559 Rickford refers to an unnamed seminar called at the invitation of Professor Sir Roy Goode at
Oxford University in early 2001: “A History of the Company Law Review”, in De Lacy (Ed.), The
Reform of United Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002), p41.
560 Ibid, 41-42. See, for example, Sinha, “A Modern Corporate Revolution for Small Private
Companies” (2002) 13 International Company and Commercial Law Review 105, 107: “The
recommendations of the Steering Group have received a warm welcome from small private companies
that have been so far subjected to a stringent regime under the Companies Act 1985”. The response of
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants to the White Paper is typical: see Responses to
Modernising Company Law White Paper, available at    http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modern/index.htm    .
The Association’s response to chapter 1 of the White Paper begins: “The individual clauses appear to
have been drafted in a deliberately informal style which will help to make the forthcoming Companies
Bill more accessible and less needlessly complex than the current legislation. We support the
approach taken with respect to the general construction of the Bill, which is to focus the attention on
the 99% of companies which are small, private and closely held”. Slightly less positively, Faber
notes that the proposed law will still not be as accessible as it could be for smaller companies, but
describes the work of the Steering Group as “otherwise admirable” and “most welcome”: “The
Companies Bill: A Vehicle for the New Millennium?” (2002) 23 The Company Lawyer 2.
561 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of
Trade and Industry (1999), para. 2.23 and 5.1.22. The Steering Group also referred to, and endorsed,
earlier recommendations to this effect by the Law Commission: see The Law Commission (UK),
Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997); and Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of
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A further consultation document released in March 2000, which specifically
addressed issues of corporate governance and enforcement, recommended both a
legislative restatement of the existing common law directors’ duties and the
introduction of a statutory derivative action. The Steering Group was of the opinion
that restatement of directors’ duties was required in the interests of certainty and
accessibility. The main argument against a restatement in the statute — that this
would produce inflexibility — was countered by a recommendation that the statutory
duties be phrased with a high level of generality, that is as a “statement of
principles”, and that they not be exhaustive, in the sense that the courts would
continue to be able to develop the content of the statutory duties, and to develop
new principles in areas not covered by them.562
The Steering Group’s recommendations on directors’ duties were largely carried
through by the government into its White Paper,563 which includes in its draft
Companies Bill a Schedule containing “General Principles by which Directors are
Bound”.564 The duties set out in this Schedule are along the lines of those already
present in the New Zealand and Australian legislation. They include a duty to act in
                                                                                                                                         
Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties, Law Com Consultation Paper No. 153 (1998),
referred to in chapter 7 of the Steering Group’s 1999 consultation document.
562 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, Department of
Trade and Industry (2000), para. 3.12-3.16. See also Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy: Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 3.11.
563 An exception was the Steering Group’s recommendation that there be a duty in relation to
creditors to the effect that, in situations where the company is (or where it is more likely than not that
the company will at some point be) insolvent, a director would be required to minimise the risk of
loss to the company’s creditors: see Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final
Report, Department of Trade and Industry (2001), Annex C, proposed Schedule 2, para. 8-9. This
proposal was based on a duty that already appears in sec 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The
government’s view was that “fear of personal liability [under such a duty] might lead to excessive
caution” and that “to incorporate it into the statement would unhelpfully conflate company and
insolvency law … The government does not believe it appropriate to single out one requirement from
insolvency law and include it within the codification of common law duties owed by directors to
companies”: Modernising Company Law, presented to the United Kingdom Parliament by the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, July 2002, Part II, para. 3.11-3.13.
564 Modernising Company Law — Draft Clauses, presented to the United Kingdom Parliament by
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, July 2002, Schedule 2.
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accordance with the company’s constitution and to exercise powers for a proper
purpose; to act in good faith and in a manner that the director decides is most likely
to promote the success of the company;565 to exercise a reasonable degree of care,
diligence and skill; and to avoid conflicts of interest.
On the issue of shareholder remedies, the Steering Group inclined towards the view
that the contractarian constitutional model, currently expressed in sec 14 of the
Companies Act 1985,
“is so misleading566 that it would be desirable to lay down … a statutory provision
explaining the extent to which individual shareholders and members are entitled to
enforce the constitution against the company, and that the contractual character
of the rights should be abolished”.567
It was, however, also acknowledged that (in the words of Steyn LJ in Bratten
Seymour Services Co. Ltd v Oxborough), the constitution is
“a statutory contract of a special nature with its own distinctive features. It
derives its force not from the bargain struck between the parties but from the
terms of the statute”.568
The Steering Group therefore concluded that, as long as the resulting provision made
it clear that the constitution confers mutual rights, obligations and powers between
the company and its members, then whether the relationship is described in the Act
                                                
565 A note to the paragraph containing this duty lists various “material factors” which directors must
take into account when deciding what would be most likely to promote the company’s success. These
include the need to foster business relationships, including those with employees, suppliers and
customers; the impact of the company’s operations on the community and environment; the
maintaining of a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and the need to achieve fair
outcomes between members: see Modernising Company Law — Draft Clauses, presented to the
United Kingdom Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, July 2002, Schedule 2,
para. 2.
566 This was also noted by the New Zealand Law Commission: see p68 above.
567 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, Department of
Trade and Industry (2000), para. 4.90.
568 [1992] BCLC 693, 698.
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as contractual or statutory is unimportant.569 It also recommended that, in cases
where an obligation is not enforceable as a shareholders’ personal right under the
constitution, the statutory unfair prejudice remedy (unchanged from its present
form)570 and a statutory derivative action should be available.571
The government’s 2002 White Paper does not address the issue of reform to
shareholder remedies. It is planned that these and other issues not dealt with in the
White Paper will “feed into” the draft Companies Bill as they are considered by the
government in the near future.572
3 Comment of the Company Law Review Proposals
Directors’ Duties
With the formulation of the statutory directors’ duties still not finalised, most
                                                
569 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure, Department of
Trade and Industry (2000), para. 5.69.
570 Companies Act 1985 (UK) sec 459. The Steering Group initially considered the possibility of
amending sec 459 by adding a rebuttable presumption that, in cases involving closely held private
companies, the exclusion of a petitioner from participation in the company’s management amounts to
unfairly prejudicial conduct. This was first proposed by the Law Commission in its 1997 report on
shareholder remedies as a means of streamlining the procedure in such cases, which make up a large
proportion of sec 459 petitions: Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), para. 3.30. See
Ferran, “Shareholder Remedies: The Law Commission Report” [1998] Company, Financial and
Insolvency Law Review 235, 235-236; and Lowry, “Mapping the Boundaries of Unfair Prejudice”, in
De Lacy (Ed.), The Reform of United Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002),
p233. The Steering Group, however, concluded that such a presumption should not be added to the
section, as it had the potential to encourage litigation and was open to abuse because it is not
reasonable to necessarily presume that removal from management under the conditions suggested is
inequitable: Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework,
Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 4.102-4.104; Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para.
5.75-5.76.
571 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, Department of
Trade and Industry (2000), para. 4.99.
572 See Modernising Company Law, presented to the United Kingdom Parliament by the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry, July 2002, Summary (p8) and Part I, para. 10-12.
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comment thus far has been on the general concept of a statutory statement, and on
the guiding principles employed by the Steering Group in its recommendations.
In its final report, the Company Law Review Steering Group noted that its proposed
statutory statement of directors’ duties had been “almost unanimously welcomed”
by respondents to its earlier consultation documents.573 Responses on this issue to
the government’s White Paper were also generally positive, with most supporting in
principle the proposal to state the duties of directors in the Act, and criticisms being
mainly limited to minor technical matters, such as the lack of clarity of some
terminology used and some obscurities in drafting. For example, responses by both
the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum and Lovells (an international business law
firm) expressed a preference for a clear separation between the duties of executive and
non-executive directors, rather than the proposal that such differences be dealt with
by way of the subjective elements contained in the duty of care, skill and diligence.574
The attitude of those few respondents who opposed the introduction of a statutory
statement of directors duties is typified by the response of The Law Society of
England and Wales. The Society acknowledged that, due to government concerns
about the complexity and inaccessibility of the common law, a statutory statement
was inevitable. However, it thought that any advantage of such a statement would be
short lived, as it became “overlaid by case law”, and that any gains in clarity and
accessibility would be outweighed by a “loss of flexibility and the uncertainty
inherent in new legislation”. The Society also believed that the reduction of complex
common law principles developed over many years to a series of legislative
statements would inevitably result in unintended changes to the law, which ought to
                                                
573 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, Department of Trade and
Industry (2001), para. 3.10.
574 See Responses to Modernising Company Law White Paper, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modern/index.htm    , responses to chapter 3 of the White Paper. The duty of
care, skill and diligence appears in Schedule 2, para. 4 of the White Paper’s draft Companies Bill. It
states that “a director must exercise the care, skill and diligence which would be exercised by a
reasonable diligent person with both — (a) the knowledge, skill and experience which may reasonably
be expected of a director in his position; and (b) any additional knowledge, skill and experience which
he has”. See also the responses of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (response to
chapter 3 of the White Paper) and Professor Len Sealy (response to question 1 on the statutory
statement of directors’ duties) for general comment on the clarity and accessibility of the proposed
statutory duties.
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be identified and acknowledged.575
Criticisms of this nature are countered by the observation that “the vagueness
inherent in fiduciary standards derived from case law” makes judicial precedent an
inappropriate primary source of directors’ duties in the United Kingdom, due to the
lack in that country of “a large number of suits producing a rich seam of modern
judicial precedent on which to draw, in order to remove uncertainty about precisely
what is required of directors in particular circumstances”. Neither was it believed that
the number of suits would greatly increase in the future, despite the proposed
reforms to the derivative action.576
The belief that stating directors’ duties in the statute will inevitably alter the common
law standards is questioned by Worthington, a member of the working group on
sanctions appointed by the Company Law Review Steering Group:
The [Steering Group’s] aim is not (for the most part) to alter the law; nor, it
seems, will the statement greatly affect the law’s development. It is unlikely that
the old cases will lose their force as illustrations of the proper application of the
law. Instead, given the generality of the principles (a generality deliberately
designed to enhance flexibility), it is unlikely that the statement will do anything
to impede developments and refinements in the law which might otherwise have
taken place at common law”.577
This prediction is perhaps supported by the experience in New Zealand and
Australia (though the statutory duties there are phrased with a greater degree of
generality than the United Kingdom proposals). In both countries the courts have
applied existing common law principles when faced with claims under the statutory
                                                
575 Responses to Modernising Company Law White Paper, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modern/index.htm    , response by The Law Society of England and Wales to
chapter 3 of the White Paper.
576 Ferran, “Company Law Reform in the UK”, paper presented to the 9th Singapore Conference on
International Business Law, 29-31 August 2001, p19. Ferran notes the comparatively low level of
directors’ duties litigation in the United Kingdom compared to the United States, where the cases
have produced the “rich seam” of precedent required to provide the necessary certainty to the law.
577 “Reforming Directors’ Duties” (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 439, 456.
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directors’ duties.578
Most respondents express support for the White Paper’s position that a specific
duty to creditors should not be included in the Schedule, noting that the current
provision for directors’ liability to creditors if a company has carried on incurring
liabilities when the directors “knew, or ought to have concluded, there was no
reasonable prospect of the company avoiding an insolvent liquidation”579 was
sufficient.580 Some were, however, of the opinion that the interests of creditors
should specifically be included on the list of “material factors” which a director must
take into account for the purposes of the duty to act in good faith to promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members.581
This highlights what has been described as the “scope” question; that is, “the
question of the interests that company law and, in particular, directors’ duties,
should be designed to serve”.582 Ferran notes that, although the proposals require
directors to operate their companies for the benefit of “the members as a whole”, the
inclusion of other interested parties on the “material factors” list represents a move
from the status quo to a more “inclusive”, “enlightened shareholder value”
                                                
578 See, for example, MacFarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261,470; Rosetex Co. Pty Ltd v Licata
(1994) 12 ACSR 779; Australian Innovation Ltd v Petrovsky (1996) 21 ACSR 218; and Sheahan v
Verco (2001) 37 ACSR 117. Textbook references to the statutory duties in New Zealand and Australia
also generally refer to the equivalent common law duties: see, for example, Farrar, Corporate
Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001), chapters 11 and 13.
579 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) sec 214. See below.
580 See, for example, the responses to the White Paper’s question 2, on whether it would be
appropriate to mention creditors in the statement of directors’ duties, by the Association of British
Insurers, the Retail Motor Industry Federation, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the Confederation of British
Industry, and Scottish corporate and commercial law firm Dundas and Wilson: Responses to
Modernising Company Law White Paper, available at    http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modern/index.htm    .
581 See, for example, the responses of Adrian Walters, Reader in Law at Nottingham Trent University
and law firm Clifford Chance to the White Paper’s question 2. The duty to promote the success of the
company appears in Schedule 2, para. 2 of the White Paper’s draft Companies Act: see p139 and note
565 above.
582 “Company Law Reform in the UK”, paper presented to the 9th Singapore Conference on
International Business Law, 29-31 August 2001, p20.
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approach,583 an approach favoured by most respondents to the White Paper.
The United Kingdom’s insolvent trading provision appears in sec 214 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. Section 214 is entitled “Wrongful Trading”, though the text
does not actually refer to “trading” but rather requires the taking of
“every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's
creditors [in situations where] at some time before the commencement of the
winding up of the company, [the director] knew or ought to have concluded584
that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into
insolvent liquidation”.585
Thus, unlike the broadly similar Australian provision,586 ceasing to trade is not a
defence; indeed, as the section may be breached either by an act or an omission,
ceasing to trade may itself constitute “wrongful trading”.587 This gives directors more
latitude to continue operating the company and to take a longer term view, provided
there is a reasonable prospect of recovery.588 It also, however, arguably heightens the
                                                
583 Ibid at 21. See also Worthington, “Reforming Directors’ Duties” (2001) 64 Modern Law Review
439, 440 and 445; and Berg, “The Company Law Review: Legislating Directors’ Duties” [2000]
Journal of Business Law 472, 475: “The Steering Group say that they have decided against imposing
pluralism, in the sense of giving directors a discretionary power to decide that other interests should
override those of shareholders. Nevertheless, it seems to the writer that Principle 1(c) [the list of
‘material factors’ to which directors must have regard: now see Schedule 2 of the draft Companies
Bill, notes to para. 2] was added in order to avoid giving the impression that pluralism was being
rejected outright”.
584 The standard required is that of a “reasonably diligent person having both (a) the general
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same
functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company; and (b) the general knowledge,
skill and experience that that director has”: sec 214(4). The same standard is proposed for the general
duty of care, skill and diligence in Schedule 2, para. 4 of the draft Companies Bill included in the
White Paper.
585 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) sec 214(2) and (3).
586 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sec 588G. See p110-114 above.
587 Goode, “Insolvent Trading Under English and Australian Law” (1998) 16 Company and
Securities Law Journal 170, 174.
588 Yeo and Lin, “Insolvent Trading — A Comparative and Economic Approach” (1999) 10
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 216, 220-221.
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risk of liability, which may serve as a disincentive to utilise corporate rescue
mechanisms such as administration under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986.589
Proceedings to enforce sec 214 may only be brought by a liquidator in the course of
the winding up of a company.590 Sealy notes that such proceedings are rare and that,
in practice, the primary use of sec 214 is as the basis for a disqualification order
under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 sec 6, on the grounds that
the director of an insolvent company is “unfit to be concerned in the management of a
company”.591 Disqualification proceedings are generally in the realm of public
enforcement, being most often brought by the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry or the Official Receiver.592
Shareholder Remedies
The policy behind the Company Law Review’s recommendations on shareholder
remedies — that of increasing (and clarifying) shareholders’ enforcement rights, and
consequently reducing reliance on the enforcement and regulatory role of the state —
appears to be generally supported by commentators. Trust, for example, notes that
“every aspect in the life of a company is now heavily regulated” in the United
Kingdom, and suggests that the government’s review of company law should
continue to emphasise the principle that
“the state should only interfere with the management of enterprises where
another principle — such as national security or protection of the environment or
criminal justice or a social good such as health or education — requires it”.
He supports moves to “strengthen the hand of shareholders in a way that reflects the
private, rather than the public, nature of their rights”, on the grounds that such
                                                
589 Goode, “Insolvent Trading Under English and Australian Law” (1998) 16 Company and
Securities Law Journal 170, 174-175.
590 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) sec 214(1).
591 “Directors’ Duties Revisited” (2001) 22 The Company Lawyer 79, 83. See, for example, Re Sykes
(Butchers) Ltd [1998] 1 BCLC 110; Re Landhurst Leasing plc [1999] 1 BCLC 286; Official
Receiver v Doshi [2001] 2 BCLC 235; and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Creegan
[2002] 1 BCLC 99.
592 See p156-157 below.
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initiatives to reduce state regulation and complexity will stimulate wealth creation and
encourage competition.593
Derivative Action
The Steering Group’s recommendation for the introduction of a statutory derivative
action relies heavily on the earlier proposals from the Law Commission.594 The
Commission noted that the basic approach of the common law derivative action is
sound — “an individual shareholder should only be able to bring such an action in
exceptional circumstances”. It also observed, however, that the common law rules
defining the situations when derivative proceedings are available are complicated,
unwieldy and unclear, and that there are situations that fall outside those rules where
it might be desirable for a member to be able to take action.595
The Commission recommended that amendments be made to the Companies Act
1985, allowing action on a company’s behalf
“if, and only if, the cause of action arises as a result of an actual or proposed act
or omission involving
(a) negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the
company; or
(b) a director putting himself in a position where his personal interests conflict
with his duties to the company”.596
                                                
593 “Company Law at the Crossroads” (2000) 21 The Company Lawyer 67, 67-68. See also Ferran,
“Shareholder Remedies: The Law Commission Report” [1998] Company, Financial and Insolvency
Law Review 235; and Poole and Roberts, “Shareholder Remedies — Corporate Wrongs and the
Derivative Action” [1999] Journal of Business Law 99 (both commenting primarily on the 1997 Law
Commission report that preceded the DTI’s review).
594 “A New Derivative Action”, Part 6 of Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997). See
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 4.115 and Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and
Industry (2000), para. 5.82 for the Steering Group’s general endorsement of the Commission’s
proposals.
595 Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), para. 6.4.
596 Ibid, Appendix E, proposed sec 458A(2). An equivalent provision which would apply in Scotland
appears in proposed sec 458B(1).
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A derivative action would thus be available in more limited circumstances than in
New Zealand or Australia, where any corporate cause of action may be pursued by
this means.597 This was justified on the grounds that almost all derivative actions are
brought against directors rather than third parties598 and that, more importantly in the
Commission’s view, it is consistent with the “proper plaintiff” principle:
“The decision on whether to sue a third party (ie. someone who is not a director
and where the claim is not closely connected with a breach of duty by a director) is
clearly one for the board. If the directors breach their duty in choosing not to
pursue the claim then (subject to the leave of the court) a derivative claim can be
brought against them. To allow shareholders to have involvement in whether
claims should be brought against third parties in our view goes too far in
encouraging excessive shareholder interference with management decisions”.599
Detailed provisions on the conduct of derivative actions were set out in proposed
amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules. These provide that leave of the court
would be required to continue a claim that the company refuses to pursue, or that the
company has commenced but which it has failed to pursue diligently or which is
otherwise appropriate for a member to continue.600 In considering an application for
                                                
597 See sec 165(1) of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) and sec 236(1) of the Australian Corporations
Act 2001.
598 The Law Commission (UK), Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), para. 6.31. The
Commission cites Cheffins, “Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British
Proposals”, a conference paper since published at [1997] Company, Financial and Insolvency Law
Review 227. Cheffins notes that in Canada, where there is no restriction on the subject matter of
derivative proceedings, there had by 1997 been only two cases brought against third parties and that
in both the application had been dismissed, with the judge expressing scepticism as to the
appropriateness of the derivative action for the type of proceedings involved. The same appears to be
true in both New Zealand and Australia. No reported cases on the statutory action in New Zealand
have been brought against third parties and, in Australia, only one such case has been reported. In that
case, Karam v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 545, a derivative
action was only necessary because direct action by the company was statute-barred under the
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).
599 Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), para. 6.34. See also Modern Company Law
for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (2000),
para. 4.118 for the Steering Group’s comments in support of this view.
600 Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), Appendix B, draft rules 50.4(2)(b) and 50.9.
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leave, “all relevant matters” would have to be taken into account, including the
following in particular:
(a) Whether the plaintiff is acting in good faith;
(b) Whether the claim is in the interests of the company, taking into account the
views of the company’s directors on commercial matters;
(c) Whether the impugned conduct may be, or has been, approved by a general
meeting of shareholders. Effective ratification by the company would be a
complete bar to a derivative action;601
(d) Whether a general meeting of shareholders has resolved not to pursue the claim;
(e) Any opinion of independent shareholders or directors that the claim should or
should not be pursued; and
(f) The availability of alternative remedies.602
It has been suggested that such a wide discretion would throw quite a burden on a
court, and that the balancing exercise which would be necessary when considering all
of the competing factors raised by each side could result in the law developing in “a
somewhat haphazard, inconsistent and hence undesirable manner”. The proposals are
welcomed, however, in that they should go some way towards remedying the
injustice which the general absence of a members’ right to bring derivative
proceedings has wrought.603
The issue of ratification has caused some concern among commentators. Ferran notes
the recommendation to retain the rule that effective ratification prevents a derivative
action (because the effect of ratification by the company is to forgive wrongdoing by
directors and to adopt their actions as the company’s), but is critical of the lack of
any guidance on what constitutes “effective ratification”. Currently it is not clear
                                                
601 Ibid, draft rule 50.8(4). This would retain the existing rule: see Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All
ER 1064, 1066; and Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1981] Ch 257,
307.
602 Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), Appendix B, draft rules 50.7(2) and 50.10(2).
603 Neuberger, “Company Law Reform: The Role of the Courts”, in De Lacy (Ed.), The Reform of
United Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002), p75.
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exactly which wrongs against a company may be ratified and which may not,604
leading to a potential situation where,
“in determining whether a derivative action would be available under the proposed
new law, on a key point — whether the wrong had been effectively ratified — one
could have to refer back to much of the same mass of case law that, in putting
forward its proposal for a new derivative action, the Law Commission, justifiably,
condemned as old, complicated and unwieldy”.605
In common with both Australia and New Zealand, the Commission recommended
that the statutory action should entirely replace its common law equivalent,606 and
that derivative claims should not be open to discontinuance or compromise without
leave of the court.607 On the claimant’s application, the court would have the
discretion to grant an indemnity out of the company’s assets in respect of costs.608
This follows the Australian approach, rather than that taken in New Zealand, where
the court is required to order that the costs of a derivative action will be met by the
                                                
604 “Shareholder Remedies: The Law Commission Report” [1998] Company, Financial and
Insolvency Law Review 235, 242-246. For example, Davies concludes that “it would seem that a wide
range of breaches of duty by directors may be ratified, whether arising out of lack of bona fides,
improper purposes, conflict of interest or negligence, provided that no dishonesty or expropriation of
corporate property is involved in the transactions which are approved”, citing Daniels v Daniels
[1978] Ch 406 and Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565: Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern
Company Law (7th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell (2003), p440-441. Hannigan also subscribes to this
view: “Limitations on a Shareholder’s Right to Vote: Effective Ratification Revisited” [2000] Journal
of Business Law 493. However, according to Vinelott J in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman
Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1981] Ch 257, the decisive factor in whether or not a wrong is ratifiable is not
dishonesty or expropriation of corporate property, but the interest of the majority in the ratified
conduct. Both Davies and Hannigan describe this as “heretical”.
605 Ferran, “Shareholder Remedies: The Law Commission Report” [1998] Company, Financial and
Insolvency Law Review 235, 242. Similar comments are also made by Poole and Roberts,
“Shareholder Remedies — Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action” [1999] Journal of Business
Law 99, 104: “In many instances the effectiveness of a purported ratification will dominate the
hearing for leave and there will be no change of emphasis in favour of a broad judicial discretion”.
606 Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No. 246 (1997), para. 6.51-6.55.
607 Ibid, draft rule 50.14.
608 Ibid, draft rule 50.13.
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company unless this is unjust or inequitable.609
Remedy for Unfair Prejudice
As noted above,610 no changes to sec 459 of the Companies Act 1985 were
recommended by the Company Law Review Steering Group. The approach to the
remedy for unfair prejudice has, however, recently undergone what has been
described as a “conservative revision” away from the approach taken in New Zealand
and Australia,611 by way of the 1999 decision of the House of Lords in O’Neill v
Phillips.612
Section 459 allows a remedy for conduct which is “unfairly prejudicial to the
interests of [a company’s] members generally, or to some part of its members”. As in
New Zealand and Australia it was, until 1999, consistently held in the United
Kingdom that illegality or bad faith by those in control of a company is not necessary
for a remedy to be granted. For example, in Re R.A. Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd,613
it was held by Nourse J that the test of unfair prejudice is an objective, rather than a
subjective one:
“It is not necessary for the petitioner to show that the persons who have had de
facto control of the company have acted as they did in the conscious knowledge
that this was unfair to the petitioner or that they were acting in bad faith; the test,
I think, is whether a reasonable bystander observing the consequences of their
conduct, would regard it as having unfairly prejudiced the petitioner’s interests”.614
                                                
609 See sec 166 of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) and sec 242 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth),
discussed at p86-88 and p120-122 above.
610 See note 570 above.
611 Farrar and Boulle, “Minority Shareholder Remedies — Shifting Dispute Resolution Paradigms”
(2001) 13 Bond Law Review 272, 273 and 286-289.
612 [1999] 1 WLR 1092.
613 [1983] BCLC 273, cited with approval in, for example, Re London School of Electronics Ltd
[1986] 1 Ch 211; Re Sam Weller and Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682; Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959;
Re J.E. Cade and Son Ltd [1992] BCLC 213; Re Little Olympian Each-way Ltd (No. 3) [1995] 1
BCLC 636; Re Regional Airports Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 30; and Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 BCLC
376.
614 [1983] BCLC 273, 290, citing the words of Slade J in Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd (Unreported,
Chancery Division, 31 July 1981).
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Nourse J did appear to narrow the test somewhat with a later comment that the
defendant’s lack of any “underhand conduct” was a factor in his finding that there
had not been unfair prejudice in this case.615 This point reflects the fact that the
United Kingdom provision does not give the court the discretion to grant a remedy
when it is “just and equitable” to do so, as is the case in New Zealand.616 This
limitation in sec 459 aside, the rulings in Noble and subsequent cases show general
agreement with the approach taken in the New Zealand and Australian cases post-
1980, and demonstrate support for the same enhanced shareholder protection which
is evident in these cases.
Until 1999 it was also commonly held in the United Kingdom that “unfair prejudice”
in terms of sec 459 could encompass the breach of a shareholder’s legitimate
expectations, not necessarily limited to those matters set out in the company’s
constitution or in other express agreements.617 This approach mirrors that taken by
                                                
615 [1983] BCLC 273, 291-292.
616 This aspect of the remedy, it will be recalled, was a major factor behind Richardson J’s
interpretation of the New Zealand provision: see p90 above. Bouchier notes this inadequacy in the
United Kingdom provision, and has recommended that the United Kingdom follow New Zealand’s
lead in giving the courts statutory authority to grant relief when it is just and equitable to do so. This
would, he suggests, be more consistent with the original desire of the 1948 Cohen Committee to
have a broad remedy allowing the court the freedom to make whatever order it deemed appropriate in
the circumstances: “The Companies Act 1989 — Yet Another Attempt to Remedy Unfair Prejudice”
[1991] Journal of Business Law 132, 143. The Cohen Committee had recommended that the court
“should have power to impose upon the parties whatever settlement the court considers just and
equitable”, and that its discretion should be “unfettered, for it is impossible to lay down a general
guide to the solution of what are essentially individual cases”: Report of the Committee on Company
Law Amendment, Board of Trade (1948), para. 60.
617 Shapira describes the “legitimate expectations” principle as “the key concept” and “centrepiece of
the jurisdiction” under sec 459 until its revision in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092: “The
Hand that Giveth is the Hand that Taketh Away — O’Neill v Phillips and Shareholder ‘Legitimate
Expectations’” (2000) 11 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 260, 261 and 270. See also
Bouchier, “The Companies Act 1989 — Yet Another Attempt to Remedy Unfair Prejudice” [1991]
Journal of Business Law 132, 137-142; Riley, “Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of
the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courts” (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 792-796;
and Griggs and Lowry, “Minority Shareholder Remedies: A Comparative View” [1994] Journal of
Business Law 463, 466-468.
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the New Zealand and Australian courts,618 and indicates that the United Kingdom
courts were at that time generally willing to apply equitable considerations to the
remedy in a similar manner to their antipodean counterparts. For example, in Quinlan
v Essex Hinge Co. Ltd619 it was held that a minority shareholder and director was
entitled to relief under sec 459 after being excluded from the management of a
company, even though the strict terms of his service agreement allowed for his
dismissal as a director upon six months’ notice. In addition, the majority shareholder
claimed that he considered the applicant to be his employee rather than his business
partner, and that the applicant’s directorship was merely a “courtesy title”. The
court, however, concluded that the applicant had established a legitimate expectation
of continued participation in management, on the basis of “an understanding” that he
would do so, and that he would participate in the conduct of the company’s business
over and above the specific areas defined in the service agreement.
In similar circumstances, it was noted in Richards v Lundy (decided before, though
reported after, O’Neill v Phillips) that although it is
“usually appropriate to treat the company’s articles as representing the agreed
contractual position between the shareholders, and therefore not to regard as
unfair any action which the articles sanction, … this is one of the cases, not all
that infrequent, in which the personal relationships within a small company have
given rise to legitimate expectations which, as a matter of equity, must be taken
into account”.620
The court held that, despite the lack of any statement to this effect in the articles, and
despite the applicant’s minimal (10%) shareholding in the company, it was “clearly
understood” that he would participate in the company’s management. His exclusion
therefore amounted to unfairly prejudicial conduct.
O’Neill v Phillips represents a shift away from this liberal approach to sec 459. The
case involved a similar situation to both the Quinlan and Richards cases: the
applicant, O’Neill, was given a 25% shareholding in the company by Phillips, the
                                                
618 See p90-91 and p124-125 above.
619 [1996] 2 BCLC 417.
620 [2000] 1 BCLC 376, 393.
153
then sole shareholder and director, who expressed the hope that O’Neill would
assume responsibility for managing the company, in which case he would receive half
of the company’s profits. O’Neill duly did take over the running of the company and
subsequently entered negotiations with Phillips to increase his shareholding to 50%.
However, market conditions changed, the company’s fortunes declined and Phillips
decided to resume personal control of the company. O’Neill was removed from his
position as managing director and the agreement that he would receive a 50%
shareholding in the company, and continue to receive 50% of the profits, never
eventuated. O’Neill sought an order that he be bought out by Phillips under sec 459.
It was, in the words of Shapira, “a run-of-the-mill unfair prejudice case, which would
not have commended much attention if it were not for the House of Lords’
reversal”.621 The Court of Appeal took what had hitherto been the conventional
approach, finding that the absence of a conclusive agreement that O’Neill’s
shareholding would be increased did not prevent him from having a legitimate
expectation that it would.622 The House of Lords, however, adopted a narrower view.
Lord Hoffmann accepted that the “just and equitable” principle underlying the
Ebrahimi decision623 was equally applicable to sec 459 but, contrary to the earlier
cases, he saw the basis of this principle to be good faith on the part of those in
control of the company:
“Company law has developed seamlessly from the law of partnership, which was
treated by equity … as a contract of good faith. One of the traditional roles of
equity, as a separate jurisdiction, was to restrain the exercise of strict legal rights in
certain relationships in which it considered that this would be contrary to good
faith … Thus unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules [on which it is agreed
that the affairs of the company should be conducted] or in using the rules in a
manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith”.624
On the issue of “legitimate expectations”, a term Lord Hoffmann himself had used
                                                
621 “The Hand that Giveth is the Hand that Taketh Away — O’Neill v Phillips and Shareholder
‘Legitimate Expectations’” (2000) 11 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 260, 261 and 266.
622 [1997] 2 BCLC 739, 767.
623 [1973] AC 360. See note 140 above.
624 [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1099.
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previously,625 he concluded that “the concept … should not be allowed to lead a life
of its own, capable of giving rise to equitable restraints in circumstances to which
traditional equitable principles have no application”, and that legitimate expectations
should only be held to have been frustrated when the conduct in question “would be
contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have actually agreed”.626
In this case, as no binding, unconditional, promise had been made regarding the
proposed increase in O’Neill’s shareholding or his sharing of the company’s profits,
Lord Hoffmann held that no unfair prejudice had occurred. O’Neill had a “reasonable”
expectation that these things would happen (in the sense that they appeared
reasonably likely to him) but not a “legitimate” expectation, as redefined by his
Lordship.
O’Neill v Phillips has since been followed in a number of cases, including Re
Guidezone Ltd, where Parker J noted that O’Neill
“establishes that ‘unfairness’ for the purposes of sec 459 is not to be judged by
reference to subjective notions of fairness, but rather by testing whether, applying
established equitable principles, the majority has acted, or is proposing to act, in a
manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith”.627
This leaves no room for the previous interpretation, which required unfairness to be
suffered by the minority, rather than necessarily being inflicted by the majority; and
which has recognised that legitimate expectations could be based on personal
circumstances or on generally accepted commercial standards, rather than on
formalised arrangements.628 It thus appears that the scope for relief for unfair
prejudice is now much more limited in the United Kingdom than it has been in the
past, or than it continues to be in either New Zealand or Australia.
                                                
625 See Re Saul D. Harrison and Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 19.
626 [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1101-1102.
627 [2000] 2 BCLC 321, 355.
628 Shapira, “The Hand that Giveth is the Hand that Taketh Away — O’Neill v Phillips and
Shareholder ‘Legitimate Expectations’” (2000) 11 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 260, 268-
269; Clark, “Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway Through the Maze” (2001) 22 The Company
Lawyer 170, 173.
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4 Public Enforcement in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the DTI acts as the main public enforcer under the
Companies Act 1985 and associated legislation.629 The DTI may take action in the
name of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (or the Official Receiver)630 for
non-compliance with many provisions, notably those relating to share capital,
company accounts,631 the appointment, removal and disqualification of directors and
fraudulent trading. The DTI may also initiate proceedings to protect members from
unfair prejudice under sec 460,632 and to enforce the directors’ obligations set out in
Part X of the Act,633 some of which carry criminal as well as civil liability.
                                                
629 See the list of company law enforcement jurisdictions currently operating in the United Kingdom
in Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The
Strategic Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (1999), Annex F, p190-204.
630 Official Receivers are officials of the Insolvency Service, an Executive Agency of the DTI,
attached to courts with winding up jurisdiction. They are appointed by, and act under the general
authority and directions of, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry: Insolvency Act 1986 (UK)
ss 399-401. The main tasks of an Official Receiver are to investigate the causes of insolvencies and
act as liquidator in court-ordered compulsory liquidations: Insolvency Act 1986 ss 132 and 136. See
Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (7th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell
(2003), p857-858.
631 For example, the requirement that every company must keep reasonably accurate accounting
records: Companies Act 1985 sec 221. Failure to do so is an offence, and is a matter to which a court
must have regard when deciding whether a director’s conduct warrants a disqualification order:
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 sec 9 and Schedule 1, para. 4(a). Disqualification of
directors is discussed below.
632 This power exists in cases where the company has been subject to an investigation under Part XIV
of the Companies Act 1985 on the grounds that it appears that the company has been conducted with
intent to defraud creditors or otherwise fraudulently, unlawfully or unfairly prejudicially; or where
documents have been seized under ss 447 or 448. It appears that this power is seldom, if ever, used.
633 These include an obligation on directors to disclose certain interests to their board (sec 317);
provisions for making directors’ service contracts open for inspection by members (sec 318);
restrictions on transactions which a company can enter into with directors without shareholder
approval (ss 320-322); a prohibition on directors dealing in the company’s share options (sec 323); an
obligation on the director to keep the company informed of his or her interests in shares and on the
company to keep a register of those interests (ss 324-329); and other extensive restrictions on the
loans and other financial transactions that a company can enter which benefit directors. Enforcement of
these provisions is rare: see Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of Trade and Industry (1999), para.
7.13; and Department of Trade and Industry, Companies in 2001-2002, report for the year ended 31
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The DTI is very active in the area of disqualification of errant directors. Neuberger
notes that the specialist company law reports “are littered with decisions under the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986”.634 The policy behind this legislation
is described as follows by Davies:
“Although in some cases it is open to any member or creditor of the company to
apply to the court for the imposition of a disqualification order upon a director635
and in other cases a disqualification order may be imposed by the court as an
ancillary measure in litigation, the leading role in initiating applications for orders
is in fact played by the Department of Trade and Industry and its agencies … In
other words, in this area of law the public interest in the enforcement of
appropriate standards of conduct upon directors and others involved in the
management of companies is recognised in the very design of the legislation”.636
The most important provision under which the DTI may seek a disqualification order
is sec 6, which allows the court to make an order on the grounds that a person is unfit
to be concerned in the management of a company, such unfitness having been shown
by conduct while acting as a director of a company that has become insolvent. The
factors which the court must consider when deciding whether a person is unfit to be a
director are given in Schedule 1 of the Act, including any misfeasance or breach of
duty by the director in relation to the company, any misapplication or retention of
company property, the extent of the director’s responsibility for any failure by the
                                                                                                                                         
March 2002 presented pursuant to the Companies Act 1985 sec 729 (July 2002), p38-41, where a
table of legal proceedings brought by the DTI in 2001-2002 does not include any brought under Part
X.
634 “Company Law Reform: The Role of the Courts”, in De Lacy (Ed.), The Reform of United
Kingdom Company Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd (2002), p65.
635 Applications under ss 2-5 of the Act (on the grounds of conviction of an indictable offence in
connection with a company, persistent breaches of companies legislation, fraud or breach of duty in
relation to a company or conviction of an offence involving failure to supply information to the
Registrar of Companies) may be made by the Secretary of State (or Official Receiver), or by a
liquidator, past or present member or creditor of the company concerned: Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 sec 16(2). Applications under other provisions, most importantly sec 6,
may only be made by the DTI.
636 Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell (1997), p679. See
also p216-217 of the 7th edition of Gower, and Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164,
176.
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company to comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 and the
extent of the director’s responsibility for the company’s insolvency itself. Breaches
of common law directors’ duties, and the statutory duty to avoid insolvent trading in
sec 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, have been raised as part of the justification for
disqualification orders by the DTI.637
The DTI is authorised to petition the court to compulsorily wind up a company in
the public interest under the Insolvency Act 1986 sec 124A. The public interest is
assessed based on information obtained from any investigation carried out by the
DTI on the grounds of fraudulent, unlawful or unfairly prejudicial conduct of the
company’s affairs, or for breaches of financial services legislation.638 In particular,
companies have been wound up for running so-called “pyramid selling” schemes in
breach of Part XI of the Fair Trading Act 1973, for conducting an insurance business
without the necessary authorisation and for giving investment advice without being
authorised under the Financial Services Act 1986.639
There are numerous criminal offences under the United Kingdom’s companies
legislation which are enforceable by the DTI. The vast majority are regulatory (in the
sense that they do not involve actual or presumed dishonesty, but rather are used to
enforce compliance with accountability or disclosure rules) rather than offences of
dishonesty.640 With the exception of those dealing with failure to deliver company
accounts and annual returns, these regulatory offences are rarely enforced.641
                                                
637 See, for example, Re Time Utilising Business Systems Ltd [1990] BCLC 568; Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry v Lubrani [1997] 2 BCLC 115; Re Launchexcept Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 36; Re
Bradcrown Ltd [2001] 1 BCLC 547 and the cases noted by Sealy at note 591 above.
638 Insolvency Act 1986 sec 124A(1).
639 See Re Sentinel Securities plc [1996] 1 WLR 316; Re Market Wizard Systems (UK) Ltd [1998] 2
BCLC 282;  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hasta International Ltd [1998] SLT 73;
and Re Delfin International (SA) Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 71.
640 See Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 13.23-13.49; and
Department of Trade and Industry, Classification of Offences under the Companies Act 1985 and
Associated Legislation, available at    http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/class_offences.pdf  .
641 See Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 13.45; and Department of
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Offences involving dishonesty include fraudulent trading642 and insider dealing.643
The fraudulent trading provision is broad, applying to any business of a company
which is carried on with intent to defraud creditors or “for any fraudulent purpose”.
Any person who is knowingly a party to such conduct is in breach of the provision,
which carries a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment as well as the
possibility of a disqualification order.644 Insider dealing carries the same penalties.
Prosecutions for insider dealing may be instituted by, or with the consent of, either
the DTI or the Director of Public Prosecutions.645
In its White Paper, the government does not propose any significant changes to the
current public enforcement regime in the United Kingdom. Its recommendations are
largely confined to the redrafting of provisions in the interests of greater clarity and,
in some cases, changes to the type or level of sanctions to better achieve desired
results.646
F Conclusion
New Zealand and Australia have traditionally followed the United Kingdom’s
“contractarian” corporate law model, under which the company constitution is
viewed as a contract between the company and its members. This model is
characterised by limited enforcement rights being available to members, and no place
being given to public enforcement of corporate rights and duties.
                                                                                                                                         
Trade and Industry, Companies in 2001-2002, report for the year ended 31 March 2002 presented
pursuant to the Companies Act 1985 sec 729 (July 2002), p38-41.
642 Companies Act 1985 sec 458.
643 Insider dealing is defined as the use of information that is not publicly available and which would
have a significant effect on the price of any securities, in the course of dealing in securities on a public
market or relying on a professional intermediary: Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss 52 and 56. Prior to
1993 insider dealing was dealt with in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
644 Companies Act 1985 Schedule 24; Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 sec 2.
645 Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss 56(1) and 61.
646 See Modernising Company Law, presented to the United Kingdom Parliament by the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry, July 2002, Part II, para. 6.23 and Part III, para. 3 and 319-327.
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All three countries have, however, been influenced more recently by the North
American model. This model, exemplified by the Canada Business Corporations Act,
emphasises the rights of members to constrain the behaviour of corporate managers
through such mechanisms as the statutory derivative action and the remedy for unfair
prejudice. Public enforcement has a limited role due to the retention of the traditional
assumption that shareholders should (and will) exercise ultimate managerial authority
over the company.
New Zealand’s 1993 company law reforms have most closely followed the North
American example. Included in the reform package was a statutory statement of
directors’ duties, a comprehensive list of shareholder remedies and a specific rejection
of public enforcement except in the interests of protecting the investing public.
Australia has followed suit to some extent, with reforms since 1992 ostensibly
designed to reduce the traditional reliance on the ASIC as corporate law enforcer and
to instead encourage private enforcement action. This objective, however, does not
appear to have survived the recent collapses of a number of high profile Australian
companies. These collapses have refocused the public’s (and the government’s)
attention on the need for regulation, resulting in an increase in enforcement activity
by the ASIC and a corresponding drop in the overall use of private enforcement
mechanisms.
The long term effect of the current reform activity in the United Kingdom is
uncertain. As in Australia, the Company Law Review proposals emphasise the goal
of an enabling company law system, based around private enforcement and a
minimising of the amount of public regulation. However, the fact that the currently
pervasive public enforcement system will remain substantially in tact, should the
proposals be implemented as proposed, suggests that public enforcement will
continue to be prominent in the United Kingdom.
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V Patterns of Enforcement Litigation 1986-2002
A Introduction
This chapter seeks to assess the practical effect of the reform activity discussed
above. The tables in Appendices 1-3 present the results of surveys of reported cases
involving enforcement action against company directors and other managers
(including receivers) for the years 1986 to 2002 in New Zealand, Australia and the
United Kingdom. The total number of cases reported in each jurisdiction is recorded,
as well as the average number of claims per 100,000 registered companies for each
period.
Section references in Tables A and B of Appendix 1 are to the Companies Act 1955
(NZ), and in Tables C to F to the Companies Act 1993 (NZ), unless otherwise
stated. As noted above,647 the Companies Act 1955 was not fully repealed until 1
July 1997. Post 1993 cases involving companies which had not yet reregistered under
the Companies Act 1993 were therefore brought under the 1955, rather than the
1993, Act. The 1955 Act was, however, amended with effect from 1 July 1994 to
align it with the new legislation in certain key areas including directors’ duties and
enforcement.
Section references in Appendix 2 are to the Corporations Law or Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) unless otherwise stated. References to the Uniform Companies Acts of
1961, and to the Codes which comprised the Co-operative Scheme in Australia
between 1980 and 1989,648 do not specify jurisdictions in view of the general
uniformity of that legislation between states.
Section references in Appendix 3 are to the Companies Act 1985 (UK) unless
otherwise stated.
                                                
647 See note 254 above.
648 See Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis (loose-leaf),
para. 2.180-2.220.
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As noted above,649 these surveys refer only to actions which resulted in at least one
judgment, rather than to all enforcement action commenced by the various enforcers
during the period under review. Thus, no account has been taken of public or private
actions which were discontinued or settled, or of administrative decisions by public
enforcement bodies which were not challenged.650
The results of the surveys are summarised in the graphs immediately below. Results
for each jurisdiction are summarised in the graphs that appear after the relevant
headings.
                                                
649 See p15 above.
650 According to the Commerce Committee’s “1997/98 Financial Review of the Ministry of
Commerce”, in Reports of Select Committees on the 1997/98 Financial Reviews of Government
Departments and Offices of Parliament (1999), the New Zealand Securities Commission actually
undertook 55 enforcement actions in 1996, reducing to 47 in 1998. Presumably this includes all
prohibitions or suspensions of investments statements, prospectuses and advertisements, as well as
actions requiring applications to the court. The Commission’s Annual Report for the Year to 30 June
2001 notes a “significant increase in enforcement work” in areas such as reviewing offer documents,
issuing warnings to investors about illegal investment schemes, producing reports on suspected
insider trading and considering recommendations that companies be placed in statutory management.
Moreover, the company names provisions of the New Zealand Companies Act, for example, were
presumably enforced by the Registrar of Companies on thousands of occasions during the period
under review without the decision being challenged. The same observation also applies to the other
jurisdictions surveyed. For example, the ASIC’s chairman, David Knott, recently stated that, as at
July 2002, the ASIC had almost 200 cases on foot and “has been responsible for the jailing of 69
white collar criminals over the past 3 years alone”: “Corporate Governance — Principles, Promotion
and Practice”, Monash Governance Research Unit Inaugural Lecture, 16 July 2002, p7. In the United
Kingdom, the Company Law Review Steering Group notes that for the 1998-1999 year, over 4000
summonses were issued for regulatory offences such as failing to deliver accounts or annual returns,
but that prosecutions resulted only rarely. “In most cases summonses result in pleas in mitigation or
in the document being filed before the case is heard”: Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy: Completing the Structure, Department of Trade and Industry (2000), para. 13.45. A full
table of legal proceedings brought by the DTI in 2001-2002 appears in its annual report, Companies
in 2001-2002, report for the year ended 31 March 2002 presented pursuant to the Companies Act
1985 sec 729 (July 2002), p38-41. This includes a total of 1,929 applications for disqualification
orders and around 4,500 other proceedings.
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B New Zealand
Private Enforcement: New Zealand
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Public Enforcement: New Zealand
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The rate of private enforcement activity in New Zealand (measured by the average
number of claims per 100,000 registered companies per year) was fairly stable
throughout the whole period surveyed, with only a slight rise between the 1994-1998
and 1999-2000 periods. Both before and after the 1993 reforms, the vast majority of
enforcement litigation was brought by private rather than public enforcers, with
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public enforcement appearing to drop away almost entirely between 1999 and 2002.
Those parties traditionally considered to be corporate “insiders” — shareholders,
directors and creditors — were responsible for most enforcement action, although in
the period between 1986 and 1993 cases brought by liquidators outscored those
brought by directors and creditors, and equalled those brought by shareholders. This
may be due to the high numbers of liquidations following the 1987 sharemarket crash,
and the inevitable attempts to recover losses from directors which followed.651
Enforcement action by the company itself, however, was rare — only five cases
between 1986 and 1993, four between 1994 and 1998 and none between 1999 and
2002, perhaps reflecting the fact that it is the directors who control company
litigation.
The most common causes of action for shareholders and shareholder/directors during
the two earlier periods were breaches of directors’ duties and the shareholders’ unfair
prejudice remedy, often combined with an application for a just and equitable
winding up. Interestingly, breaches of fiduciary duties were claimed slightly more
often than breaches of the statutory duties introduced in the 1993 Act. This may
reflect the fact that the statutory duties are specifically stated to be owed to the
company rather than to shareholders and, although they may be enforced by way of a
derivative action, this requires leave of the court. The statutory derivative action has,
however, proven more popular than its common law equivalent — a total of eight
cases were brought under the statutory provision between 1994 and 1998 and six
between 1999 and 2002, compared to only two common law derivative actions
between 1986 and 1993.
Between 73 and 75% of all cases brought by private enforcers during all three periods
involved closely held companies. This is not surprising given that the vast majority
of New Zealand’s registered companies are closely held,652 and supports the view
that shareholders (and even perhaps creditors) of widely held companies are, in
reality, passive investors with little interest in having (or perhaps little scope to
                                                
651 Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 13.
652 Dugan, McKenzie and Patterson, Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New
Zealand Ltd (2000), p3 note that over 86% of New Zealand’s registered companies have only one or
two shareholders, and 95% have fewer than five.
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have) any say in the governance of the companies in which they invest.653
Action by public enforcers which actually sought to enforce the law was almost
entirely conducted against widely held companies. During the period surveyed, not
one case was brought by the Securities Commission against the management of a
closely held company.654 Those cases involving the Registrar of Companies were
mainly of an administrative nature, most often involving the refusal to reserve a
company name because of its similarity to that of another company. This seems to
reflect the policy of the Law Commission that public enforcement should only be
resorted to when the wider public interest, rather than private interests, are at
stake,655 and seems to indicate that this policy prevailed in practice even before the
1993 reforms.
C Australia
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653 Hill, “Changes in the Role of the Shareholder”, in Grantham and Rickett (Ed.), Corporate
Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing (1998), p190-192.
654 This is not surprising given that closely held companies generally do not offer securities to the
public.
655NZLC R9 para. 318.
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Public Enforcement: Australia
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The New Zealand figures are in contrast to the patterns observed in Australia.
Ramsay’s 1995 study found that the ASIC was many times more likely than
shareholders to undertake action to enforce corporate rights and duties. He concluded
that,
“although there will always be situations where shareholders will commence
litigation to enforce corporate rights and duties, such enforcement is more
typically undertaken by a regulatory agency such the [ASIC]”.656
These surveys confirm that the level of private enforcement is low in Australia, and
that it appears to be dropping — it was only around 53% of the rate observed in
New Zealand between 1986 and 1993, 41% between 1994 and 1998 and 21%
between 1999 and 2002.
The rate of public enforcement observed reduced by almost half between the 1986-
1993 and 1994-1998 periods, before increasing again between 1999 and 2002. This is
in keeping with the ASIC’s “deliberate strategy of being more visible in [its]
enforcement activity” since 2000, after taking a lesser role in the immediately
                                                
656 “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian Securities
Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174, 175 and 180-
183. Unlike Ramsay’s study, the levels of public enforcement in Australia observed in these surveys
were all lower than the corresponding figures for private enforcement. This is entirely due to the
different methodologies used in the two studies: see note 26 above.
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preceding period.657
As in New Zealand, shareholders, directors and creditors were the principal private
enforcers. Liquidators were also prominent during all three survey periods. The unfair
prejudice remedy was used extensively by shareholders and shareholder/directors,
with between three and four cases being reported per year between 1986 and 1998,
dropping slightly to around 2.5 between 1999 and 2002. Directors’ duties were also
common causes of action, the statutory duty to avoid insolvent trading being the
single most commonly enforced duty. As in New Zealand, actions to enforce
common law duties outnumbered claims under the statutory duties (other than the
insolvent trading provision) during all three periods.
It was predicted, prior to its enactment, that the statutory derivative action would
have little effect on the extent of shareholder litigation in Australia.658 From these
surveys, this appears to have been perhaps a little pessimistic. Between 1999 and
2000 there were a total of eight statutory derivative claims made by shareholders and
directors (at a rate of two per year), compared to eight common law actions between
1986 and 1998 (a rate of 0.6 per year).
As in New Zealand, most private enforcement in Australia involved closely held
companies, though by a lesser margin than in New Zealand. In the 1986-1993 and
1994-1998 periods, the proportion of cases involving closely held companies was
only around 55%, rising to 65% in the intervening period.
Public enforcement in Australia covered a much wider range of causes of action than
in New Zealand, including a significant number of claims for breaches of directors’
duties and for orders prohibiting a defendant from managing a company. Surprisingly,
the overall rate of reported public enforcement activity in Australia only exceeded
that in New Zealand between 1999 and 2002. For the period 1986-1993 the rates
                                                
657 See Knott, “Corporate Governance — Principles, Promotion and Practice”, Monash Governance
Research Unit Inaugural Lecture, 16 July 2002, p6.
658 See Ramsay, “Enforcement of Corporate Rights and Duties by Shareholders and the Australian
Securities Commission: Evidence and Analysis” (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 174,
175; Ramsay, “Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory
Derivative Action” (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 149; and p117-122 above.
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were the same in each country and between 1994 and 1998 New Zealand had the
higher rate of public enforcement. If, however, actions of a primarily administrative
nature (such as those relating to the reservation of company names) are ignored,
Australia’s rate of public enforcement is comfortably ahead of New Zealand’s for all
but the middle period (1994-1998), when the level of ASIC enforcement activity
appears to have been uncharacteristically low.
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Overall levels of private enforcement in the United Kingdom were the lowest of the
three jurisdictions by a significant margin throughout the survey period, although the
downward trend in Australia’s rate of private enforcement resulted in similar figures
being generated by both countries in the 1999-2002 period. The rate of private
enforcement activity in the United Kingdom also showed a slight downward trend.
Between 1986 and 1993 the rate was around 44% of that observed in Australia and
24% of that observed in New Zealand. Between 1994 and 1998 the rate was 56% of
that for Australia and 23% of that for New Zealand and between 1999 and 2002,
84% and 18% respectively.
As in New Zealand and Australia, shareholders and directors were responsible for the
greatest proportions of private enforcement actions, with liquidators (and, to a lesser
extent, creditors and the company itself) also taking fairly prominent roles.
The rate of public enforcement rose sharply between the 1986-1993 and 1994-1998
periods, mainly in the areas of director disqualifications and associated claims for
breaches of the insolvent trading provision, before returning to approximately its
previous level in the period 1999-2002. This increase occurred in the years
immediately after the 1990 to 1992 recession, during which economic activity in the
United Kingdom contracted significantly. Between 1991 and 1994 the number of
companies on the register in the United Kingdom decreased by over 67,000,659
resulting in a rise in insolvent liquidations,660 triggering the observed increase in
disqualification proceedings by the DTI.
The remedy for unfair prejudice was the most common cause of action for private
enforcers. Directors’ duties were not commonly litigated by shareholders or directors,
with liquidators or the company itself being the chief private enforcers of these
duties. Derivative actions were also very rare. 69% of private enforcement claims
between 1986 and 1993 involved closely held companies, reducing to 64% between
1994 and 1998 and 58% between 1999 and 2002.
                                                
659 See the table of company registrations in the United Kingdom, following Table F of Appendix 3
below.
660 Rutstein notes the United Kingdom government’s alarm at the rate of corporate failure experienced
during the recession of the early 1990s: “Corporate Failure: A Change of Direction” (2000) 15
Journal of International Banking Law 71, 71.
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Public enforcement in the United Kingdom is dominated by proceedings seeking the
disqualification of directors and associated claims for breaches of directors’ duties
(notably the duty to avoid insolvent trading in sec 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986).
The overall rate of public enforcement was significantly lower than New Zealand’s in
the period 1986-1993 (although the New Zealand figure is exaggerated by the
presence of a large proportion of decisions on the reservation of company names),661
but rose to a similar level by the 1994-1998 period and was almost double the New
Zealand rate between 1999 and 2002. The United Kingdom and Australian rates of
public enforcement have been virtual mirror images — Australia’s rate was around
double that of the United Kingdom between 1986 and 1993, the reverse was true
between 1994 and 1998 and in the latest period the rates were approximately the
same.
                                                
661 See the comments at p165 and 168 above.
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VI Conclusions
It is contended by Shirtcliffe and others that the law on directors and the enforcement
of their duties in New Zealand represents an “inexorable tide of legalism”. The 1993
reforms, although intended to follow an enabling model, have brought only
“complexity, compliance costs, frustration and alarm”, it is claimed.662 In particular,
the newly enacted directors’ duties have been singled out for criticism. It was feared
that these, in combination with the liberalising of shareholder remedies and a
perceived increase in government regulation, would lead to an unwillingness by
directors to take legitimate business risks. It was also predicted that capable business
people would be discouraged from accepting directorships due to the excessive
standards of care and caution which are now required.
Such arguments have, however, been balanced by those of other, less critical,
commentators. While justifiably describing the rewriting of the Law Commission’s
draft Act by the Law Reform Division as unnecessary and, at times, confusing, they
have also noted that the complaints levelled at the 1993 Act’s provisions on directors
and enforcement are in many cases not realistic ones. Hodder, for example, suggests
that “there have been no conspicuous signs of directors being hard to find, or of mass
resignations by experienced commercial players”, that the “much discussed minority
remedies in the 1993 reform package have been little exercised”, and that the law has
been interpreted by the courts with an “awareness of the general intentions of the
reforms”, as expressed in the Long Title to the Act.663 This is in contrast to the
dramatic increases in enforcement activity, from both public and private enforcers,
foretold by the critics of the 1993 reform package.
New Zealand does have a much higher rate of private enforcement activity than either
                                                
662 Shirtcliffe, “Good Governance: A Case for Paternalism or Personal Responsibility?” [1998]
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 66, 66. See also p25-27 above; and Goddard, “Company Law
Reform — Lessons from the New Zealand Experience” (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law
Journal 236, 246.
663 Hodder, “Whither the Companies Act 1993?” [1997] New Zealand Law Journal 97, 99-101. See
also Tompkins, “Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors under the Companies Act 1993”
(1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 13, 27, 29 and 38.
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Australia or the United Kingdom. Does this indicate that the potential for liability
goes beyond what is required to ensure “good governance”, leading to unnecessary
alarm among current and potential company directors? The results of the survey of
enforcement litigation contained in Chapter V of this thesis suggest not. Despite
some obscuring of the Law Commission’s original vision arising from the Law
Reform Division’s changes, a largely self-enforcing system has emerged. The 1993
reforms appear to have had little effect on who enforces corporate rights and duties,
the amount of enforcement activity or on the methods used. Most enforcement action
continues to be initiated by private parties, primarily shareholders and
shareholder/directors, and the newly enacted directors’ duties have produced
comparatively few claims since their commencement in 1994. It may be that New
Zealand’s higher rates of private corporate enforcement are simply symptomatic of a
generally higher rate of litigation of all kinds,664 rather than being due, in any way, to
the 1993 reforms in this area.
Enforcement activity by the state, through the Registrar of Companies and the
Securities Commission, remains confined to administrative matters and the
enforcement of securities law provisions, as was also the case prior to the
introduction of the reform package. This will remain the case, even with the Securities
Commission’s newly enhanced enforcement role in the areas of insider trading and
continuous disclosure by listed companies, and if the further proposed reforms to
New Zealand’s insider trading laws are put into effect.665 Such a role is consistent
with the principle that “self-reliance and voluntary co-operation” should be relied
upon in cases where the parties are, in fact, in a position to protect their own
interests. Those provisions which are, and have been, subject to public enforcement
are those designed to ensure “a free and open market” through the disclosure of
information which may not otherwise be available to widely dispersed groups of
investors.666
Despite claims that Australia’s reforms, particularly the introduction of a statutory
                                                
664 Robertson, for example, notes that New Zealand send “three times as many appeals per head to
the Privy Council as the British do to the House of Lords”: “The Privy Council: The Changing
Arguments” [2003] New Zealand Law Journal 189.
665 See p95-98 above.
666 See p27-29 and p73 above.
173
derivative action, were designed to increase the role of private enforcers and reduce
the enforcement role of the ASIC, this does not appear to have occurred in practice.
Indeed, it appears that statement such as those by Farrar and various law reform
bodies that the reforms were designed to shift the primary enforcement role from the
ASIC to the private sector, and so reduce the ASIC’s regulatory burden, are too
wide.667
It appears that there was a genuine intention to reduce the complexity of Australia’s
corporate law and to entrust private parties with a greater role in enforcement
(evidenced, perhaps, by a marked drop in enforcement activity by the ASIC between
1994 and 1998). However, this did not survive the more recent large scale collapses
of companies like HIH and One.Tel which, like the so-called “excesses” and
accompanying company failures of the 1980s, have loomed large in the minds of the
Australian public and media.668 Action has been demanded to counter the effects of
these collapses and the ASIC appears to have responded by reaffirming its role as the
dominant enforcer of corporate rights and duties in Australia.669
Interestingly, the survey of Australian enforcement activity in Chapter V of this
thesis indicates that the ASIC takes action against directors of smaller companies
almost as often as those of larger ones (unlike in New Zealand, where the little public
enforcement that does occur is mainly limited to “public interest” cases involving
breaches of securities law by widely held companies). This suggests that the ASIC is
willing to satisfy its enforcement role even when the loss suffered and relief sought
by investors is not as great as in cases involving the high profile corporate collapses,
and that it does get involved over the whole spectrum of corporate failures.670
                                                
667 Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press (2001),
p197; Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action
(1993), p4-5; and Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill
1998, para. 6.30: see note 410 above.
668 See Du Plessis, “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses:
The Role of ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 227-230.
669 See p125-126 and p131-134 above.
670 See Du Plessis, “Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses:
The Role of ASIC” (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 242-243, noted at note 547
above.
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As in Australia, proposed reforms to directors’ duties and shareholder remedies in
the United Kingdom have been accompanied by comment from law reform bodies and
commentators that private enforcement (and consequently a less regulatory and more
enabling approach to corporate law enforcement) is preferable to public enforcement
in most cases.671 A decision on whether this policy has been carried through in
practice must await the implementation of the Company Law Review proposals, but
it is noteworthy that no significant changes to the current public enforcement regime
in the United Kingdom are contemplated as part of this reform package.672
If Australia’s experience can be used as a guide, then this suggests that levels of
private enforcement will remain at their present very low levels, should the DTI
continue its active role as a public enforcement agency, and that the proposed
statutory derivative action will be little used. The recent reversion in the United
Kingdom to a more conservative interpretation of the commonly used unfair
prejudice remedy, following the House of Lords’ decision in O’Neill v Phillips,673
also does not bode well for future private litigants (though the survey of United
Kingdom cases in Chapter V of this thesis does not indicate any immediate reduction
in the use of this remedy).
Overall, it seems that the primary factor determining whether a jurisdiction’s
corporate law enforcement system can be characterised as “enabling” (in the sense
that private parties exercise the chief enforcement role) or “regulatory” (where a
prominent role is taken by a public agency) is the enforcement power given to the
state body, rather than that which is placed at the disposal of potential private
enforcers. Even if company shareholders and directors are given increased powers and
incentives to bring errant managers to account, if a public agency has (or retains) the
power, the resources and the inclination to enforce corporate rights and duties, then
private enforcement will not significantly increase.
                                                
671 See, for example, the comments of the Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company
Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, Department of Trade and Industry
(1999), para. 2.23 and 5.1.22; and Trust, “Company Law at the Crossroads” (2000) 21 The Company
Lawyer 67, 67-68, noted at notes 561 and 593 above.
672 See p158 above.
673 [1999] 1 WLR 1092: see p150-154 above.
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VII Appendix 1: Tables of New Zealand Cases
A Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in New Zealand 1986-1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 209):
• Share allotment
• Sale to director at undervalue
• Share forfeiture
• Directors acting in own interest
1
1
1
3
Derivative action:
• Recovery of debt owed to company 1
Tort:
• Deceit
• Negligence
1
2
Injunction:
• Inadequate notice of meeting
• Restraining entry into service contract with director 1
1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and skill
• Conflict of interest
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders
• Fiduciary duty to company
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
Misleading and deceptive conduct (Fair Trading Act 1986) 1
Compulsory share acquisition (sec 208) 1
Allotment of securities without registered prospectus
(Securities Act 1978 sec 37) 1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 217) 1
Valuation of shares 1
Total claims by shareholders: 12 14
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Injunction:
• Invalid appointment of receiver
• Registration of share transfer
• Restraining threatened proceedings by liquidator
2 1
1
1
Derivative action:
• Invalid appointment of receiver 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 209):
• Management deadlock
• Preferring majority interests over minority
• Withholding dividends
3
1
1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 217) 5
Illegal takeover (Companies Amendment Act 1963) 1
Breach of receiver’s duties 2
Breach of prohibition on company purchasing own shares (sec
62) 1
Compulsory share purchase under articles 1
Total claims by directors: 15 6
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Improper use of company name (sec 116) 4
Guarantee of company debt 3
Tort:
• Negligence 1 1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and skill 1 1
Breach of prohibition on company purchasing own shares (sec
62) 1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 319) 1
Reckless or fraudulent trading (ss 320 and 321) 2
Breach of receiver’s duties 1
Total claims by creditors: 14 2
177
No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Guarantee of company debt 1
Tort:
• Negligence
• Procuring breach of contract
1
1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty as agent 3
Misleading and deceptive conduct (Fair Trading Act 1986) 1
Total claims by outside parties: 7 0
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Breach of receiver’s duties 1
Directors duties:
• Conflict of interest
• Fiduciary duty to company
2
1
Injunction:
• Conflict of interest 1
Total claims by the company: 4 1
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 319) 7 1
Reckless or fraudulent trading (ss 320 and 321) 12 1
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty of care and skill
1
1
Transaction for inadequate consideration (sec 311C) 1
Voidable preference (sec 309) 2
Total claims by liquidators: 23 3
No. of Cases
Litigation by Receivers/Statutory Managers Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Breach of receiver’s duties 1
Disclosure of interest (sec 199) 1
Total claims by receivers/statutory managers 1 1
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Total Claims 1986-1993: 76 27
Average Claims per Year: 9.5 3.4
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year:674 6.2 2.2
                                                
674 See Table of New Zealand Company Registrations, following Table F of this appendix, for
figures used in these calculations. The average number of claims per year is divided by the average
number of companies on the New Zealand Register of Companies for the relevant period.
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B Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in New Zealand 1986-1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Securities Commission Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to give notice of relevant interest (Securities
Amendment Act 1988 sec 20) 3
Breach of prohibition on company purchasing own shares (sec
62) 1
Total claims by the Securities Commission: 0 4
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Registrar of Companies675 Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Registration of prospectus declined (Securities Regulations
1983) 1
Company names:
• Reservation of name (sec 32) 7 2
Criminal liability for misleading statement in registered
prospectus (Securities Act 1978 sec 58) 3
Winding up petition (sec 217) 1
Restoration to Register of Companies (sec 336) 2
Failure to file annual return (sec 132) 1
Total claims by the Registrar: 11 6
Total Claims 1986-1993: 11 10
Average Claims per Year: 1.4 1.3
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.9 0.8
                                                
675 The majority of these cases were actually appeals by companies from decisions of the Registrar.
Although not initiated by the Registrar as such, they have been included because they stem from
action taken by the Registrar to enforce statutory provisions.
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C Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in New Zealand 1994-1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 174):
• Share forfeiture
• Excessive directors’ salaries 1
1
Derivative action (sec 165):
• Director’s conflict of interest
• Breach of fiduciary duties
• Excessive directors’ salaries
• Misappropriation of company funds
1
1
1
1
1
Disclosure of company information 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Injunction:
• Restraining share forfeiture 1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and skill (sec 137)
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Good faith and company’s best interests (sec 131)
• Proper purpose (sec 133)
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total claims by shareholders 12 7
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Injunction:
• Restraining unauthorised use of company funds
• Share purchase by directors
1
1
Derivative action (sec 165):
• Breach of fiduciary duties
• Director’s conflict of interest
• Unauthorised use of company funds
1
1
1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 174):
• Conflict of interest
• Exclusion from management
• Financial mismanagement
3
3
2
Appointment of liquidator (sec 241) 2
Illegal takeover (Companies Amendment Act 1963) 1
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders
2
1
Total claims by directors: 16 3
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Liability for misapplication, default, breach of duty, etc (sec
301) 3
Misleading and deceptive conduct (Fair Trading Act 1986) 1
Tort:
• Negligence 2 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to creditors
• Proper purpose (sec 133)
• Reckless trading (sec 135)
2
2
3
1
Guarantee of company debt 1 1
Injunction:
• Restraining restructuring of business 1
Total claims by creditors: 11 7
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Tort:
• Negligence 3 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty as agent
• Reckless trading (sec 135)
• Duty of care and skill (sec 137)
1
1
1
Liability of directors for debts of solicitors’ nominee company 1
Total claims by outside parties: 6 2
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors duties:
• Good faith and company’s best interests (sec 131)
• Fiduciary duty to company
1
1
Breach of prohibition on company purchasing own shares
(Companies Act 1955 sec 62) 1
Injunction:
• Conflict of interest 1
Total claims by the company: 4 0
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 300)
1
Liability for misapplication, default, breach of duty, etc (sec
301):
• Reckless trading (sec 135) 2
Failure to notify Registrar of share allotment (Companies Act
1955 sec 60) 1
Liability as contributory on winding up (Companies Act 1955
sec 211) 1
Production of company documents (sec 261) 1
Voidable preference (sec 292) 1
Total claims by liquidators: 7 0
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Total Claims 1994-1998: 56 19
Average Claims per Year: 11.2 3.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 6.2 2.1
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D Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in New Zealand 1994-1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Securities Commission Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Obtaining evidence for overseas Commission (Securities Act
1978 sec 18A) 1
Breach of exemption notice (Securities Act 1978 sec 5) 1
Offer of Securities without registered prospectus (Securities Act
1978 sec 33) 1
Misleading advertisement (Securities Act 1978 sec 44A) 1
Total claims by the Securities Commission: 0 4
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Registrar of Companies Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Inspection of documents (Securities Act 1978 sec 67) 1
Company names:
• Reservation of name (sec 22)
• Use of the word “Limited”
4
1
Termination of liquidation (sec 250) 1
Restoration to Register of Companies (Companies Act 1955 sec
336) 1
Criminal liability for misstatement in registered prospectus
(Securities Act 1978 sec 58) 1
Criminal liability for allotment in breach of Act (Securities Act
1978 sec 59) 1
Commencement of business without filing statutory declaration
(Companies Act 1955 sec 117) 1
Total claims by the Registrar: 6 5
Total Claims 1994-1998: 6 9
Average Claims per Year: 1.2 1.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.7 1
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E Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in New Zealand 1999-2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 174):
• Excessive directors’ salaries / inadequate dividends
• Delaying meeting requested by shareholders
1
1
Derivative action (sec 165):
• Director’s conflict of interest
• Breach of fiduciary duties
1
1
1
1
Enforcement of minority buy-out right (sec 111) 2
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Injunction:
• Restraining share transfer
• Restraining share issue
• Restraining voting by interested shareholder
1
1
1
Application to bring insider trading proceedings (Securities
Amendment Act 1988) 4
Opposition to court-approved amalgamation (sec 236) 2
Void allotment of securities (Securities Act 1978 sec 37) 7
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders 1
Total claims by shareholders 6 20
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Derivative action (sec 165):
• Breach of shareholders’ agreement
• Misleading or deceptive conduct
1
1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 174):
• Conflict of interest
• Inadequate dividends
• Exclusion from management
• Financial mismanagement / diversion of company funds
• Management deadlock
1
1
5
2
2
Just and equitable winding up (sec 241) 1
Breach of constitutional notice requirement for directors’
meeting 1
Share dealing by director (sec 149) 1
Failure to register share transfer (sec 84) 1
Breach of prohibition on company purchasing own shares
(Companies Act 1955 sec 62) 1
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act in good faith and in company’s best interests
(sec 131)
• Duty to act for a proper purpose (sec 133)
1
1
1
Total claims by directors: 20 1
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Liability for default, breach of duty, etc (sec 301) 2
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to creditors
• Reckless trading (sec 135)
• Duty in regard to obligations (sec 136)
• Duty of care, diligence and skill (sec 137)
1
2
1
1
Guarantee of company debt 1
Improper use of company name (sec 25) 2
Restoration of company to Register (sec 329) 2
Breach of implied warranty to ratify pre-incorporation
contract (sec 183) 1
Personal liability in contract 2
Breach of receivers’ duties 2
Total claims by creditors: 17 0
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside Parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Fair Trading Act 1986) 1 1
Total claims by outside parties: 1 1
No. of Cases
Litigation by Receivers / Statutory Managers Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Misappropriation of investors’ money (Corporations
(Investigations and Management) Act 1989 sec 54) 1
Total claims by receivers / statutory managers: 0 1
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 300) 2
Liability for default, breach of duty, etc (sec 301):
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best interests
(sec 131)
• Reckless trading (sec 135)
• Duty in relation to obligations (sec 136)
• Duty of care, diligence and skill (sec 137)
1
1
5
3
1
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Voidable preference / transactions for inadequate
consideration (ss 292 and 298) 5
Total claims by liquidators: 19 0
Total Claims 1999-2002: 63 23
Average Claims per Year: 15.8 5.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 6.6 2.4
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F Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in New Zealand 1999-2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Registrar of Companies Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Company names:
• Reservation of name (sec 22) 1
Acting as director when disqualified (sec 382) 2
Conditional appointment as director (sec 382) 1
Breach of Contributory Mortgage Regulations 1988 1
Criminal liability for allotment in breach of Act
(Securities Act 1978 sec 59) 1
Total claims by the Registrar: 4 2
Total Claims 1999-2002: 4 2
Average Claims per Year: 1 0.5
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.4 0.2
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New Zealand Company Registrations 1986-2002
Year Companies on Register676
1986 136,553
1987 147,158
1988 158,032
1989 160,988
1990 159,922
1991 153,275
1992 154,526
1993 156,925
1994 168,391
1995 170,350
1996 177,093
1997 192,224
1998 202,317
1999 217,000
2000 230,359
2001 (est.) 244,000
2002 (est.) 256,000
                                                
676 New Zealand company registration figures for 1986 to 2000 were taken from the New Zealand
Official Yearbook (94th ed.), Department of Statistics (1990), p569; and the New Zealand Official
Yearbook (103rd ed.), Statistics New Zealand (2002), p515. Figures used for 2001 and 2002 are
estimates.
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VIII Appendix 2: Tables of Australian Cases
A Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in Australia 1986-1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Rectification of share register (sec 1094 / Companies Code sec
186, 259) 6
Failure to disclose interest 1
Financial assistance to purchase own shares (Companies Code
sec 129) 1
Breach of Stock Exchange listing requirements (Securities
Industry Code sec 42) 3
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose
• Fiduciary duty to shareholder
• Fiduciary duty to company
3
4
1
4
2
Directors acting without authority 1 1
Misleading statement in takeover report (sec 750 / Companies
(Acquisition of Shares) Code sec 38, 44) 6
Inadequate notice of shareholders’ meeting 4
Injunction:
• Insider Trading (Securities Industry Code sec 128)
• Takeover offer in breach of (Companies (Acquisition of
Shares) Code
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
• Breach of shareholders’ agreement
• Share issue for improper purpose
• Invalid amendment to articles
• Compelling disclosure of relevant interest (Companies Code
sec 261)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Irregular conduct of shareholders’ meeting (sec 1322 /
Companies Code sec 539) 4 9
Invalid removal of director 1
Inspection of records (sec 319 / Companies Code sec 265B) 1 6
Just and equitable winding up (Companies Code sec 364) 5 4
Validation of share allotment (Companies Code sec 122) 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 260 / Companies Code sec
320):
• Diversion of company property / business
• Unfair / discriminatory provision in articles
• Failure to give access to records
• Share transfer not registered
2
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
191
• Irregular conduct of company’s affairs
• Oppressive issue of shares / options
• Failure to pay dividends
• Unlawful payments to directors
• Conduct benefiting group, not individual company
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
Unfair reduction of capital (sec 195 / Companies Code sec 123) 1 2
Derivative action:
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
• Breach of statutory directors’ duties
• Company claim under Trade Practices Act 1974 1
2
1
Invalid share issue (sec 196) 1
Offer of securities in breach of Companies Act 1961 sec 83 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1 3
Insider trading (Securities Industry Code sec 128, 129) 3
Failure to convene shareholders’ meeting (Companies Code sec
241) 1
Invalid amendment to articles 3
Directors acting without authority 1
Inspection of accounting records (sec 289) 1
Total claims by shareholders: 45 76
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Validity of directors’ appointment (sec 226 / Companies Code
sec 539) 1 2
Validation of share allotment (Companies Code sec 122) 2
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to act honestly (Companies Code sec 229)
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
2
1
Invalid share issue (sec 196) 1
Inadequate notice of directors’ meeting 2 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 260 / Companies Code sec
320):
• Invalid share issue
• Exclusion from management
• Management deadlock
• Unfair divestment of shareholding
• Improper conduct of board meetings
1
3
1
1
1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461 / Companies Code sec
364) 2
Breach of receivers’ duties 1
Irregular conduct of directors’ meetings (sec 1322) 4
Total claims by directors: 23 3
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Insolvent trading (sec 592 / Companies Code sec 556) 28 7
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Inspection of company books (sec 486) 2
Guarantee of company debt 4 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Breach of receivers’ duties 1
Total claims by creditors: 35 10
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No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Tort:
• Breach of confidence
• Deceit
1
1
Financial assistance to purchase own shares (Companies Act
1961 sec 67) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to act honestly (Companies Code sec 229)
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
• Duty of care and diligence (Companies Code sec 229)
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty not to compete with company
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
Invalid appointment of receiver (Companies Code sec 323) 2 1
Directors acting without authority 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Failure to disclose interest (Companies Act 1961 sec 123) 1
Total claims by the company: 10 10
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to take account of creditors’ interests
• Duty of care
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
1
1
2
1
2
Void preference (Companies Code sec 451, 453) 2
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Examination of directors (Companies Code sec 541) 3 4
Delivery of company property to liquidator (sec 483) 2
Total claims by liquidators: 13 6
No. of Cases
Litigation by Receivers and managers Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Proper purpose
• Duty of care and diligence (Companies Code sec 229)
• Duty to take account of creditors’ interests
2
1
1
1
Total claims by receivers/statutory managers 5 0
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Total Claims 1986-1993: 131 105
Average Claims per Year: 16.4 13.1
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year:677 2.5 2
                                                
677 See Table of Australian Company Registrations, following Table F of this appendix, for figures
used in these calculations. The average number of claims per year is divided by the average number of
companies on the register in Australia for the relevant period.
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B Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in Australia 1986-1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by the National Companies and Securities
Commission (NCSC) / Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) /
ASC
Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Prohibition from leaving Australia without consent
(Companies Code sec 573) 1
Offer of prescribed interest (sec 1064 / Companies Code sec
169) 6 8
Invalid change of company type (sec 411 / Companies Code sec
69, 70) 3
Financial assistance to purchase own shares (Companies Code
sec 129) 1
Notice requiring production of company books (Companies
Code sec 12) 5 1
Reservation of company name (Companies Code sec 65) 1
Breach of Futures Industry Code 2 2
Offer of securities in breach of Securities Industry Code sec 43 3
Untrue statements in prospectus (Companies Code sec 108) 1
False / misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities
(Securities Industry Code sec 126) 1
Examination of directors (Companies Code sec 541) 1 1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (Companies Code
sec 267) 2 1
Failure to disclose directors’ fees  (Companies Code sec 270) 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 260):
• Exclusion from management 1
Unlawful reduction in capital (sec 195) 1
Prohibition from managing a company (Companies Code sec
227A, 562A) 15
Negligence, default, breach of duty or trust (Companies Code
sec 542) 2
False or misleading statement in document (Companies Code
sec 563) 2
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and diligence (Companies Code sec 229)
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
• Fiduciary duty to creditors
• Duty to act honestly (Companies Code sec 229)
• Insolvent trading (Companies Code sec 556)
2
2
1
1
2
1
Failure to disclose substantial shareholding (Companies Code
sec 146) 1
Failure to keep registered office open and accessible
(Companies Code sec 216) 1
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Insider trading (Securities Industry Code sec 128, 129) 1
Failure to report to liquidator (Companies Code sec 375) 1
Takeover in breach of Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Code
sec 11 2
Total claims by the NCSC / CAC / ASC: 46 31
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown (Director of Public Prosecutions) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Offer of prescribed interest (Companies Code sec 169) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Insolvent trading (Companies Code sec 556)
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
3
2 3
Fraudulent trading (Companies Code sec 374C) 1
Fraudulent taking or applying of company property (Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW) sec 173) 1
Acting as a director while disqualified (Companies Code sec
227) 1
Total claims by the Crown: 8 4
Total Claims 1986-1993: 54 35
Average Claims per Year: 6.8 4.4
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 1 0.7
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C Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in Australia 1994-1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 260):
• Refusal to pay dividends
• Irregular conduct of company’s affairs
• Unfair proposed restructuring
• Refusal to adjust agreement between shareholders and
company
• Inadequate notice of shareholders’ meeting
1
3
2
1
1
Derivative action:
• Transfer of company assets
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
1
1
1
1
Unfair reduction in share capital (sec 195) 1
Breach of pre-emptive rights in articles 1
Furnishing false or misleading information (sec 1309) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act honestly (Companies Code sec 229)
1 1
1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Unauthorised related party transaction (sec 243H) 1
Misleading statement in takeover report (sec 739, 750) 9
Misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities (sec
995) 3
Failure to convene shareholders’ meeting (sec 246) 1 1
Irregular conduct of shareholders’ meeting (sec 1322) 2 3
Failure to register share transfer (sec 1094) 1
Oppressive expropriation of minority shareholding 1
Validation of improper allotment of shares (sec 194) 2
Rectification of share register (sec 212) 1
Breach of option contract 1
Breach of receivers’ duties 1
Invalid removal of directors (sec 227) 1
Misleading material in notice of shareholders’ meeting 1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 3
Total claims by shareholders: 21 30
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholder 1
Tort:
• Deceit
• Negligence
1
2
Failure to disclose interest (sec 231) 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 260):
• Management deadlock
• Breach of fiduciary obligations
• Misuse of company assets
• Failure to hold directors’ meetings
• Exclusion from management / employment
3
1
2
1
5
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 4
Misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities (sec
995) 1
Invalid appointment of receiver 1
Irregular conduct of directors’ meetings (sec 1322) 1 2
Power to requisition directors’ meetings (sec 247) 1
Invalid share transfer 1
Insolvent winding up (sec 459P) 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Invalid removal of directors (sec 226E, 227) 2 1
Total claims by directors: 28 5
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unauthorised transaction (Companies Code sec 68A) 1
Guarantee of company debt 2
Directors’ duties:
• Insolvent trading (sec 592 / 588G / Companies Code sec 556)
• Duty of care and diligence (sec 232)
• Improper use of position (sec 232)
18
1
1
2
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1 1
Opposition to scheme of arrangement (sec 444A) 1
Concealment of company property (sec 486A) 1
Total claims by creditors: 25 4
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries
• Duty of care (sec 232)
1
1
Disposition of property to defraud creditors (Bankruptcy Act
1966) 1
Company acting outside its objects clause (sec 162) 1
Total claims by outside parties: 3 2
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Tort:
• Negligence 3
Directors’ duties:
• Improper use of position / information (sec 232)
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Failure to disclose interest (Companies Code sec 228)
1
5
1
7
Irregular conduct of shareholders’ meeting (sec 1322) 1
Total claims by the company: 7 11
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Seizure of company books (sec 530C) 2
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to cooperate with liquidator (sec 530A)
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty of care and skill (sec 232)
• Duty to act honestly (sec 232)
• Improper use of position (sec 232)
1
5
2
1
3
1
2
Invalid disposition of property (sec 468) 1
Void preference (sec 565) 2
Avoidance of disposition of property by receiver (sec 468) 1
Order for examination of directors (sec 596B) 1
Uncommercial transaction (sec 588FB) 4
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Failure to keep financial records (sec 286) 1
Total claims by liquidators: 23 5
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Total Claims 1994-1998: 107 57
Average Claims per Year: 21.4 11.4
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 2.2 1.2
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D Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in Australia 1994-1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by the ASC / ASIC Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfair reduction in share capital (sec 195) 1
Untrue statements / non-disclosure in prospectus (Companies
Code sec 108) 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 1
False / misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities
(sec 995, 998) 5
False takeover announcement (sec 746) 1
Prohibition from managing a company (sec 600) 5
Directors’ duties:
• Improper use of position (sec 232 / Companies Code sec 229)
• Duty of care and diligence (sec 232)
3
1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 1 1
Failure to keep, and deliver to liquidator, proper accounts (sec
590, 591) 1
Failure to give notice of substantial shareholding (sec 709) 1
Reservation of company name (sec 367) 1
Managing a company while disqualified (sec 229) 1
Offer of prescribed interest (sec 1064) 2
Seizure of company books (sec 530C) 1
Surrender of passport during investigation (sec 1323) 1
Total claims by the ASC / ASIC: 15 13
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown (Director of Public Prosecutions) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to act honestly (Companies Code sec 229)
• Improper use of position (Companies Code sec 229)
• Duty of care and diligence (Companies Code sec 229)
2
3
2
4
1
Furnishing misleading information (Companies Code sec 564) 1 1
Misleading statement in relation to securities (Securities
Industry Code) 1
Financial assistance for purchase of company’s own shares
(Companies Code sec 129) 2
Defrauding creditors (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) 1
Total claims by the Crown: 9 9
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Total Claims 1994-1998: 24 22
Average Claims per Year: 4.8 4.4
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.5 0.4
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E Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in Australia 1999-2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 246AA / sec 232):
• Share allotment for improper purpose
• Inadequate disclosure to shareholders
• Refusal to allot shares
• Directors’ conflict of interest
• Breach of shareholders’ agreement
• Breach of directors’ fiduciary duties
• Failure to pay dividends
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Derivative action (sec 236):
• Breach of directors’ fiduciary duties
• Diminution of share value
• Breach of shareholders’ agreement
• Failure to disclose interest and other relevant information
• Failure to pay dividends
1
1
1
1
1
Unfair appropriation of minority shareholding (sec 256B) 2
Injunction:
• Inadequate notice of meeting 2
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act honestly (sec 232)
1
1
1
Misleading or deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974 and
State equivalents) 5
Invalid appointment as administrator (sec 436A) 1
Misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities (sec
995) 2
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 2 1
Application to inspect company books (sec 247A) 1
Unauthorised increase in members’ liability (sec 140) 1
Invalid appointment / removal of directors (sec 225) 1
Members’ right to access share register (sec 173) 2
Rectification of share register (sec 175) 1
Irregular conduct of shareholders’ meeting (sec 1322) 1
Total claims by shareholders: 15 23
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders 1
Derivative action (sec 236):
• Invalid / wrongful transfer of property 3
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 246AA):
• Exclusion from management / breakdown in directors’
relationship 2
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 3
Irregular conduct of directors’ meeting (sec 1322) 1
Limitation of scope of public examination of administrator
(sec 596F) 1
Invalid appointment / removal of directors (sec 225) 2
Total claims by directors: 10 3
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 1
Guarantee of company debt 1
Setting aside of deed of company arrangement (sec 445D) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Constructive trust based on breach of fiduciary duty to
company
• Insolvent trading (sec 592)
1
1
Failure to give notice of creditors’ meeting (sec 497) 1
Removal of administrator (sec 449B) 1
Total claims by creditors: 5 2
No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Restoration of company to Register (sec 601AH) 1
Invalid execution of documents 1
Failure to give substantial shareholding information (sec
671B) 1
Misleading and deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974
and State equivalents) 1
Breach of Stock Exchange Business Rules 1
Total claims by outside parties: 3 2
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No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best interest
(Companies Act 1993 (NZ) sec 131)
• Proper purpose (Companies Act 1993 (NZ) sec 133)
• Improper use of position / information (sec 182, 183)
2
1
1
1
Unauthorised transaction (Companies Act 1993 (NZ) sec 18) 1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461) 1
Total claims by the company: 1 6
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 286) 1
Production of company documents (sec 596B) 1
Directors duties:
• Improper use of position (sec 232)
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act honestly (sec 232)
• Duty of care and diligence (sec 232)
• Insolvent trading (sec 588G)
2
2
1
6
2
1
2
1
Misleading and deceptive conduct (Trade Practices Act 1974
and State equivalents) 1
Examination of director (sec 596A) 2
Total claims by liquidators: 15 7
Total Claims 1999-2002: 49 43
Average Claims per Year: 12.3 10.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 1 0.9
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F Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in Australia 1999-2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by the ASIC Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to give notice of substantial shareholding (sec 671B,
709) 2
Offer of prescribed interest (sec 1064) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to act honestly / in good faith and for a proper purpose
(sec 232 / 181)
• Duty of care and diligence (sec 232 / 180)
• Improper use of position (sec 232 / 182)
• Improper use of information (sec 183)
• Insolvent trading (sec 588G)
2
1
2
1
3
3
4
1
Prohibition from managing a company (ss 230, 600, 1317EA) 8
Banning of licensed securities dealer (sec 829) 2
False / misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities
(sec 765, 995, 999) 1 5
Misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial
services (ASIC Act 2001 ss 12DA, 12DB) 1
Invalid appointment as director 1
Conspiracy to defraud (Criminal Code) 1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 286) 2
Objection to scheme of arrangement (sec 707) 1
Prohibition of payment or transfer of money or property (sec
1323, 1324) 1
Unlicensed securities / investment advice business (sec 780,
781) 2 1
Just and equitable winding up (sec 461, 464) 2
Unauthorised related party transaction (sec 208) 1
Failure to register managed investment scheme (sec 601ED) 1 5
Total claims by the ASIC: 24 31
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No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown (Director of Public Prosecutions) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Insider trading (sec 1002G) 2
Non-reporting of financial transactions (Financial
Transactions Reports Act 1998) 1
Creating a misleading appearance in respect of the price of
securities (sec 998) 1
Fraudulent application of company property (Crimes Act 1914) 1
Total claims by the Crown: 1 4
Total Claims 1999-2002: 25 35
Average Claims per Year: 6.3 8.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.5 0.7
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Australian Company Registrations 1986-2002
Year Companies on Register678
1986 (est.) 530,000
1987 (est.) 575,000
1988 (est.) 620,000
1989 (est.) 660,000
1990 (est.) 710,000
1991 (est.) 745,000
1992 (est.) 785,000
1993 839,593
1994 885,118
1995 933,652
1996 965,461
1997 1,026,206
1998 1,088,922
1999 1,167,687
2000 1,208,613
2001 1,246,297
2002 1,280,971
                                                
678 Australian company registration figures for 1999 to 2002 were taken from the ASIC website
http://www.asic.gov.au   , and figures for 1993 to 1998 were supplied upon request to the “ASIC
Infoline” (  infoline@asic.gov.au   ). Figures used for 1986 to 1992 are estimates, actual figures being
unavailable due to the fact that company registrations were the responsibility of the various state
Corporate Affairs Departments, rather than the ASIC, during that period.
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IX Appendix 3: Tables of United Kingdom Cases
A Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in the United Kingdom
1986-1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Breach of shareholders’ agreement
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
• Unlawful / irregular conduct of company’s affairs
• Failure to pay adequate dividends
• Misappropriation of company property
• Share transfer in breach of articles
• Failure to disclose information during takeover
• Director’s conflict of interest
• Delay in convening shareholders’ meeting
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
Derivative action:
• Diverting company business
• Breach of receiver’s duties to company
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
1
1
1
1
Enforcement of class rights in articles 1
Improper variation of class rights (sec 125) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholder 1
Injunction:
• Restraining improper resolution at shareholders’ meeting 1
Misleading statement in prospectus 2
Irregular conduct of shareholders’ meeting 2
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 2 3
Just and equitable winding up (sec 517 / Insolvency Act 1986
sec 122) 5 2
Total claims by shareholders: 19 22
210
No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Order that shareholders’ meeting be held (sec 371) 3 1
Specific performance of share transfer contract 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Unfair alteration of articles
• Enforcement of shareholders’ agreement
• Withholding financial support from subsidiary
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
• Misuse of company assets
• Inadequate directors’ remuneration
• Excessive directors’ remuneration
• Refusal to transfer asset to director
• Exclusion from management / breakdown in directors’
relationship
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
21
2
4
Just and equitable winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 122) 13
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 1
Valuation of shares 1
Injunction:
• Restraining removal of director 2
Invalid removal of director 1
Total claims by directors: 50 9
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Restoration of company to register (sec 653) 2 1
Guarantee of company debt 4
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to creditors 1
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 238) 1
Misfeasance / breach of duty (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 212) 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1 1
Personal liability on company cheque (Bills of Exchange Act
1882 sec 26) 1
Inducing breach of contract by company 1
Incorrectly stating company name (sec 349) 5
Examination of director (sec 561) 1
Personal liability of receiver for company debt 1
Injunction:
• Restraining disclosure of confidential poll vote 1
Administrator managing company’s affairs in a manner
prejudicial to creditors (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 27) 1
Recovery of money traceable as money of creditor 1
Insolvent winding up (sec 518 / Insolvency Act 1986 sec 123) 5 2
Total claims by creditors: 23 8
No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Restoration of company to register (sec 651) 2
Total claims by outside parties: 2 0
No. of Cases
Litigation by Receivers and managers / administrators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Production of company documents (Insolvency Act 1986 sec
236) 3 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company 1 1
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 236) 1
Financial assistance to purchase company’s own shares (sec
156) 1
Total claims by outside parties: 5 3
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No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and skill
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty to act in company’s best interests
1
2
1
2
1
Recovery of money withdrawn from company 1
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 1
Failure to disclose interest (sec 317) 1 3
Delivery of company documents by receiver 1
Total claims by the company: 5 10
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Production of company documents (Insolvency Act 1986 sec
236) 1 1
Directors’ duties:
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214) 3
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 238) 2
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 239) 4
Misfeasance / breach of duty (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 212) 5
Fraudulent trading (Companies Act 1985 sec 630) 3 1
Recovery of money withdrawn from company 1
Examination of director / receiver (sec 561) 2 2
Total claims by liquidators: 21 4
Total Claims 1986-1993: 125 56
Average Claims per Year: 15.6 7
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year:679 1.4 0.6
                                                
679 See table of United Kingdom company registrations, following Table F of this appendix, for
figures used in these calculations. The average number of claims per year is divided by the average
number of companies on the register in the United Kingdom for the relevant period.
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B Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in the United Kingdom 1986-
1993
No. of Cases
Litigation by the DTI (Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry / Official Receiver)
Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Winding up in public interest (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 124A) 3 1
Directors’ duties:680
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214)
1
8
Disqualification of director (sec 300 / Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 sec 6) 35 7
Investigation of company’s affairs (sec 432 / Financial
Services Act 1986 sec 105) 3
Injunction:
• Restraining breach of Financial Services Act 1986 1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 221) 10 1
Recoupment of payments made to employees from redundancy
fund (sec 196) 1
Failure to provide returns concerning receivership (Companies
Act 1948 sec 342) 1
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 239) 1 1
Unlawful loan to director (sec 330) 1
Breach of contract (as assignee of investors in failed company) 1
Total claims by the DTI: 61 15
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Insider dealing (Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act
1985 sec 2) 4
Breach of Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 1
Fraudulent trading (sec 458 / Companies Act 1948 sec 332) 2
Liability of director for offence by company (Fire Precautions
Act 1971 sec 23) 1
Total claims by the Crown: 2 6
                                                
680 These claims were all made in association with claims by the Secretary of State for the
disqualification of directors under sec 300 of the Companies Act 1985 or sec 6 of the Company
Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
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Total Claims 1986-1993: 63 21
Average Claims per Year: 7.9 2.6
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.7 0.2
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C Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in the United Kingdom 1994-
1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Transfer of company business at undervalue
• Breach of fiduciary duty to company
• Unlawful / irregular conduct of company’s affairs
• Misappropriation of company property
• Excessive directors’ remuneration
• Unfair dividend policy
• Removal of director
• Failure to comply with Stock Exchange listing rules
• Failure to comply with pre-emptive rights provision in
articles
1
2
4
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
Derivative action:
• Diverting company business 1
Order that shareholders’ meeting be held (sec 371) 1 1
Breach of share transfer provision in articles 1
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 5 2
Just and equitable winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 122) 4
Total claims by shareholders: 22 10
No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Order that directors’ meeting be held (sec 371) 1
Order that shareholders’ meeting be held (sec 371) 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Misappropriation of company property
• Excessive directors’ remuneration
• Exclusion from management / breakdown in directors’
relationship
1
1
6 2
Just and equitable winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 122) 3
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 3
Breach of receiver’s duties 1
Shares held by directors as constructive trustees 1
Recovery of money withdrawn from company 1
Financial assistance to purchase company’s own shares (sec
151) 1
Total claims by directors: 19 3
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Restoration of company to register (sec 651, 653) 2
Guarantee of company debt 1 2
Breach of covenant to maintain assets 1
Misrepresentation 1
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 423) 1
Liability for knowing receipt 1
Company with prohibited name (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 216) 1
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 239) 1
Ultra vires transaction 1
Insolvent winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 123) 1
Total claims by creditors: 5 8
No. of Cases
Litigation by Outside parties: clients, principals, auditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Restoration of company to register (sec 651) 1
Tort:
• Negligence 2
Total claims by outside parties: 2 1
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Duty to take account of creditors’ interests
• Fiduciary duty to company 1
1
2
Enforcement of restraint of trade covenant 1
Invalid directors’ resolution 2
Failure to disclose interest (sec 317) 1
Voidable transaction with director (sec 320, 330) 1 2
Total claims by the company: 3 8
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Production of company documents (Insolvency Act 1986 sec
236) 5 2
Directors’ duties:
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214) 4 2
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 238) 1
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 239) 2
Misfeasance / breach of duty (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 212) 3 1
Fraudulent trading (Companies Act 1948 sec 332) 1
Restoration of company to register (sec 651) 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Liability for carrying on business with less than 2 members
(sec 24) 1
Financial assistance to purchase company’s own shares (sec
151) 1
Recovery of money withdrawn from company 1
Liquidator’s remuneration from company assets (Insolvency
Act 1986 sec 115) 1
Total claims by liquidators: 19 9
Total Claims 1994-1998: 70 39
Average Claims per Year: 14 7.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 1.2 0.7
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D Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in the United Kingdom 1994-
1998
No. of Cases
Litigation by the DTI (Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry / Official Receiver)
Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Disqualification of director (Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 sec 6) 38 13
Winding up in public interest (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 124A) 8 2
Company with misleading name (sec 32) 1
Company with prohibited name (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 216) 1
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to creditors
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214)
3
2
11
1
1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 221) 10 1
Failure to provide statement of affairs of company in
receivership (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 47) 1
Failure to disclose interest 1
Carrying on insurance business contrary to Insurance
Companies Act 1982 3
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 239) 1
Total claims by the DTI: 78 20
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Acting as director while disqualified (Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 sec 11) 2
Fraudulent trading (sec 458) 2
Company with prohibited name (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 216) 1
Insider dealing (Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act
1985 sec 1) 1
Liability for offence by company (Control of pollution Act
1974 sec 87) 1
Total claims by the Crown: 5 2
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Total Claims 1994-1998: 83 22
Average Claims per Year: 16.6 4.4
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 1.4 0.4
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E Litigation Commenced by Private Enforcers in the United Kingdom 1999-
2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by Shareholders Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Misappropriation of company property
• Unfair alteration of articles
• Failure to complete share transfer in a fair and reasonable
manner
• Breakdown in shareholders’ relationship
2 2
1
1
1
Derivative action:
• Breach of directors’ fiduciary duties
• Company claim against outside party for fraud
1
1
Failure to disclose information relating to takeover 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1 2
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders 1 2
Misrepresentation inducing share transfer 1
Unfair compulsory share acquisition (sec 429) 3
Unfair reduction in share capital (sec 137) 1
Invalid share transfer 1
Members’ right to access share register (sec 356) 1
Breach of share purchase agreement 2
Order that shareholders’ meeting be held (sec 371) 1
Total claims by shareholders: 7 19
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No. of Cases
Litigation by Directors (including shareholder/ directors) Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors’ duties:
• Fiduciary duty to shareholders 1
Unfairly prejudicial conduct (sec 459):
• Exclusion from management / breakdown in directors’
relationship
• Refusing access to company accounts
• Failure to follow share transfer provisions in articles
• Improper transfer of control
13
1
2
2
1
Just and equitable winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 122) 2
Breach of contractual duty of confidence 1
Failure to disclose interest (sec 317) 1
Tort:
• Passing off 1
Rectification of share register (sec 359) 1
Failure to follow share transfer provision in articles 1
Total claims by directors: 24 3
No. of Cases
Litigation by Creditors Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Insolvent winding up (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 123) 1
Guarantee of company debt 1
Director acting without authority (sec 36A) 1 1
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 238, 423) 2 1
Misrepresentation inducing investment 1
Funds held by receiver on trust 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Misfeasance / Breach of duty (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 212) 1
Total claims by creditors: 7 4
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No. of Cases
Litigation by the Company Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Proper purpose
4 5
1
Recovery of unauthorised payments 1 1
Recovery of unlawfully paid dividends (sec 263) 1 2
Recovery of unlawful loan to director (sec 341) 2
Tort:
• Breach of confidence 2
Failure to disclose interest (Companies Act 1948 sec 199) 1
Total claims by the company: 9 11
No. of Cases
Litigation by Liquidators Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Production of company documents held by receiver (Insolvency
Act 1986 sec 236) 1
Directors duties:
• Fiduciary duty to company
• Duty of care and skill
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214)
2
1
2
Transaction at undervalue (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 238) 2 1
Carrying on business with intent to defraud (Insolvency Act
1986 sec 238) 1 2
Voidable preference (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 231) 1
Liquidators’ remuneration from company assets (Insolvency
Act 1986 sec 115) 1
Examination of director (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 236)) 1
Tort:
• Negligence 1
Total claims by liquidators: 11 5
Total Claims 1999-2002: 58 42
Average Claims per Year: 14.5 10.5
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.9 0.7
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F Litigation Commenced by Public Enforcers in the United Kingdom 1999-
2002
No. of Cases
Litigation by the DTI (Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry / Official Receiver)
Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Winding up in public interest (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 124A) 7 4
Directors’ duties:
• Duty of care and skill
• Insolvent trading (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 214)
2
4
3
Disqualification of director (Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 sec 6) 23 11
Appointment of inspectors (sec 436) 1
Examination of directors (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 133, 235) 1 1
Failure to keep proper accounting records (sec 221) 2 1
Unlawful trading scheme (Fair Trading Act 1973 sec 120) 1 1
Just and equitable winding up (Companies Act 1998 (Cayman
Islands) sec 94) 1
Total claims by the DTI: 40 23
No. of Cases
Litigation by the Crown Closely Held
Companies
Widely Held
Companies
Failure to deliver company books to liquidator (Insolvency Act
1986 sec 208) 1
Fraudulent removal of company property (Insolvency Act 1986
sec 206) 1
Company with prohibited name (Insolvency Act 1986 sec 216) 1
Fraudulent trading (sec 458) 2
Total claims by the Crown: 5 0
Total Claims 1999-2002: 45 23
Average Claims per Year: 11.3 5.8
Average Claims per 100,000 Registered
Companies per Year: 0.7 0.4
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United Kingdom Company Registrations 1986-2002
Year Companies on Register681
1986 1,057,600
1987 1,066,300
1988 1,115,300
1989 1,133,200
1990 1,175,400
1991 1,186,900
1992 1,180,200
1993 1,136,400
1994 1,119,700
1995 1,124,200
1996 1,165,500
1997 1,244,000
1998 1,323,100
1999 1,422,900
2000 1,510,500
2001 1,595,500
2002 1,658,200
                                                
681 Company registration figures in the United Kingdom for 1986 to 2002 were supplied in response
to an email request to Companies House:    enquiries@companies-house.gov.uk   .
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